

UTDRAG FRÅ DEN LEKSIKRYPTISKE ENCYKLOPEDI

Panposidonianisme. Nedsettande term for ei feilaktig oppfatning om at den stoiske filosofen Poseidonios (ca. 135 f.kr. – ca. 50 f.kr.) var det intellektuelle opphavet til ei stor mengd tankar og idear. Poseidonios var eit universalgeni, som det vert sagt beherska all kunnskap i samtida. I den tyske tradisjonen av Quellenforschung, vart det vanleg, på nokså lite grunnlag, å gje Poseidonios æra for intellektuelt arbeid som i røynda skriv seg frå andre tenkjarar.

Pansofi (av gr. *πᾶν* «alt» og *σοφία* «visdom»). Lære om at fullstendig vitskapleg, teologisk og filosofisk innsikt er tett knytt i hop og berre kan verte oppnådd saman. Opphavsmannen til pansofien var den tsjekkiske filosofen Johann Amos Comenius (1592–1670), som òg vert rekna for å vere grunnleggjaren av pedagogikken som vitskap. Gjennom nyskapande lærebøker, som var mykje brukt i samtidas europeiske grunnskular, og meir filosofiske/teoretiske verk, har Comenius og pansofien hatt stor innverknad på seinare utdanningsteori.

Den gjennomgripande tanken som prega dei pansofisk orienterte arbeida til Comenius, var at alle aspekt ved tilværet heng nøye saman, og difor må dei forståast i samanheng med kvarandre. Vidare meinte han at all utdanning må ha som formål å utdanne kvart menneske fram mot universell kunnskap og visdom. Til grunn for pansofien ligg dei pedagogiske og teologiske ideane som Comenius utarbeidde og stod for.

Pansofien baserer seg på eit konkret syn på mennesket sitt forhold til Gud; sidan mennesket er skapt av Gud, er det ibuande godt. På den andre sida vert vi ikkje født med den naudsynte kunnskapen til å ha denne og mange andre viktige innsikter. Konsekvensen er at vi ikkje klarar å forstå tilhøvet vårt til Gud og verda. Formålet med å søkje pansofisk innsikt er i hovudsak av praktisk og religiøs art, for slik innsikt kan mellom anna vere med på å framskude Jesu tilbakevending til jorda.

Mennesket må gjennom mykje opplæring for å oppnå ein pansofisk tilstand, og Comenius såg på menneskelivet som ei utdanning som startar ved fødselen og held fram så lenge ein lever. I verket *Didactica Magna* («Den store utdanningslæra») skildrar han korleis menneska bør utdannast gjennom livet, og dette forankrar han i tanken om at mennesket er det høgaste og mest absolutte vesenet, og at livet berre er ei førebuing for æva. I forlenginga av dette krev pansofien òg at alle menneske skal ha rett til utdanning, uavhengig av kjønns og sosial status.

Comenius ønskte å bringe saman filosofi (mennesket), teologi (det heilage) og vitskap (naturen), som for mennesket ofte kan verke å vere disiplinær som tek for seg åtskilte sider ved tilværet. Fordi kvar av dei berre kan gje oss kunnskap om enkelte delar av den universelle sanninga, ser dei ut til å gå dårleg overeins. Ved å oppnå verkeleg pansofisk innsikt vil ein sjå korleis dei utfyller og harmonerer med kvarandre.

Innanfor fleire aspekt av tenkinga si la Comenius vekt på det universelle. Ikkje berre skulle kunnskapen ein lærte i skulen vere så universell som mogleg, men også universelle læremåtar og høgskular, kor ein får innføring i alle pansofiens sider, var sentralt. Comenius gjekk faktisk så langt som å åtvare mot å tru at ulike områder og problem har spesifikke metodar knytt til seg. Kunnskapen ein tileignar seg har eit universelt grunnlag som ein kan finne fram til a priori. Ved hjelp av pansofiske skular og høgskular kan ein styre vitskapen si utvikling i ei einskapleg pansofisk retning.

Comenius var respektert i samtida som ein dyktig pedagog, sjølv om det er meir usikkert kor mange som var einige i dei underliggjande ideane hans. Han vart mellom anna kritisert av René Descartes, som ønskte å halde vitskap og teologi åtskilt. Descartes avviste dermed pansofien sin underliggjande premiss om einskap mellom filosofi, teologi og vitskap. Men sjølv om tankane til Comenius hadde låg status under opplysningstida har dei pedagogiske ideane om universell opplæring, og mange av dei innovative læringsmetodane hans, vore viktige for utdanningsteoretikarar, også fram til vår tid. **A.M.**

Personleg idealisme (også kjend som California personalism). Metafysisk teori som byggjer på idear om menneskeleg fridom og ein demokratisk Gud. George Holmes Howison (1834–1916) utarbeidde denne teorien i opposisjon til Boston personalism.

Cambridge University Press). The definition Martin refers to is given in Ch. 1, pp. 19–20. Roughly, Jackson defines ‘mediately seeing X’ as ‘seeing X in virtue of seeing something else Y’, and then ‘immediately seeing X’ as ‘seeing X not in virtue of seeing something else Y’.

⁷ Clarke, T. (1965) ‘Seeing Surfaces and Seeing Objects’, in M. Black (ed.) *Philosophy in America* (London: George Allen and Unwin), pp. 98–114. According to Clarke, the context will determine whether you see the tomato or just a part of it, just as it can determine whether you nibble at a whole cheese or just the part of it affected by your nibbling. The fact that you see the tomato ‘in virtue of’ seeing its surface or that you nibble at the cheese ‘in virtue of’ nibbling a part of it doesn’t show that you see or nibble ‘indirectly’. Clarke thus provides the materials for undermining Jackson’s position – well before Jackson’s work came out. ⁸ The argument from illusion comes in various forms, but in its basic form, it says that in cases of illusion, we must be aware of something which *has* the properties we are aware of in the experience. For instance, if a straight stick immersed in water seems to be bent, then I am aware of something which is in fact bent. And if we are aware of things different from ordinary objects in illusion, it is reasonable to suppose that these are the kind of things we are always aware of. Like the argument set out in note 5, then, the argument from illusion purports to establish that we are only ‘indirectly’ aware of the ordinary objects around us, that is, only in virtue of a more ‘direct’ awareness of mental or at least non-physical items – ‘sense-data’, in Moore’s term.

⁹ Martin discusses the argument from hallucination in various articles. See in particular his (2004) ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’, *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 120, Nos. 1–3, pp. 37–89 and (forth) *Uncovering Appearances* (unpublished, available at <http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/chapters.htm>), Ch. 3. The latter work in particular covers many of the issues discussed in the interview in much more detail.

¹⁰ One might raise the worry here that the experience’s being constitutively sufficient for the existence of the presented element might not entail mind-dependence (the interviewer raised this worry after the interview). For instance, it is part and parcel of naïve realism that perception cannot occur in the absence of the presented element. Hence, perception guarantees that the presented element exists. To allay this worry (as Martin explained it), one must note that (2) is understood as asking whether the experience is *wholly* constitutive of the presented element, and hence whether the existence of the presented element depends on the existence of the experience (though we don’t have to understand (1) that way; the issue there is whether the presented element is at least *partly* constitutive of the experience). If the experience were not wholly constitutive of the object of awareness, then the occurrence of the experience would not be sufficient to explain its existence (even if it guaranteed it), and one would then face a problem in setting out the causal argument from hallucination: One would have to explain why the causally sufficient conditions for bringing about the experience should be able to ensure the obtaining of all of the conditions necessary for the experience to occur.

¹¹ Burnyeat, M. (1979) ‘Conflicting Appearances’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 65, pp. 69–111.

¹² Harman, G. (1990) ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 31–52.

¹³ Martin, M. G. F. (2000) ‘Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality, and the Mind–Body Problem’, in T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.) *The History of the Mind–Body Problem* (London: Routledge); (2003) ‘Sensible Appearances’, in T. Baldwin (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1870–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); (2007) ‘Austin: Sense and Sensibilia Revisited’, unpublished. All three articles are available online through <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/view/col-lections/iplpp.html>.

¹⁴ In this perspective, the discussion of ‘mental paint’ is a descendant

of earlier discussions of sensationalism. For a recent paper, see Block, N. (2010) ‘Attention and Mental Paint’, *Philosophical Issues*, Vol. 20: Philosophy of Mind, pp. 23–63.

¹⁵ See Martin, M. (2000) ‘Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality, and the Mind–Body Problem’, in T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.) *The History of the Mind–Body Problem* (London: Routledge), in particular pp. 218ff, and Martin (forth) *Uncovering Appearances* (reference given in note 9), in particular, Ch. 1, pp. 32–3 and Ch. 3, pp. 8–14.

¹⁶ See note 9 above.

¹⁷ Searle sets out his views on perception in his (1983) *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch. 2; see in particular pp. 45–6 and 57–8.

¹⁸ What even disjunctivists must accept in the argument from hallucination, Martin argues, is that the kind of mental state present in a hallucination will also be present in a genuine perception, given the same neural bases. What the disjunctivist denies, of course, is that this common kind is the most specific kind that the perception falls under; the existence of a kind in common between the states is consistent with the existence of more basic kinds that only one of them falls under. Yet this commonality severely constrains our positive characterization of hallucination: Suppose, for instance, that the disjunctivist tried to hold that phenomenology of hallucination were constituted by sensational properties. Since the same neural processes would also be present in genuine perception, perception would also have the same sensational properties. But since the disjunctivist also holds that the phenomenology of perception is constituted by the properties of the objects perceived, we have a problematic kind of overdetermination, seemingly leaving the instantial properties explanatorily redundant. This is the ‘screening-off’ problem, to which Martin responds by denying that there is such any characterization to be given for hallucinations. All we can say about the kind of state occurring in hallucination is that its instances are indistinguishable from perceptions; we cannot know merely by reflecting on the state on is in that it isn’t a perception (this much is of course in common between hallucination and perception, since everything is indistinguishable from itself). What we cannot allow is a ‘substantive’ commonality consisting in, say, awareness of sense-data. Martin provides a much fuller discussion in his (2004) ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’ (reference given in note 9 above) and his (2006) ‘On Being Alienated’, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) *Perceptual Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 354–410.

¹⁹ J. M. Hinton (1967) ‘Experiences’, *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 66, pp. 1–13; (1973) *Experiences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

²⁰ See Burge, T. (2005) ‘Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology’, *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1–78, p. 29: “It is fairly unusual, at least since the days of Descartes and Newton, for philosophical views to be as directly at odds with scientific knowledge as disjunctivism is. Hegel’s claim that there are seven planets springs to mind.” (In fairness to Hegel, it should be noted that the popular legend – that he gave an a priori ‘proof’ that there are seven planets just before Neptune was discovered – seems to be incorrect. See Beaumont, B. (1954) ‘Hegel and the Seven Planets’, *Mind* (New Series), Vol. 63, No. 250, pp. 246–8; Craig, E. and Hoskin, M. (1992) ‘Hegel and the Seven Planets’, *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, Vol. 23, pp. 208–10.)

²¹ Another point is that sense-datum theorists, with whom naïve realists share the commitment to actualism, did not think of awareness of sense data in terms of representation, but rather as a primitive relation (often called ‘acquaintance’). Now, naïve realists agree with intentionalists when it comes to the objects of perception. But does this in itself also mean that they must depart from the sense-datum theorists’ construal of the relation of awareness?

²² Armstrong sets out his view most famously in his (1968) *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), Ch. 10. For Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘seeing as’, see his (1953/2001) *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell), Part II, Sect. xi.