SANNHET

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SANNHET

Alle bryr seg om sannhet, ikke sant? Enhver debatt, uansett om den er praktisk eller teoretisk, tar utgangspunkt i at to eller flere parter peker på forskjellige ting og kaller det sant. En dom i retten kan ikke felles uten at noe samtidig holdes for sant. Vitenskapen har objektivt sanne teorier som mål, mens god diktning kan sies å uttrykke det som er sant om oss selv. Mediene skal helst formidle det som er sant, i likhet med det meste av kommunikasjon – selv ironi forutsetter en implisitt sannhet for å være vellykket. Men bare filosofien har sannheten selv som studieobjekt.

Der noen besvarer spørsmålet «Hva er sannhet?», har andre omformulert det til «Hva må til for at noe skal være sant?» og sett på rollen sannhetspredikatet spiller i språket. Så ofte, og i så mange former, dukker sannheten opp, at det innen filosofien fremstår som nærmest uunngåelig å ha en formening om den. Selv filosofer som benekter sannhetens metafysiske eksistens er nødt til å ta stilling til sannhetsbegrepet.

Carsten Martin Hansen diskuterer nettopp *deflasjonismen* i sin artikkel «Is Truth a Property?» til vår faste spalte *Fra forskningsfronten.* Han argumenterer for at så lenge kognitive vitenskaper implisitt benytter seg av sannhetsbegrepet gjennom ideer om representasjon, vil deflasjonismens påstander vanskelig kunne forsvares.

Blant versjonene av deflasjonisme hører også det Horwich kaller *minimalism.* Mariona Sturm drøfter i sin artikkel «Minimalism's Minimal Choice of Truth Bearers» hva som kvalifiserer til å være sannhetsbærer. Sturm går gjennom sentrale aspekter ved Horwichs minimalisme og argumenterer blant annet for at han ikke kan la proposisjoners natur stå uspesifisert, slik han hevder, men er nødt til å definere dem ganske spesifikt.

Et annet sentralt spørsmål er hvorvidt det finnes flere typer sannhet. «Hva er sannhet?» spurte Pontus Pilatus, og den kristne teologien har vært opptatt av det samme. Broder Antoine Lévy tar for seg Edith Steins imaginære dialog mellom Aquinas og Husserl, og diskuterer metafysikkens rolle som en språklig megler mellom vitenskapens sannhet og teologiens Sannhet. Og senere i bladet, i spalten *Leksikryptisk*, blir vi presentert for Thomas Aquinas' tese om transcendental ekvivalens, som står for at transcendentaler – fenomener som væren, sannhet og godhet – ontologisk sett er én og samme ting.

Søken etter sannhet kan på mange måter være søken etter det utildekte. Fabelen forteller at Løgnen snek seg av gårde med Sannhetens klær etter et bad i lag, og Sannheten ville heller forbli naken enn å kle seg opp i Løgnens drakt. I artikkelen «The Artwork as Happening» skriver Inger Bakken Pedersen om *The Origin of the Work of Art* og Heideggers påstand om at kunstverkets væren er en sannhetshendelse. Sannhetshendelsen skjer som kampen mellom verden og jorden i urstriden. Pedersen diskuterer hvorvidt Dasein kan ha en aktiv rolle i kunstverket qua sannhetshendelse.

Er det sant at Aristoteles utviklet sine sentrale filosofiske posisjoner som motargumenter mot Platon? UiOs nyansatte professor i antikkens filosofi, Thomas Kjeller Johansen, forteller i intervjuet at forholdet mellom Platon og Aristoteles gjerne er mer komplisert enn som så. Johansen sammenlikner Platons former med Aristoteles' universalier, drøfter de to filosofenes syn på teleologi samt diskuterer relevansen antikkens filosofi har i den moderne filosofidebatten.

Tomas Stølen har oversatt den tysk-jødiske filosofen Moses Mendelssohns «Om spørsmålet: Hva betyr det å opplyse?». Mendelssohn ser på opplysning fra et danningsteoretisk perspektiv og argumenterer for at opplysning og kultur er gjensidig avhengige aspekter ved danning. Han hevder at sannheter som kan være nyttig for mennesket om menneske kan være skadelig for mennesket som borger.

Dataprogrammering, som få forstår men alle er avhengige av, tar på eget vis kjente sannhetsbegreper i bruk. Professor ved institutt for informatikk ved UiO, Jan Tore Lønning, går i denne utgavens *I praksis* gjennom forskjellige måter begrepet sannhet opptrer på i møtet med datamaskinene.

Til tross for, eller kanskje på grunn av, at sannhet er et begrep vi omgir oss med nesten hele tiden, er det vanskelig å definere. I denne utgaven presenterer og diskuteres flere filosofiske teorier om sannhet. Men spørsmålet er: «Er de sanne?»

God lesning!

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

MINIMALISM'S MINIMAL CHOICE OF TRUTH BEARERS[1]

How minimalistic is Paul Horwich's 'minimal' theory of truth? As the theory presupposes the meanings of words in its treatment of the concept of truth, minimalism is restricted to a theory of meaning that doesn't use the very same concept in order to understand meaning. This is especially vivid when considering truth bearers – the sort of things that can be true or false – as the most plausible, and certainly the most developed, account of the different truth bearers are indeed incompatible with minimalism. This essay is mostly devoted to refute some of Horwich's claims on the subject-matter, but it will be noted that the way he answers to the critique makes minimalism a much more substantial choice than intended as it excludes most theories of meaning.

By Mariona Eiren Bohlin Sturm

In this essay I will argue that minimalism is strongly restricted as to what kinds of entities it can take as its primary truth bearers, the kinds of entities that can be true or false. 'Minimalism' is Paul Horwich's brand of deflationism; a view of truth characterised by the belief that the only important use of the truth predicate is how it enables us to make generalisations. As this use can be fully accounted for by the various instances of what is often called the 'equivalence schema', nothing commits us to postulate that 'truth' names a property of a substantial sort there for us to discover the nature of. In minimalism, the primary bearers of truth and falsity are taken to be propositions, but Horwich argues that nothing important turns on this as one could easily create a minimalism with statements, utterances, or different propositional attitudes such as beliefs and hopes, as the primary bearers of truth (1990:108–9). In addition, he claims that he is not committed to one specific understanding of the nature of propositions but that minimalism is compatible with most, if not all, of the different accounts of what propositions are (1990:18). But, minimalism takes the meanings of words as given when analysing the concept of truth, and this, contrary to Horwich's claim, strongly restricts how 'proposition', 'utterance', 'sentence', and so on, can be understood. Specifically, minimalism is incompatible with a truth-conditional theory of meaning, and any other theory that explains meaning in terms of truth. Horwich presupposes a *use theory* of meaning, which – of course – is compatible with minimalism, but it does not give the wide variety of ways to understand what propositions are which he needs if his second claim is to come out true.

In the following, I will first give an outline of the deflationary conception of truth, to make minimalism more comprehensible, before I in the second section turn to that specific version of deflationism. I will then give a brief account of the use theory of meaning, which will become important in later discussions of truth bearers. Having laid down this theoretical background, I will turn to truth bearers in section three. After giving a general introduction to the field I will go through a few different proposals as to what entities can be true or false in some detail. Here I will argue that of all the different types considered, only sentence types and tokens (and propositions, which will be discussed in the section following) are plausible as truth bearers. In section four I will briefly go through different specifications of the nature of propositions; they are handled on their own because the nature of propositions is a complex topic, and because they are the main choice of

Illustrasjon: Yin Yi Look

(primary) truth bearers in minimalism. Here I will show that Horwich's claim that he can leave the nature of propositions unspecified does not hold, and then give a brief outline of the use of theoretical notions of propositions that minimalism *can* be combined with. In the fifth and last section I will show how he formulates minimalism in a way that is based on linguistic entities rather than propositions. I will conclude that even if Horwich indeed can construct a version of minimalism that is not specified for propositions, which I believe he can, he is still forced to give a quite specific account of the meaning of both linguistic entities and propositions. In light of the discussion of section three we can see that neither of his claims to the effect that minimalism can assume a variety of truth bearers hold: All except for two kinds of entities are implausible as the primary bearers of truth and falsity, and they in turn have to be understood in a quite specific way.

I

In this essay I will not discuss topics such as the value of truth, truthfulness, or the truth predicate as it figures in sentences like 'She is a true leader'.[2] Instead I will discuss the truth predicate as it is used in sentences like 'What you say is true' and 'It's true that the velociraptor was about the size of a turkey', i.e. restrict the use of the predicate to things that on the face of it can be properly called true or false. This does presuppose some of the discussion to come, but for simplicity I will continue to write restricted by this, even though the reasons for it will become evident only later on.

The central use of the truth predicate is as a generalisation-making device, especially in connection with 'blind' ascriptions of beliefs, wishes, hopes, and other intentional states. If we want to generalise over sentences of the form 'Peter is a human', 'Frank is a human', 'Carl is a human', and so on, we can do this by saying 'For every *x*, *x* is a human'. But some generalisations cannot be made simply by adding a(n objectual) quantifier and changing names for variables. Say we want to generalise over instances of more complex sentences, such as 'Nothing is both wet and not wet, or green and not green, or…'. We can do that by saying that 'Every sentence of the form "Nothing is both *F* and not *F*" is true' (see e.g. Horwich 1995:359; Quine 1970:11). Now, without using the truth predicate, the generalisation could read 'For every *z*, no *z* is both *F* and not *F*', but here the variable stands in both for sentences and whatever it is that is expressed by sentences (if we are truthful to the interpretation of the original sentence, of course). This is clearly troublesome. To continue this Quinean analysis,[3] by 'semantically ascending' to talk of sentences the variable's double role is avoided, and by adding the truth predicate the ascent is nullified, so to speak, and ensures that we are not just talking about the sentence mentioned. This case is parallel to blind ascriptions of truth. Say you hold your uncle in the highest esteem and believe everything he says to be true, but did not quite catch what he just said. You could say 'Whatever my uncle says is true' and thus ascribe truth to whatever he said blindly, as it were, as you predicate something (namely truth) of what you do not know the nature of. As in the foregoing case, you could instead of using the truth predicate partly express this belief by an infinite disjunction, 'If my uncle said 'Frege is a gentleman', then Frege is a gentleman, or if my uncle said 'water is wet', then water is wet, or…'. This is a list of instances of the schema "S' is true iff S,' which we can call the 'disquotational schema' for the way it specifies the truth condition of the quoted sentence by the use of the same sentence on the other side of the biconditional. This infinite disjunction will only be partly expressed, because mortals such as yourself have problems expressing infinities. In section II I will – briefly – discuss yet another way to express the desired generalisation, namely, by substitutional generalisation.

The (central) use we have for the truth predicate, then, is as a device for making generalisations. Now, it is not controversial that the truth predicate functions in the ways described, although it could have other uses besides this.[4] But, two main approaches to understanding truth divide over whether, when one has shown this, one has said all there is to say about truth: One is deflationary and the other we can call 'inflationary'. We can, roughly, characterise deflationism as a family of theories that holds that, after accounting for this use, there is no need to postulate a genuine, interesting property of truth: Everything we need the predicate for is already accounted for. A theory counts as inflationary if it denies this. Remember that when giving a theory of truth, what we aim for is to explain our notion as it actually is (alternatively, as it should be) and not to make up some elegant, but irrelevant, way to understand truth. The inflationary accusation is that by accounting for the use of the truth predicate in making generalisations, one does not succeed in giving the full story of our concept of truth.

> Insofar as this ['truth' functioning as merely a device for generalisation] can be shown, and since truth's ability to play that role requires nothing more or less than the disquotational schema, there can be no reason to suppose that truth has

> an underlying nature. Just because most of the properties we encounter have one, we should not assume that all do. (Horwich 1995:359)

As mentioned, the disquotational schema is the formalisation of the truth conditions of a sentence, "S' is true if and only if (iff) S' (e.g. 'Poets die young' is true iff poets die young). We will see much more of that schema in what follows; for now, it suffices to say that if the truth predicate functions merely as a generalisation device, in itself this does not exclude there being a genuine property of truth. But, the deflationist will say, we have no reason to postulate a genuine property of truth, as nothing more than that the instances of the schema holds is needed to account for its use in making generalisations, which we said was the only important use of the predicate. If the trivial disquotational schema can account for the predicate singlehandedly, as it were, this captures all that we need the concept of truth for and we need not look for a deeper nature. But why should we not assume that all predicates, like 'is true', 'is blue', 'is composed of sulphur', expresses a property that has an underlying nature of the interesting sort? Interesting, as in a sort that can surprise us when understanding it, something that is not fully captured by a tautology. Most predicates do (I assume) stand for what can be called a genuine property, so the default attitude towards them better be that all do. On the other – and well-known – hand, we do have predicates like 'exists', which if it stands for a genuine property at all, surely stands for an unusual one. The deflationist will hold that the above considerations give us enough reason to assume that 'is true' is an unusual predicate on par with 'exists'.

II

One of the contemporary deflationary theories of truth is Horwich's minimalism.[5] We can explain the theory as follows. Consider the disquotational schema, "S' is true iff S'. Minimalism claims that *all* there is to our notion of truth is captured by the schema and how the truth predicate is used when making generalisations. Earlier we saw that using the truth predicate is an elegant way to generalise over sentences that are somewhat complex by already being quantified, and generalise over and infer from 'blind' ascriptions in intentional contexts. Thus we can generalise 'Everything is either hot or not hot, blue or not blue, square or not square…' to 'Every S of the form 'either *q* or not *q*' is true'; and use the truth predicate in inferences from, e.g., 'What Oren said is true' and 'Oren said that octopuses are wonderful' to 'Octopuses are wonderful'.

This gives the function of the truth predicate. We (are disposed to) accept every[6] instance of the schema as a tautological truth about the truth conditions of the sentence in question, and if there is no other use of the truth predicate than the one outlined above, then the schema seems to be an appropriate vehicle for analysing truth. The schema we introduced earlier was for sentences; to talk (explicitly) about propositions we can write it like this:

<p> is true iff p

where '<p>' is to be read *the proposition that p*, i.e. the proposition that is to fill its place when giving instances of the schema. Horwich uses the term 'equivalence schema' for this schema, and that is the term I will continue to use in this essay. The equivalence schema can, as we saw, be constructed using propositions as the entity truth is predicated of, and appropriately enough shift the focus from the disquotation to the equivalence, i.e. from the shift from mention to use, to the equivalence between the (sentence expressing the) proposition and the condition for its truth. The various instances of the schema are all taken as axioms for the theory, and for this reason minimalism cannot be explicitly stated: The list of axioms for the theory is for the most part unrealised and (potentially) infinite. This point is formulated somewhat differently by Horwich when he says that minimalism cannot be explicitly stated because "the number of *formulatable* axioms is too great [and]… there are some propositions we cannot express" (1990:21). This is because of how languages develop – the expressions of some possible future instances of the schema are not yet available to us – and perhaps also because of the complexity of some expressions; but most of all because the quite possibly infinite list of instances is too great – infinitely much so – to formulate explicitly in a finite time by finite beings, i.e. without slipping into ellipses.

According to minimalism, the meaning of 'truth' is given by our disposition to accept instances of the schema (1990:38; 2004:351, note that this is based on a use theory of meaning); and all there is to the function of the truth predicate is how it lets us generalise over propositions in blind ascriptions (e.g. 'What he says is true'), without invoking substitutional quantification. "[I]f 'true' is simply a device of infinite conjunction [or disjunction], then we have a serious need for a predicate of truth only because (or, only *if*) we don't have a substitutional quantifier in English" (Field 1986:58). "An interpretation associates with [substitutional quantifiers] not a domain of quantification, but rather a substitution class … of linguistic

expressions of an appropriate syntactic category [such as verbs, nouns, etc.] in the initial language" (Uzquiano 2014). If we allow this form of non-objectual quantification, we can state the schema as follows, ranging over sentences expressing propositions (i.e. declarative sentences):

(p) <p> is true iff p

Thus we can get rid of the infinite axiomatisation while still being able to account for all the instances of our initial infinite disjunction.[7] That is, with substitutional quantification one could formulate minimalism explicitly as the theory that all there is to truth is that for every p, <p> is true iff p. Horwich will not use substitutional quantification in his theory as that, according to him, "would be a cumbersome addition to our language" (1990:33) as it would require "a battery of extra syntactic and semantic rules to govern the new type of quantifier" (1998:114; fn. 5). But the truth predicate's usefulness as a device for making generalisations is exactly what lets us avoid employing this new 'battery of rules': "The advantage of the truth predicate is that it … enables us to achieve the effect of generalizing substitutionally over sentences and predicates, but by means of ordinary variables (i.e. pronouns), which range over *objects"* (1990:5, fn. 1). I will assume with Field that if we indeed did use substitutional quantification in natural language, there would be no need for the truth predicate (if deflationists are right about its use as a generalisation device being its sole function), and I will continue to write as if we do not use that form of quantification in natural language. That said, I will not go further into the pros and cons of substitutional quantification in this essay, but keep to Horwich's formulations of his theory.

As both 'minimalism' and 'deflationism' indicates, the theory tries to keep the particular metaphysical implications to a minimum. But there is one issue minimalism, consisting of a vast – indeed, in(de)finite – amount of instances of the schema '<p> is true iff p', has to take a stand on, and that is which theory of meaning it can be combined with. The reason for this is twofold: The formulation presupposes an account of propositions (or another truth bearer, as we will see later on), and it presupposes that one understands the meaning of the words involved. This means that minimalism cannot be coupled with a semantic theory that explains meaning in terms of truth, lest it explains meaning in terms of truth and then goes on to explain truth by the self-same meaning. As a sub-constraint of this, propositions and any other possible truth bearer cannot be defined in terms of truth (conditions, values, or any other truth-theoretic notion). Important accounts of meaning are given in terms of truth-conditions, and these are then inaccessible to minimalism.

But there is one issue minimalism, consisting of a vast – indeed, in(de)finite – amount of instances of the schema '<p> is true iff p', has to take a stand on, and that is which theory of meaning it can be combined with.

Minimalism and any other similar deflationary theory can be matched with a theory that explains meaning "in terms of sameness of verification conditions or interpersonal sameness of conceptual role" (Field 1986:75). It is a version of the last that Horwich presupposes in his theory about truth, and has been developing in parallel with his minimalism (see e.g. his 1995; 1998; 2004). This theory, the 'use theory of meaning', purports to explain all the semantic facts in terms of non-semantic ones; specifically, in terms of human linguistic behaviour. The meaning of a word, Horwich says, is given by our disposition to use it in a certain way in certain situations. As a rough example, 'cat' means what it does in virtue of our disposition to accept sentences containing it, like 'That is a cat', when faced with sensory impressions of an individual that seems to be of the relevant species (2004:351). The use theory of meaning, if successful, reduces meaning to non-semantic behaviour:

> The non-intentional underlying natures of meaning-properties are basic regularities of use, explanatory fundamental generalizations about the circumstances in which words occur. For … it is on the basis of how words are used that we infer what is meant by them. (Horwich 1995:356)

"[M]eaning is a matter of the role an expression plays in human social behaviour. To know the expression's meaning is just to know how to deploy the expression appropriately in conversational settings" (Lycan 2008:76). This points to important aspects of language use and social interaction, but whether it is possible to reduce semantic to non-semantic facts and whether the facts in that case will be facts about regularity of use is debatable – but we will not take that debate here. In section IV I will go through some aspects of this theory in somewhat more detail. But I think it is important to note that a case *can* be made for a use theory of meaning, so that the choice is not best understood as that between a plausible, truth-conditional

theory of meaning, and an implausible semantic account required by minimalism.

III

Suppose I, on the 28th of April 2016, utter: 'Silver has atomic number 47', and suppose that this is true. What exactly is it that is true? Is it the sentence, either its type or token? Or is it the very utterance – that is, my act of making those very sounds? The proposition I express? The belief I express by uttering it sincerely? Why not all of them at once? Mostly in the literature on truth and truth bearers the authors argue that only one, at most some few, entities are the primary bearers of truth-value, and I will also continue to talk as if the choice of one entity as the primary truth bearer excludes others from this position.[8,9]

In the foregoing I have taken the liberty to digress from our main objective in quite a few places, but not more than was needed to give us enough background to start answering the question 'What kind(s) of entities can minimalism about truth take as the primary bearers of truth and falsity?' There are different considerations constraining this choice: general philosophical ones, those specific for the theory in question, and arguments deciding between the remaining options. Examples of the first includes theoretical virtues such as parsimony and explanatory power. The second includes, as we have just seen, how minimalism cannot take any entity that is explained in terms of truth as bearers of truth-value. And, lastly, from the possible entities left, some are more plausible as truth bearers than others for a variety of reasons. The first I will barely discuss. Theoretical virtues like these are, with good reason, so commonly accepted that every acceptable theory of truth will already have weighted them against other benefits of the theory. That is not to say that they don't play an important role in these debates; specifically, whether one weighs ontological parsimony or consistency with pre-theoretical beliefs as the more important principle will often influence one's views on propositions. But interesting as this is, we will only touch upon it where highly relevant. My focus here will be on the constraints and the options specific to minimalism.

Let me, briefly, go through some of the proposals as to what kinds of entities can be truth bearers before discussing the more plausible candidates in more detail. In his summary of what has been taken as truth bearers in the literature, Kirkham gives a list that includes sentence types, sentence tokens, statements, and propositions. Before you are relieved that there are so few kinds here, it is important

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to note that what these kinds *are* is very much debatable, and among the different proposals listed in Kirkham are: statements understood as the '*act* of uttering a sentence' (an event), and as 'the content of a declarative sentence'. As for propositions, they have been taken to be "what is common to a set of synonymous declarative sentences," "timeless, wordless entities," "what expressions in different grammatical moods have in common," and "the meanings of sentences *and* the objects of states of consciousness" (1995:55–56). Horwich gives a different list, including utterances understood as 'sounds and marks located in particular regions of space and time', sentence types, 'individual, localized actions or states of mind' such as statements and beliefs[10] (note the different ways 'statement' is understood here and in one of Kirkham's examples) and the 'content of such states': propositions (1990:17).

As should be clear by now, there is no consensus on what kinds are the fundamental bearers of truth-value, and using the same name does not ensure that it is the same entity you and your neighbour has in mind. As my discussion is centred on Horwich's minimalism, it is best to keep close to his understanding of the entities lest I attribute views to him that he doesn't hold. The second 'statement' in Kirkham's list (taken from Haack 1978:75–6) I will leave behind here: I do not think it a controversial view that 'statement' is reserved for the utterance or inscription of a declarative sentence and not at all to the content of one. Indeed, the content is, at least *prima facie*, taken to be a proposition. Horwich is perhaps not so well served by his grouping together of statements and intentional states, but it is clear enough that he takes them to be, respectively, 'individual, localized actions' and 'states of mind'. On the surface, minimalism can be comfortable with most of the different specifications of the nature of propositions as listed here, as they are about the content of sentences and intentional states, "the things that are believed, stated, supposed, etc[.]" (Horwich 1990:17). However, as we have seen and will get back to, every one of the specifications of the nature of propositions has to be made without reference to truth to be compatible with minimalism, which is easier said than done.

As should be clear by now, there is no consensus on what kinds are the fundamental bearers of truth-value, and using the same name does not ensure that it is the same entity you and your neighbour has in mind.

Presently I will go through the most relevant options of truth bearers and briefly discuss their pros and cons. I will argue that of the different entities listed in this section, only sentences (types and tokens) are of the right kind to be taken as truth bearers with any plausibility. The other linguistic entities and intentional states will be seen to either collapse into the content of such states and acts or to be highly implausible as truth bearers (though they might be called true or false in a derived and almost metaphorical way). I will leave a discussion of propositions for the next section.

i) Beliefs. In contrast to most of the items on this list, beliefs are not necessarily language dependent (although at least conscious beliefs often are). Beliefs are about something – which we can call the object of the belief – and in this sense they are interpersonally shareable. Yours and my belief that Vulcan would have been spherical if it indeed had been between Mercury and the Sun have the same content. By stipulation, the content is the propositional content; what this belief is about, and what we stand in the believe-relation to when we believe in it, is most often taken to be a proposition (for an additional defence of this claim see e.g. Horwich 1998:82, and Schiffer 2006:268–69). Beliefs understood as the particular acts of believing will not do as truth bearers: It is true that I believe that Vulcan would have been spherical, but that *my believing it* is true either gets the facts I try to express wrong as it then claims *that it is true that I now believe it* rather than *that the believing-it is true*, or, as in the last case, is a nonsensical expression with no support whatsoever from actual linguistic behaviour. We will meet this point again in connection with statements, assertions, and utterances.

One reason to take beliefs as truth bearers is their connection with actions – particularly the connection between successful action and true beliefs. This point is emphasised by Russell although he does not take them (but propositions) as the primary bearers of truth and falsity (e.g. 1919:43). So when he writes, "the property of being true or false is what specially characterises beliefs" (1919:25) this is to be understood in a derived sense: Truth or falsity is primarily a property of propositions, but a characteristic of beliefs is that they are about something which is true or false. So are wishes, hopes, fears, etc., but they lack the action-guiding link (roughly, the reason upon which you act) that motivates taking beliefs as truth bearers.[11] But let us get back to how this truth bearing could be understood. Deprived of the possibility of understanding *believing* as a truth bearer (because we found it to be nonsensical), what other choice do we have than to take the content of the

belief as the truth bearer? As mentioned, this belief-content is most readily taken to be a proposition (whatever its exact nature), so by taking the *content* of beliefs as truth bearers we move away from understanding *beliefs* thus. In addition we can assume that there are plenty of truths that are never believed and if beliefs are taken as truth bearers we have two ways of responding to this. Either our assumption is wrong, and there can indeed be no other truths than those believed, or something else is true in those cases, which would probably render taking beliefs as truth bearers redundant.[12] Beliefs are on Horwich's list over possible truth bearers, as an example of a state of mind. In a later section we will discuss in more detail how he reformulates minimalism such that it takes beliefs (and other states) as truth bearers, to show that minimalism is not necessarily bound up with propositions. It is worth noting that nowhere does he give reasons for taking them to be truth bearers, and I believe the foregoing supports the claim that it is implausible to take them as such.

ii) Statements and assertions. Horwich understands statements as "individual, localized actions" (1990:17) and more specifically a statement can be taken as an "action done to express an opinion" (dictionary.cambridge.org).[13] I will here understand a statement as the utterance or inscription of a declarative sentence, i.e. that we use a declarative sentence to make a statement, parallel to how an interrogative sentence often is used to make a question. A statement is paradigmatically used to convey information, and is an act or the product thereof. Is that an appropriate entity for being (in a non-derived sense) true or false? By being of a linguistic kind a statement is given meaning (or rather the other way around), which seems to be a necessary prerequisite for being a truth bearer. But I cannot see a way around taking that content itself rather than the act of expressing that content as being the truth bearer, unless one is to radically reinterpret our linguistic behaviour. And I cannot see that we have a desperate enough need for statements as fundamental bearers of truth-values to justify this radical move. Close to statements and also of a kind that has been taken as truth bearers are *assertions*. Assertions are statements in which one claims that what the sentence one states holds; it is an expression of the speaker's attitude towards the sentence, a judgment of the truth-value of statements. It is the additional 'assertoric force', to use Frege's phrasing, of the former that distinguishes assertions from statements. They are already coupled with a judgment of their truth-value and might thus be even less plausible as truth bearers, but here I will continue to focus on the two-readings problem it shares with statements. One can understand the claim that an assertion is a truth bearer as saying either that the act of asserting, or the content asserted, is the bearer of truth and falsity.[14] As was the case above, I cannot see a way to reconcile the first reading with our linguistic behaviour: My assertion in the foregoing sentence is *not* true. That assertion is the process, and the product of that process, of expressing my judgment; what my assertion is an assertion *of* is hopefully true. This is parallel to what we noted in connection with beliefs. We do not talk as if sounds or marks in themselves are true or false – nor should we. What distinguishes sounds and marks that cannot properly be said to be true from those that can is the meaning we give them. They are just vehicles we use to convey that meaning, for which we could just as well (if we got the rest of our language group in on it, that is) use something quite different, as is shown by Kirkham's teddy bears (1995:61–4) and more to this world, by alphabets and logograms. Neither do we ascribe truth to sounds or mark plus assertoric force: When I assert that everything is perfect I do not assert that e, and v, and e, and r…, but what that sentence means. But here is the catch: When we leave that behind as nonsense and try to say something in accordance with how we actually think of these matters, we stop trying to ascribe truth to statements and assertions and start ascribing it to their contents. And that meaningful content is, as I have claimed but not argued in the foregoing, best understood as a proposition. Because of the limitations of space I will not give sufficiently strong reasons to believe that claim if one is not already convinced, but suffice it to say here that even if we can make sense of the content of a statement without mentioning propositions, it will in any case not be a statement itself.

iii) Utterances. An utterance is the verbal equivalent of an inscription: it is the making of a speech token of some kind. It need not be a sentence token, interjections (such as 'Hi!', 'Bloody hell!', 'Ouch!') are perfectly fine utterances. The foregoing two paragraphs suggest that also utterances can have two readings – on the one hand, the utterance of something, and on the other, the utterance in itself, i.e. the making of sound waves. On the last reading whatever noise one can make counts; the first can perhaps best be understood as a possible way of making noises that is taken to mean something by one's community, as the interjection example shows a grammatically minimal way of doing. The same considerations apply here as in the foregoing cases, perhaps even more so, and I will not repeat them but consider the case for the implausibility of utterances taken as truth bearers made. But let us leave ut-

terances of 'non-linguistic noises' behind, and concentrate on those noises that are expressions of whole sentences.[15] If we were to take utterances as truth bearers, is it *possible* or *actual* utterances we are considering? It seems obvious that we cannot take only actual utterances (or any other (expression of a linguistic kind) as what is true or false: there are many truths that are never conceived of, one would assume, and even fewer are expressed in speech or writing. This is a complex topic, made even more so by assuming a use theory of meaning (which will have to take a stand on whether it is actual or possible human linguistic behaviour it considers, and both alternatives come with considerable problems), but this will not be discussed further here. For the rest of the essay I will assume that we take possible *x*'s as truth bearers.

iv) Sentence types and tokens. Consider the sentence 'What is true today will be false tomorrow', and then again 'What is true today will be false tomorrow'. In one sense they are the same sentence – they are of the same sentence type. But they are two different instances of that very same sentence type, and we can call each of them a token of this type. Now why would we want to take any form of a sentence, be it a token or a type, as the primary bearers of truth or falsity? In an important sense they are of the appropriate kind of things to be called true or false: sentences are the linguistic objects *par excellence*. To predicate truth of something you have to give both the predicate and the subject, thus a word alone seldom expresses a truth. A whole textual context is not necessarily necessary for expressing truths; a sentence is a linguistic expression of just the right size to be truth-apt. This, of course, is to grant that we understand what it means to express a truth before we understand what entities can be true or false, which points towards the relevant linguistic expertise by which we judge our account of truth bearers, but is not an argument for taking sentences as such. It is by using language and in response to sentences we say that something is true or false, as when I claim that the above example – 'what is true today will be false tomorrow' – is false. More importantly, perhaps, at least more widely appreciated, is the fact that sentences come with a rather unproblematic metaphysics: The sound waves of spoken sentences and the ink or pixels of written sentences are not problematic in any way particular to them. Note that this is somewhat misguiding, for what distinguishes a series of sounds and pauses from an uttered *sentence*? Meaning, and a theory accounting for this phenomenon might be quite problematic itself. In defence of not taking propositions as truth bearers, Field writes:

> [T]he point of having a notion of truth applicable to propositions is to facilitate the evaluation of utterances and states



Illustrasjon: Yin Yi Look

> of thinking: the point is to enable us to evaluate these things in terms of whether they *express truths* or *have true contents*. (1986:55)

He uses 'utterance' in much the same way as we will use 'sentence token', and I think that his point can be generalised to all linguistic kinds or propositional attitudes. Our interest is not in possible true things we cannot connect with in any way, but whether our talking and thinking is true or false. But what initially sparks our interest and our best account of the matter can, of course, diverge.

> In general, a sentence can be the bearer of a fixed truth value only if we understand 'sentence' in the sense of semantic token [i.e. a particular sound pattern or inscription *plus* meaning (insertion original)]. (Burgess and Burgess 2011:12)

Here sentence types are disregarded as truth bearers (in natural language). The main reason for this is the context dependence of a language by its inclusion of indexicals, ambiguity, and vague expressions. This is what makes a language flexible enough to use, but it also makes it possible that one and the same sentence type (try 'I'm not good at this') is true at one point and false at another. Indexicals are words that refer to one aspect of the context, such as 'I', 'now', 'her', 'here', and thus might mean something different on different occasions. Ambiguous expressions will have more than one probable reading in the context it is used, albeit it often will be quite clear what is meant, and with vague expressions like 'bald' and 'flat' it is often hard to see whether there is a fact of the matter of whether the predicate applies at all.[16] A sentence type could thus not be taken as a truth bearer if we want something that for the most part has one, and only one, truth-value. Note that this objection does not apply to formal languages like those of logic and mathematics as expressions there are given clearly specified and rigid meanings, and are thus more on par with sentence tokens in natural language. Sentence tokens, like this particular 'Blue is the colour I see now', are relativised to a context, including a speaker, listener, time, place, or other relevant aspects of the situation. But the 'plus meaning' in the above quote is crucial here. The reason sentences (or sentence tokens) might be appropriate as truth bearers, and indeed what makes them sentences and not random words, is that they *mean* something. They are what we use to express a meaning.

"What is it that we call a sentence?" Frege asks us: "A series of sounds, but only if it has a sense. And when we call a sentence true we really mean that its sense is true" (Beaney 1997:327). Very roughly, sense (*Sinn*) is for Frege the part of the meaning of a word concerned with how the (if any) referent (*Bedeutung*) of the word is presented to us. For a word, the sense is the way we know the object, the facts (or fictions) about it with which we pick it out among other objects; the 'cognitive value' of the word. With sentences this is different. The sense of a sentence is for Frege a proposition, or what he calls a *thought*. A thought is that which can have a truth-value, or "something for which the question of truth can arise at all" (1997:327–28) and is expressed by a sentence. But not just any sentence expresses a thought, for the question of truth does not arise for every sentence (try evaluating the truth of 'Open the door!'). For our purposes here it is enough to notice that declarative sentences express thoughts, and that these thoughts are abstract objects and mind-independently and timelessly either true or false. This is a rather strict understanding of propositions. From the way Frege defines – or should we say constructs – propositions, we can see that they are not easily reconciled with minimalism, and later we will see that they indeed cannot be so reconciled. We will shortly turn to this, but let me first say something more general about propositions and minimalism.

IV

Horwich takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth and falsity. The reason he gives for this is conformity with common sense and use in natural language: We do speak as if the *content* of the statement, sentence token, belief, etc., is what we attribute truth or falsity to, not some specific ink molecules, sound waves, or the belief itself, and that content is most often taken to be a proposition. That is, the reason to take propositions as truth bearers is not (just) that the other possible truth bearers have problems on their own, but that this is what squares best with our everyday use. Now obviously, there is no reason to blindly follow folk intuitions, and they have to be scrutinised if they are to do philosophical work. At the same time intuitions are often the only guides available to us, and they are firmly held beliefs that should not be thrown out unless one has a good reason to do so. As we have seen, what 'proposition' and 'propositional content' stand for can be understood in many different ways, but as a first shot we can say that they are the content of that-clauses and objects of propositional attitudes. Or, with Schiffer's words: "propositional content is whatever that-clauses contribute to what is ascribed in utterances of sentences" (2006:267; italics removed), where that-clauses are what is italicised in, e.g., 'I believe *that every cat is beautiful*' and 'It is true

that Peter stole your jumbo jet'.

The most prominent argument against taking propositions to be (the primary) truth bearers is that the existence and nature of propositions is debatable (see Kirkham 1992; Horwich 1990, 1999; Burgess and Burgess 2011; Alston 1996; and Field 1986). Parts of this resistance come from a suspicion towards abstract objects, parts from the fact that there are plenty of disparate accounts of what propositions are. The lack of agreement on what propositions are certainly makes the field a bit messier, but is not a strong reason not to engage in it unless there are other plausible options for fundamental truth bearers available. The foregoing discussion has given some glimpses, I hope, for why there are very few available; indeed, of the various possible truth bearers, only sentence tokens and that expressed by them have seemed promising. We have already looked briefly at Fregean propositions; I will now show in more detail why they are inconsistent with minimalism about truth. Horwich, as will be remembered, claimed that he does not need to specify the nature of propositions, as most, if not all, accounts of their nature will be compatible with minimalism. My claim is to the contrary, and this section is concerned with showing just that. Apart from Fregean propositions, Russellian ones are the only ones Horwich mentions directly (1990), and because of that we will take a brief look at a Russellian way of specifying the nature of propositions. We will see that they are no more compatible with minimalism than Fregean ones are, and from this discussion it will hopefully become evident why most accounts of propositions are not. Lastly, I will outline Horwich's own account of propositions based on his use theory of meaning, which of course is compatible with minimalism.

The most prominent argument against taking propositions to be (the primary) truth bearers is that the existence and nature of propositions is debatable.

As we saw when introducing Fregean propositions, they are defined as that which can be true or false. Propositions are thus defined in terms of truth-value, and as minimalism presupposes the notion of proposition (or another truth bearer) in its explanation of truth they cannot be combined lest we run into a vicious circle with no explanatory power to speak of. So Fregean propositions are not compatible with minimalism, contrary to what Horwich claims. Can a basically Fregean account be constructed, without appealing to the notion of truth? Horwich abstains from specifying what propositions are to leave room for minimalism to be coupled with diverse theories, making the theory palatable for as many as possible. Giving an essentially Fregean account, in addition to other accounts, helps retain this desirable trait. But there does not seem to be much of a point in this, as the account would have to be drastically rewritten. We could of course implement some of Frege's insights into a new account, such as the distinction between the referent of a word and its mode of presentation (and perhaps give a full account of what that mode is while we are at it) but this and many other points from Frege's philosophy are already common coin in accounts of thought and language and will not turn a basically non-Fregean account into a Fregean one.

What about Russellian propositions, which Horwich also appeals to (1990:94–96)? "A proposition may be defined as: What we believe when we believe true or falsely" (Russell 1919:1; capitalisation and italics removed). As we saw in the section on beliefs, Russell saw beliefs as being central to truth although he held propositions to be the primary bearers of truth-value; beliefs were the foremost of the derived truth bearers, so to speak. In contrast to Fregean propositions, which are ordered pairs of the senses of the words of a sentence, Russellian ones are "structured entities whose basic components are the objects, properties, and relations our beliefs and assertions might be about" (Schiffer 2008:270). Thus the proposition that I have an ammonite might, roughly, be represented as <me, ownership, ammonite>, i.e. with referents and relations as constituting the proposition rather than abstract senses being the propositional constituents. Horwich helps himself to these two – Russellian and Fregean – ways of understanding propositions in dealing with objections to propositions as truth bearers (see especially 1990:94–96). But focusing on the way of structuring the propositions is unnecessary all the while they are not compatible with a minimalism about truth. We are not better off if we first define propositions as whatever it is we believe 'when we believe true or falsely' and then explain truth as the instances of the schema '<p> is true iff p'! So the same circularity appears if we understand propositions in a Russellian as in a Fregean way, and minimalism cannot make use of these ways of accounting for the nature of propositions.

So with both of these traditional analyses of the nature of propositions the problem is not even concealed in the underlying semantic theory, but shows itself in the very definition of a proposition. Neither of the accounts are compatible with minimalism, contrary to Horwich's claim. Here it is in full:

> [T]his commitment [to the existence of propositions]… is much less substantial than it might seem at first. For it presupposes very little about the *nature* of propositions. As far as the minimal theory of truth is concerned they could be composed of abstract Fregean senses, or of concrete objects and properties; they could be identical to a certain class of sentences in some specific language, or to the meanings of sentences, or to some new and irreducible type of entity that is correlated with the meanings of certain sentences. … [T]he minimal theory does not require any particular of them. (Horwich 1990:17–8)

In some sense this is true: Minimalism does not come with a specified way to understand propositions. But it does come with a specification of how *not* to understand propositions – in terms of truth and truth conditions – and that is almost as strong a restriction. From the above account we have seen that one ready way to understand propositions is in terms of their truth-aptness or truth-conditions, and this will of course not do. But more generally, the explanation of truth in terms of the equivalence schema presupposes that we already understand the meaning of the sentences involved (and note how much more than just a particular schema one needs to understand the meaning of to understand that particular schema), and that leaves us unable to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions. It is not enough to shift from talk of propositions to another kind – every kind of truth bearer, and all the parts of language that facilitates our understanding of the equivalence schema – would have to be understood without prior reference to truth.

As we have seen, Horwich is supplementing his theory of truth with a use theory of meaning, which crucially does not explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions. This theory can thus account for propositions, and linguistic entities generally, in a way that is compatible with minimalism. In the following I will briefly outline a use-theoretic notion of propositions, as presented in Horwich's (1998). He emphasises that this is not a fully developed account, but just a sketch of how a use-theoretic notion of propositions can be developed (1998:82). What motivates this account of propositions (as opposed to focusing solely on sentences) is that the same use of certain sentences – most notably those including indexical expressions – will express different things at different times. Thus it seems like the theory, which explains meaning in terms of regularity of use (here, of proposition-expressing sentences), cannot account for the difference in meaning in the use of these expressions. "[T]he proposition expressed by an utterance is determined by how that utterance is construed from its parts and by which propositional constituents those parts express" (1998:83). The proposition is a function from its parts, where, for example, the proposition expressed by 'Cats meow' is a function from its constituent parts, <cats> and <meow>, to <cats meow> (see 1998:156–7). His account focuses on what propositional constituents are and how the meaning of terms determine which proposition is being expressed. I will focus on the first part. Horwich assumes that that-clauses are singular, referring terms, and distinguishes between the different forms of attitude attribution; *de re*, *de dicto* and *de se* (1998:82, 84). 'Mary said that she saw the last dodo' (his example) is ambiguous between a *de dicto*-reading, in which 'the last dodo' conceived of that way is what is seen, a *de re*-reading in which the last dodo, no matter how the seer picks it out, is the object of the sentence. Lastly we can give a *de se*-reading, as when the 'she' rather than being about some other female conveys that Mary saw the last dodo, i.e. as if she had said 'I saw the last dodo'. Horwich accommodates these differences by giving a different account of what the distinct propositions expressed in these cases are. In the *de dicto*-case, the propositional constituent is either the concept (if context-insensitive) or an ordered pair of the concept and the relevant aspects of the context in which the term expressing that concept is used. In the *de re*-case, the propositional constituent is the referent of the term used,[17] and in the *de se*-case, the propositional constituent is the same as in the context-sensitive *de dicto*-case, i.e. an ordered pair of the concept and the context (1998:84–5). The concept expressed by a given term is, as we saw in the brief formulation of the use theory above, the meaning of the term, which is supposed to be given by the use of the expression. Thus propositions, on Horwich's account, are functions from ordered pairs of meanings, ordered pairs of meanings and contexts, or referents. Horwich does not intend this to be a full account of what propositions are, and it most certainly is not, but aims at showing that the use theory of meaning can give an account of what propositions are. I will leave it here, but as his theory of truth – the way we have formulated it until now – is given in terms of propositions, it is quite central that he has a plausible way of accounting for them.[18]

VI

Horwich takes, as we have seen, propositions to be the primary bearers of truth-value, but maintains that nothing important hinges on this, for two reasons. The first reason for this is his claim that he can let the nature of

propositions be left unspecified, thus making it as unsubstantial as a commitment to propositions can possibly be (1990:17–8). I have argued to the contrary: minimalism is incompatible with some leading theories of meaning and this has a strong bearing on the choice of truth bearers as, e.g., propositions cannot first be understood in terms of their truth conditions and then used to explain truth. To avoid the circularity he runs into with truth-conditional semantics he defends, as we have seen, the use theory of meaning which, roughly, says that how a word is used is what determines its meaning.

The second reason Horwich gives for his claim is that one can easily construct a minimalism about truth for utterances and other instances of (the production of) sentence tokens, like inscriptions, beliefs, statements, etc. That this works is, of course, crucial if he is to give a theory that is not committed to the existence of propositions, which many find problematic. Note that these other possible truth bearers will require a theory that does not explain meaning in terms of truth just as much as propositions does; this is required by how truth is analysed and not bound up with any specific truth bearer. I will end this essay by showing, very briefly, how Horwich constructs a minimalism taking those other entities as the primary truth bearers.

At the outset of this essay I briefly characterised a Quinean disquotational account of truth, in which the truth predicate functions to make generalisations over sentences (and cancel out the ascension to talk of sentences) where it cannot otherwise be obtained. Quine used sentences and their tokens as primary bearers of truth-value, and thus he ran intro the same problems we did in connection with sentences: indexicality and ambiguity. To avoid these problems he introduces 'eternal sentences', which we can think of as the disambiguation of a given ambiguous sentence. Thus the sentence 'I'm rereading Fadiman's *Rereadings*' can be specified to read 'Mariona E. B. Sturm is rereading Anne Fadiman's book *Rereadings* the 2nd May 2016', and ensure that it is only sentences thus specified that are allowed into the disquotational schema. '[A]n eternal sentence is a sentence whose tokens all have the same truth value' (1970:14), thus the (eternal) sentence types will avoid ambiguity in much the same way as sentence tokens does, i.e. by having only one reading. Horwich briefly discusses Quine's proposal and dismisses it because these eternal sentences manage not, after all, to be without context sensitivity. First, the sentences are still true or false relative to a given language, and second, there are a lot more context sensitive words than just the obviously indexical or vague ones (1990:104–5). Quine noted the problem of language relativity himself and modified his account accordingly: "When we call a sentence eternal, therefore, we are calling it eternal relative only to a particular language at a particular time" (1970:14). But, Horwich objects, if we don't specify what the 'in language L' means, then "the schema will becomes [sic] a definition of *that* notion rather than a definition of truth" (Horwich 1990:105). E.g., "Poets die young' is true in English iff poets die young' says what the sentence just mentioned and used means in English rather than what 'true' means. And if one specifies it the truth of utterances will be given in terms of the propositions they express, i.e. what Quine sought to avoid (ibid.). The second problem can be illustrated by predicates such as 'hard', 'easy', 'flat,'[19] which can be properly predicated of a whole range of differently hard, easy, or flat things depending on the context; proper names, where the same name will refer to different individuals in different contexts; even quantifiers, as, e.g., 'all' will be read with a radically different scope depending on context. We can mend at least part of this problem by making the eternal sentences ever more complex, on pain of being able to use them as substitutes for the relative expressions. But however that might fare, in light of these problems with Quine's eternal sentences Horwich tries to construct a minimalism about truth for linguistic entities in another way.

This he does by using the (disquotational) schema 'This ('p') is true iff p', where 'this ('p')' refers to the other instance of 'p' in the schema, ensuring that "instances of the disquotational schema are construed in the same way as the utterances whose truth conditions they specify" (1990:105). That is, of course, to avoid a shift in meaning and truth-value when filling out the schema with context-sensitive expressions. The 'this ('p')', which will be more naturally formulated in what follows, is to ensure that the sentence mentioned there will be interpreted in a relevantly similar way when it is used in the other part of the biconditional. When filled out the schema yields, for example, 'The immediately following utterance of 'houses have roofs' is true iff houses have roofs', 'The immediately following statement of 'Neptune was discovered in 1846' is true iff Neptune was discovered in 1846'. Paraphrasing

Quine used sentences and their tokens as primary bearers of truth-value, and thus he ran intro the same problems we did in connection with sentences: indexicality and ambiguity.

Illustrasjon: Vilde Rudjord



Horwich, there will be a possible instance of the utterance schema for every utterance *u* of a declarative sentence, and for every statement *s* there will likewise be a possible instance of the statement schema (1990:105–6). In the same way as all the different instances of the equivalence schema are taken as axioms in the original formulation of minimalism, so all the instances of, e.g., the schema for utterances are taken as axioms in a minimalism with utterances as the primary bearers of truth-value. In a section trying to formulate this 'minimal theory of truth for utterances' for other languages (i.e. where the object- and metalanguages are different) he draws on a use-theoretical way of translating between languages.

The schema reads "u' is true iff p,' "where 'u' is replaced by a singular term referring to an utterance and 'p' is replaced by a sentence of our language that, in our context, would be the strong or weak translation of that utterance" (1990:106). The problem is that the strong and weak translations are, respectively, translations where two sentences from different languages express either the same Fregean or the same Russellian proposition (1990:98). And this, we have seen, are two ways of understanding propositions which are unavailable to Horwich. Furthermore, Horwich shows that his schemas for utterances and propositions can be derived from each other given some plausible assumptions about what it takes for a sentence or other linguistic entities and propositional attitudes to express a proposition, and the relationship between the schema for sentences, utterances, etc., and propositions. This is to show that the one is not more fundamental than the other. But again use-theoretic translatability is appealed to, and unless this notion can be captured without appeal to truth-conditions (here, in the propositions the translation is done in terms of) minimalism about truth, for utterances, will help itself to the concept of truth to explain truth. I will not go deeper into this issue, but leave the worry about minimalistic use-theoretic translatability here. I see no *prima facie* problems with basing a use-theoretic notion of translatability on a use-theoretic notion of propositions, and this, or any other non-truth-conditional notion of proposition, could be used in constructing a minimalism about truth for linguistic entities and propositional attitudes. But the details of how this can be done will have to be given in another place. Horwich's aim is to show that the propositional view has no theoretical priority in minimalism and thus that those having a quarrel with propositions need not object to the theory on that behalf. If this can be done, minimalism is not restricted to take propositions to be truth bearers, but is free to construct the schema it is based on in terms of statements, utterances, and other linguistic entities. There are two ways to ensure flexibility in the choice of truth bearers: between different kinds of entities and different accounts of the nature of those entities. We have seen that the second kind is unavailable to minimalism. But this section was about showing how Horwich goes on to enable flexibility in the first sense to ensure that minimalism is not bound up with one specific entity as truth bearer.

Conclusion

Horwich's minimalism is not, then, as minimal as first proposed because it presupposes a theory of meaning and then constrains what kind of theory that can be. Thus all the instances of the equivalence schema *plus* the use theory of meaning, or another non-truth-conditional semantic theory, is what constitutes minimalism about truth. In the foregoing I have presented some of the different possible truth bearers to see which of them can be what a minimal theory of truth predicates truth and falsity of. We have gone through some linguistic entities and some propositional attitudes in more detail, and seen that there are grave problems with all of them. I have also outlined the two traditional, truth-invoking notions of proposition that Horwich makes use of and shown the inappropriateness of this use. We saw that Horwich's use-theoretical propositions, although not yet a complete account, can serve as the fundamental truth bearers under minimalism, and that he probably can formulate his theory about truth for other linguistic entities and propositional attitudes if using a notion of translation that does not rely on the concept of truth in any essential way. Thus even though there is room for some flexibility in the choice of truth bearers under a minimal theory of truth, Horwich's claim that he can leave the nature of truth bearers unspecified is shown to be overly optimistic. As I hope to have indicated in the foregoing, few of the proposed truth bearers are actually able to do the job. Sentence types, sentence tokens, and propositions are the entities that are most likely to be able to bear the truths and falsehoods. Thus few kinds of entities are appropriate as the primary truth bearers given minimalism, and their nature will in turn be quite specific, as they are understood with respect to a specific semantic theory.

NOTES

[1] Thanks to Daniel Parmeggiani Gitlesen, Max Johannes Kippersund, Carsten Hansen, and Ainar Petersen Miyata for comments on earlier drafts.

[2] With 'truth predicate' I mean 'is true' and its different cognates such as 'is so', 'holds good', etc. (See Burgess and Burgess (2011:33)).

[3] See especially his (1970:10–14).

[4] That is, although perhaps this is the most central function it need not be the only one. For instance, 'That is true' also acknowledges that the utterer is not the first to say that (whatever is the subject matter) is true, which 'if one *intends* to express agreement then the antecedent must normally be explicitly acknowledged' (Grover, Camp, and Belnap (1975:80)). We can also use the truth predicate to flatter, in being ironic, etc., but this is arguably not a central function for which we need a unique predicate.

[5] See e.g. Horwich (1990:6, n. 2), for a list of early and contemporary defenders of deflationism.

[6] Almost all the instances – there has to be some adjustment to account for the Liar and similar paradoxes, see e.g. Horwich (1990:41–3). As I'm giving only a quite rough sketch of minimalism – which is all I need for my purposes here – I will continue to write as if this is not an issue.

[7] See Field (1986) for more on substitutional quantification and its use in connection with a deflationary theory of truth.

[8] We can be fairly comfortable with taking a whole range of different entities as being true or false in a derived sense. So if propositions are the primary entities to be rightfully called true or false, sentences expressing them and beliefs, hopes, wishes, etc., about them can be called true or false: but this will be in an elliptical way, where the 'expressing them' and so on is left out for convenience.

[9] In his (1995: ch. 2) Kirkham argues for a very liberal view of truth bearers allowing for a variety of entities being truth bearers at the same time, only restricted by practicalities and considerations specific to the theory in question. For various reasons this does not seem to work, not the least because the various 'radically different' truth bearers all seems to fill the same function as sentence tokens, his preferred truth bearer, does (see e.g. 1995:59–64). His is the only account I have encountered that argues for multiple kinds of primary truth bearers, thus my unwillingness to go into this debate is hopefully not too great a drawback for the rest of this discussion.

[10] As I read the relevant section by Horwich, he reserves the first disjunct for statements and the second for beliefs, although the way it's formulated makes it ambiguous between this reading and taking both statements and beliefs to be examples of the whole (obviously inclusive) disjunction.

[11] I do not doubt that something like fear can be strongly action guiding. But here I am assuming that this holds, for non-psychiatric cases (which is what I will assume here, for simplicity's sake), when there is a belief essentially involved: One acts upon one's fear to the extent that one believes the fear to be grounded in reality.

[12] One can imagine three cases of multiple primary truth-bearers: Either TB1 bears one part of all truths and TB2 bears the rest, without overlap, or TB1 is a sub-set of TB2, or TB1 and TB2 equally bears all the truths and falsities. Case one is quite unlikely, and in both case two and three, without a good argument for postulating it, TB1 seems redundant.

[13] One also meets definitions of statements such as "a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing" (oxforddictionaries.com). This is a homonym 'statement', in which when one is making a statement one does something else than just stating something (derived from this we have 'statement' as used in fashion etc., which will not bother us here).

[14] This point is made more thoroughly in Alston (1996:14–5), and also in Burgess and Burgess (2011:14).

[15] Of lesser expressions, such as single words, we would say that the word could be true *of* something, but not true *per se*. Ordinarily, that is: an example due to Carl Wegner Korsnes of the Latin *sum* (I am) is even truer than most sentences as nobody can tell a lie by uttering it.

[16] Vague, or more generally indeterminate, expressions are especially problematic for theories about truth, but we will not go into that field here. See e.g. Burgess and Burgess (2011: ch. 4).

[17] Notice the similarities to Russell (and to Fregean indexicals, although we have not gone into that here).

[18] I am unsure whether Horwich has developed it in more detail lately (in his 2004 he refers back to the account just given from his 1998 (2004:353; fn. 5)), or indeed whether anyone else has. I assume here that it is possible to develop this account in a plausible way, whether it is done already or not.

[19] See a discussion of the flexibility of this last predicate in Dummett (2004:5–8) – and another way to stiffen up flexible expressions in terms of plausible interpretations according to the context the expression occurs in. "The interpretation will select, for each word, one of the senses that the language allows it to bear; it will fix suitable ranges of application for vague expressions involved" (2004:8).

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THE ARTWORK AS HAPPENING

By Inger Bakken Pedersen

In the years of 1935–36 Martin Heidegger gave several lectures on philosophy of art. These lectures were eventually published as an essay in Heidegger's first post-war book *Holzwege* (1950) under the name *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* ('*The Origin of the Work of Art*'). In this essay, Heidegger rejects modern aesthetics for endorsing an overly subjectivist approach, where the focal point is the subject's relation to the artwork *qua* object, and instead insists on a phenomenological account of art. Heidegger explores the relationship between the work of art and truth, and grounds his thesis of the artwork as a 'happening of truth' in his concept of truth as *unconcealment.* In order to include Dasein in his ontology of the artwork, Heidegger radically reconstructed Dasein's role – so it would no longer be based on Dasein's *experience* ['Erlebnis'] of the artwork.[1]

When faced with the question of the origin of the work of art, the notion of 'origin' ['Ursprung'] comes to the fore. Heidegger quickly defines a thing's 'origin' as the "source of its nature" (2002:2). By defining 'origin' thus, Heidegger continues his project of doing '*Seinsphilosophie*' ('Philosophy of Being') by turning the introductory question of the origin of the artwork into a *Seinsfrage*, i.e. into a question of Being[2], in this case a question of the artwork's nature ['Wesen']. In order to answer this, one must answer the question of its *kind of Being*, which, according to Heidegger, *necessarily belongs* to the question of a thing's nature (1962: 257/H 214).

"The art presences in the art-work [Kunst-werk]", Heidegger writes (2002:2). What is striking with this sentence is the peculiarity of the verb 'presences' ['west']. Heidegger employs this verb '*west*' instead of the noun 'nature' ['Wesen'] so as to underline the fact that the nature of something actively *is*, as constant *Being.* This constant Being-ness reminds one of Heidegger's own claim in *Sein und Zeit* ('*Being and Time*') (1927) that the essence of Dasein is *existence*, i.e. presence in the world as Being-in-the-world (2002:6, 1962: 67/H 42). The relation between art and the artwork is thus an event of some sort – art proper *actively happens* in the artwork as a *happening of essence*.

Throughout *The Origin of the Work of Art* (from now on merely *The Origin*) Heidegger puts emphasis on *happenings.* Whether he discusses the relation between the mere thing, the equipment and the artwork, or whether he gives his thoughts on Hegel's "End of Art", the temporal and historical aspect seem to pervade his account (2002: 13, 51). As to the work of art, it seems to have a specific function for Heidegger, in the meaning that it *functions actively,* i.e. that there is a *happening*. "The work as happening" is thus the claim I will take to be my starting point in this essay, and further how it is the *happening of truth* that 'works' ['wirken'] in the art-work ['Kunst-werk']. In order to be able to understand how Heidegger envisages this *happening of truth*, an account of how Heidegger characterizes *truth* as *unconcealing* seems necessary. The first section will therefore be concerned with trying to make sense of his general theory of truth as such, with a special focus on the characterization given in *Being and Time*. In the second section I will go into the particular happening which takes place in the artwork, namely the happening of

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Strife. According to Heidegger, *Strife* designates the central conflict between *world* and *earth*, two contrasting notions that will, hopefully, become clearer over the course of the second section. In the third section I will discuss how the self-subsistent artwork, being "the historical existence of a people", "allows truth to arise ['entspringen']" (2002:49). That is, if the artwork is self-subsistent (viz. the ontology of the artwork *qua* happening of truth), does this leave room for an active Dasein (2002:48)? Can truth as unconcealment arise in the artwork independently of Dasein? These questions become salient in the effort of understanding the connection between the earlier Heidegger, i.e. when he wrote *Being and Time*, and the works of the later Heidegger, of which *The Origin* is an example.[3]

Truth as *aletheia*

Heidegger characterizes the nature of art to be "the setting-itself-to-work of truth" (2002:44). The art-work's *work* is to instigate the happening of truth, thus letting Being be illuminated by the shining of truth. The question regarding the nature of truth thus seems indispensable to our investigation into the origin of the artwork. Heidegger has a different conception of 'truth' than the traditional theory in Western philosophy. As we shall see, Heidegger differentiates his conception of truth by founding it on the Greek word '*aletheia*', which literally means "unconcealment" (2002:28).

In ¶ 44 in *Being and Time* Heidegger presents three theses as being the traditional conception of truth:

> … (1) that the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment);
> (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgement with its object;
> (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as 'agreement'. (1962: 257/H 214).

The Modern notion of truth thus has its basis in *correspondence* ('*adaequatio*'), where truth is a judgement to be passed on propositions if they correctly correspond to some facts of reality. However, if the reference between these propositions and the described bits of reality fails, the propositions can no longer be branded 'true' or 'false'. In our average everydayness, this does not present itself as a problem. However, this is only possible due to the fact that we have a collective horizon of reference. A collective background understanding of our subject-matter becomes thus a necessary condition for the possibility of capturing the "correct" truth (Young 2002:7). This raises the question whether art is to be representational in order to correctly correspond with a proposition. Is it the title of a painting that must correspond to what is pictured? Is it because Van Gogh's painting *A Pair of Shoes* depicts a pair of shoes that it somehow captures truth? If so, it would severely limit art's possibilities of expression.

The dominance of the epistemological question of *knowledge* in traditional Western philosophy requires a theory of truth where *correspondence* is the decisive content. Truth thus considered is an *adaequatio intellectus et rei,* and it entails therefore the Cartesian belief in the power of reason and its ability to correctly grasp the world as a totality of that which exists. Consequently, the *ego* is displaced from its Being *as* Being-in-the-world and must understand the work of art based on its objective (thingly) character instead of its work-Being. The work of art is thus robbed of its truth-bearing function due to the "imperialism of reason" (Young 2001:4).

This is because truth as correspondence limits the ways in which truth can be established to "modern natural science or even "reason" and propositional knowledge" (Pippin 2013:100). This means that for truth to be established in the artwork, the artwork must conform with the requirements of truth as correspondence, viz. agreement between a proposition and some state of affairs. The only possibility for the artwork to "fit in" is if the artwork is considered to be an artwork in force of it being a thing. Despite the fact that the work of art *does* have a universal thingly character, it is not artwork *qua* thing Heidegger wants to establish (Heidegger 2002:19).[4] The reason why the artwork can be a *bearer of truth* is not on account of the artwork being a thing, but rather, that there is a happening of truth *at work* in the art-work (Pippin 2013:102).

Heidegger does not *deny* this traditional use of 'truth', but he considers it as being derivative of the more primordial truth, namely the Greek *aletheia* or *unconcealment* (Heidegger 1962: 257/H 214). In *Being and Time* he poses these questions:

> *What else* [than the predicate 'knowledge'] *is tacitly posited in this relational totality of the* adaequatio intellectus et rei*?* (1962: 258/H 215).

And:

> *How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand?* (1962: 259/H 216).

These are questions that challenge the very structure of truth as correspondence. Whereas propositional knowledge is already established as the "Being-true" in the correspondence theory, the "relational totality" of which Heidegger writes has not been ontologically fully accounted for. Propositional knowledge is clearly secondary to that which fundamentally *is*, to *Being*, which means that we are in need of a more primordial truth, i.e. a truth that is not discursively formulatable and is thus *prelinguistic*, where the goal is to open up Being (Pippin 2013: 98, 104). Truth as correspondence can thus be said to be a consequence of our ignorance of the question of Being, the very question that drives Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

Seeing that it is the *Seinsfrage* which occupies Heidegger, the Being of truth and the ways in which there can be a happening of truth become salient. We will not find the Being of truth by merely replacing the word 'truth' with 'unconcealment'. As Heidegger points out: "We are not merely taking refuge in a more literal formulation of the Greek word … [but] reflecting upon that which, unexperienced and unthought, underlies our familiar and therefore worn out essence of truth in the sense of correctness." (2002:29). Truth as agreement *presupposes* not only a necessary successful horizon of reference, but also the more primordial truth as such. Without the already existing unconcealment of beings, we would not find ourselves in the "illuminated realm in which every being stands for us and from it withdraws" (2002:29). We would not be able to make statements about some facts of reality seeing as this activity is secondary to, and only possible if, a more original unconcealment already has taken place (Pippin 2013:104).

This "illuminated realm" is what Heidegger calls *clearing*, i.e. the open place in the midst of the whole of beings (Heidegger 2002:30-31). This clearing is beyond beings; it is prior to them and is "more in being than is the being" (2002:30-31). Thus, clearing is that which is presupposed in truth as correspondence, it is that which gives us access to what there is and allows us to ponder on the Being of beings (2002:30-31). This is what is meant by a *primordial* truth – the clearing is always already everywhere in the world into which humans are *thrown* ['geworfen'] (Pippin 2013:104).[5] Furthermore, *concealment* also belongs to clearing, seeing as "the being can only [be concealed] within the scope of the illuminated" (Heidegger 2002:30). Concealment has a twofold character: the first as the outskirts of the clearing itself, i.e. refusal, whilst the second happens *within* the clearing, i.e. obstruction (Heidegger 2002:30). Whilst refusal is the beginning of the illuminated, obstruction is that which explains how we are fallible in our actions, i.e. when something appears different than what it really is. According to Heidegger, the clearing can only happen this way, which means that there is no "absolute truth" in the sense of traditional metaphysics. On the contrary, the primordial truth is rather that which admits us into the "'horizon' of possible sense" and thus enables us to try to understand the meaning of Being (Pippin 2013:104).[6]

However, unconcealment can never be a property some things have and others do not – it is not a label under which one can place the beings that *have become unconcealed* (Heidegger 2002:31). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes:

> The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if … That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. (1962: 265/H 222)

Rather, *aletheia* has a twofold nature, seeing as "[t]ruth, in its essence, is un-truth" (Heidegger 2002:31). By this Heidegger does not mean that truth, in some fundamental way, is falsity, rather it is the fact that truth has its origin in concealment – that without concealment there can never be unconcealment (2002:31). The happening aspect lies in the constant flux between the concealed and the unconcealed which is the essence of truth. This opposition between 'clearing' and concealment is "the primal strife – the essence of truth is in itself the ur-strife ['*Urstreit*']" (2002:31).

How is it, then, that the setting-itself-to-work of truth can be the nature of art? Have our account of what truth is, and is not, clarified how art is to be a becoming and happening of truth? One thing is certain, and that is that the traditional theory of truth as correspondence is not well suited to describe what happens in the artwork. Truth as correspondence is too interconnected with the goal of propositional knowledge, and based upon a "thing"-ontology (Pippin 2013:102). Heidegger however, operates within a different framework; his ontology of the work of art is an "event"-ontology (2013:102). Thus, truth must be a *happening of truth*, actively *at work* in the artwork, and not a judgement to be passed from the *ego* about the *thing*. If art has a truth-bearing quality, it must be in the sense of this primordial, opening-up illuminating of Being. How is, then, truth set to work in the artwork? This must be

answered by the relation between clearing and concealing, and the twofold nature of truth as untruth. As we shall see, it is the *Urstreit* that accounts for this particular aspect of happening, where the stark opposition between 'world' ['Welt'] and 'earth' ['Erde'] comes to the fore.

Strife of world and earth

We have now given an account of what kind of truth Heidegger indicates when there is a happening of truth in the artwork, namely truth as unconcealment. Before we continue our investigation into the *strife* of world and earth, let us look into a particular artwork, namely *The Milkmaid* painted by Vermeer in the Dutch golden age. Béatrice Han-Pile (2011) discusses three Vermeer paintings (viz., *The Milkmaid*, *The Woman in Blue* and *The Geographer*) where she takes on a (rather free) Heideggerian interpretation. She stresses that her starting point is phenomenological; it is our relation to the paintings as *artworks* that is important, and we should not take them as artefacts and decrypt them according to some external principles (2011:139).[7] "…[T]he work opens up a *world*", Heidegger writes (2002:22). Is, then, a world opened up in *The Milkmaid*, if so, which world? Does the depiction of a milkmaid, dressed in blue and yellow pouring milk, somehow disclose the world of the Dutch golden age? *The Milkmaid* depicts everyday objects of *equipment* (viz. jug, table, milk, bread, etc.) in addition to the maid herself. These objects as *ready-to-hand* are part of the world in which she finds herself.[8] They are, however, not ready-to-hand for the beholder of the painting, i.e. we would not try to take the jug and pour milk (Han-Pile 2011:143). The world disclosed can therefore definitely not be ours, as we are not part of the relational totality depicted. However, according to Heidegger, the work cannot disclose a world if the artwork's world has been *withdrawn* or has *decayed* (2002:20). As the Dutch golden age has long since perished, *The Milkmaid* can no longer disclose this world, it is forever lost.[9] According to Han-Pile, the painting still seems to disclose *a* world, namely "the *unworlding* of a past world", i.e. the painting makes us *aware* that the Dutch world of the 17th century is out of "our existential reach" (2011:155). Thus, the artwork makes "our



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own thrownness and finitude palpable"; we understand that *our* world is heading for the same end, and thus our sadness over the loss of the world of the Dutch golden age is really sadness over the inevitable loss of our own (Han-Pile 2011:156). This is thus a rather free Heideggerian interpretation. Han-Pile objects to Heidegger's world-withdrawal thesis and claims that the artwork still is able to open up a world, though the world thus disclosed is peculiar. It is a hybrid of the lost Dutch world and our own, a fictitious world "born from our attempts to fill in the formal structure of worldhood … with elements of the world we live in" (2011:152).[10]

As art's nature is the setting-itself-to-work of truth and, as art presences in the work, the work-Being of the work is the setting up of the world.

In order to explicate what the *Urstreit* consists of, the Heideggerian notions of 'world' and 'earth' must be further analysed. "To be a work means: to set up a world", Heidegger writes, and in this 'setting up' there lies "an erecting in the sense of dedication and praise" (2002:22). In this dedication and praise we find the glory and splendour in which the world glowingly illuminates itself as it rises up within the work (2002:22). This characterization of the world entails that it is not, as Western tradition will have it, the totality of being that are present-at-hand or the name of the framework in which these beings find themselves. The Heideggerian world *worlds* ['Welt weltet'], it actively is what it is and presences as such (2002:23). World is thus never an object to be regarded from afar by the *ego*, rather, world is that "to which we are subject" as long as we are Being-in-the-world (2002:23). As art's nature is the setting-itself-to-work of truth and, as art presences in the work, the work-Being of the work is the setting up of the world. This is one of the essential traits of the work-Being of the work, and how an artwork can be a happening of truth.

In order to understand Heidegger's conceptions of 'world' and 'earth' in *The Origin*, we need to relate them to his view on 'world' in *Being and Time*. In ¶ 14 in *Being and Time* Heidegger differentiates between four different worlds, of which two are ontic (i.e. confined to entities) and two are ontological (i.e. confined to Being) (1962: 91–93/H 63–66). The two ontical meanings of 'world' are i) "the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world" and, ii) "not as those entities … which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that '*wherein*' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'" (1962: 93/H 64–65). The first ontological meaning is the *Being* of the first ontical one, i.e. the Being of the totality of entities (1962: 93/H 64–65). The second ontological meaning is the Being of the second ontical 'world', i.e. the Being of the '*wherein*', which Heidegger calls *worldhood* (1962: 93/H 64–65). Thus Heidegger explicates four different meanings of 'world' without mentioning its counterpart 'earth' once. Neither is there talk of any 'primal strife' nor emergence of truth in any way.

So, how can the characterization of 'world' in *The Origin* be continuous to those we find in *Being and Time*? Are we to believe that Heidegger no longer endorses his carefully laid out exposition of world in ¶ 14? I should believe not. It is rather a shift in emphasis. The world in *The Origin* is one of two parts indispensable for the institution of strife that *is* the happening of truth in the artwork. Thus, 'world' in *The Origin* must be seen in relation to its counterpart. It is no longer *Dasein* that is the starting point from which the quest for the meaning of Being is to be led, i.e. Dasein is no longer believed to be the key to the depth of Being. This may suggest that it is not Dasein's world that is primarily described, seeing that "[the worlding world] *is more fully in being* than all those tangible and perceptible things in the midst of which we take ourselves to be at home" (Heidegger 2002:23, my italics). However, Heidegger also states that: "World is that always-nonobjectual to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse, keep us transported into being." (2002:23). Hence, even though Dasein is no longer our starting point for investigating the meaning of Being, the world in *Being and Time* and the world in *The Origin* are continuous. The world in *The Origin* is, in fact, the *practical world in which we live*, i.e. it is similar to the 'wherein'. Is it, then, the ontic 'wherein' or the ontological worldhood that is described in connection to the artwork? This is explicated in relation to the *clearing*. As clearing is "[t]he illuminated centre itself [that] encircles all beings – like the nothing we scarcely know", there must be something that is encircled (Heidegger 2002:30). Furthermore, as this open *happens* (as the twofold concealment) in the midst of beings, the clearing thus seems to be that which allows our world to appear, i.e. it allows the Being of the '*wherein*' (viz. worldhood) to come into view as a *worlding world* (2002:30).

Julian Young characterizes world as being nothing but "the illuminated surface of an uncharted and unbounded region of epistemological darkness," and that this one possibility of disclosure, this one illuminated surface out of

many, has a natural counterpart in the countless other possible surfaces that have not been illuminated of truth (2001: 39–40). Thus according to Young, the illuminated surface of world will have a natural opposition in the *un-illuminated*, *shaded* surfaces, namely 'earth'. However, Robert Pippin objects to this interpretation, calling it "anodyne" (2013:113). Indeed, such an interpretation would entail a direct correspondence between unconcealment and world, and concealment and earth, something Heidegger explicitly denies (2002:31). Earth is not that region of Being which has escaped unconcealment, because concealment "is not primarily or only the limit of knowledge in each particular case" (Pippin 2013:113; Heidegger 2002:30). Earth is not, as Young would have it, "the dark side of the moon", that which is merely hidden from view and has not *yet* been unconcealed (Young 2001:41; Pippin 2013:113). This would be a simplifying of what Heidegger actually says, and would thus not capture how "the essential nature of earth, of the *unmasterable and self-closing bearer*, reveals itself, … only in its rising up into a world" (Heidegger 2002:43, my italics).

This is the first of four different senses Michel Haar (1993) ascribe to earth. Earth cannot be illuminated by truth because it is already in the open *as* the essentially undisclosable (Heidegger 2002:25). "Opacity in Earth is powerful, but it must manifest itself," Haar writes, and thus points out that earth belongs to concealing (*lethe*) which *holds sway* in un-concealment, in *a-letheia* (1993:57). "[Earth] shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it. It turns every merely calculation into an act of destruction," Heidegger writes (2002:25). Earth lies in the depth of the stone, and resists every attempt to become a *sur-face* ('over the façade'). The second sense Haar offers is the intuitive connection to 'nature', as the counterpart of the *constructed world* of human beings (1993:59). The untouched nature consisting of plants, mountains and animals is part of what Heidegger means by earth.

> All the things of the earth, the earth itself in its entirety, flow together in reciprocal harmony. … The self-seclusion of the earth is, however, no uniform, inflexible staying-in-the-dark [*Verhangenbleiben*], but unfolds, rather, into an inexhaustible richness of simple modes and shapes. (2002:25)

Earth as nature is not derived from world, but still occurs only within it (Haar 1993:59). The diversity of nature *is in contrast to* the lived-in world of humans, the 'wherein', but rests in earth where it flows "in reciprocal harmony".

The third sense of earth is as the 'material' of the work. Earth is here *within* the work of art, as the wood carved, the colours painted or the words written (Haar 1993:60). Many of Heidegger's statements about earth suggest this very meaning:

> [T]he work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of the stone, into the firmness and flexibility of the wood, into the hardness and gleam of the ore, into the lightning and darkening of color, into the ringing of sound, and the naming power of the word. That into which the work sets itself back, and thereby allows to come forth, is what we called "the earth". (2002:24)

And:

> To be sure, the sculptor uses stone just as, in his own way, the mason uses it. But he does not use it up. That can be, in a certain sense, said of the work only when it fails. (2002:25)

The artwork lets earth as 'material' come forth in its Being, lets it "emerge as something fundamentally *unutilizable* which belongs to Earth and its withdrawal," Haar writes (1993:61). Earth as material in the artwork is not at all similar to the material used in the manufacturing of equipment (viz. hammer, cup, clothing, etc.). Whilst in the artwork the earth rises up through the world so that the material shows itself in itself, in equipment it is the *completed use* of the material, i.e. the finished product, that is the *for-the-sake-of-which* (Haar 1993:61). The "material" is thus conceived of differently from the material in equipment. As Heidegger already rejected the artwork as "formed matter," this is not the sense of material here (Heidegger 2002: 11–12). Heidegger rethinks material as earth, thus it is the coming-to-be of the artwork itself, as earth and world come together and instigate strife (Haar 1993:60). As the work is created, strife is instigated, not on account of the artist forming matter, but "on the essence of the truth 'setting itself to work'" (Haar 1993:60).

The fourth and final sense Haar attributes to earth is that of *ground* ['Grund']. The word '*Grund*' is the same as the metaphysical term designating the foundation and reason for being, but the meaning attributed to it by Heidegger is that of earth as *rootedness* (Haar 1993:61). It is that upon which the temple rests, though the world opened up by the temple, is more original (1993:62). However, this rootedness must be understood, not as the actual earthly soil, but rather as that ground which is historical, i.e. the metaphorical soil of a people (1993:61). The soil of a people comes from tradition, tradition as *world*, where a people find its ground in the "native Earth"

in the meaning of 'heimatlich', derived from the German 'Heim' which means 'home' (1993:61).[11]

Heidegger gives, then, several, somewhat different, meanings to earth, almost as if he approaches the notion from different angles, thus suggesting parts of what is actually a larger 'something'. This 'something' – that which unifies the four senses of earth – is, according to Haar, the "unique thought of a *non-foundational foundation*" (1993:64). This captures the complexity of earth fairly well; how it rises up through the world and is in the open and at the same time is impenetrable, inaccessible – only truly itself as manifestly undisclosable. Earth does not have the power to ground, though it is at the same time *the* ground. As the work sets itself back into earth, it does not land on a solid foundation, it rather sets into an opaque depth itself, flowing into some dense nothingness. It is, then, some distinct 'other-ness', inaccessible by its very self.

How, then, does world and earth show themselves in Heidegger's description of a Greek temple at Paestum?[12] Each of the four senses of earth described by Haar manifests itself in the temple work. Heidegger explains how the temple-work "opens up a world while, at the same time, setting this world back onto the earth which itself first comes forth as homeland [*heimatliche Grund*]" (2002:21). Here is the fourth sense of earth exemplified, as the familiar ground upon which the temple rests. Earth as "material" (the third sense) is also made visible by the temple-work: "The rock comes to bear and to rest and so first becomes rock" (2002:24). The literal construction of a temple springs to mind, where one rock rests upon another whilst bearing a third, thus setting up the columns of the temple. "The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of the air", Heidegger writes (2002:21).[13] The temple-work thus establishes some openness, through which "the god is present in the temple" (2002:20). Earth as nature (the second sense) in contradistinction to the human world is also emphasized:

> The steadfastness of the [temple-]work stands out against the surge of the tide and, in its own repose, brings out the raging of the surf. Tree, grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter their distinctive shapes and thus come to appearance as what they are. … We call this the earth. (2002:21)

Nature do not have any subsistence of its own, but become what it is in relation to the human world and work (Haar 1993:59). The first of Haar's senses of earth, namely earth as concealment ("openly latent, manifestly hidden"), comes to the fore as that which brings back and shelters (Haar 1993: 57; Heidegger 2002:21). "In the things that arise the earth presences as the protecting one," Heidegger writes (2002:21). As the temple-work stands tall, earth rises up through the world and provides shelter in the temple's steadfastness (2002:21).

It is not only earth that comes to the fore in Heidegger's account of the temple. The world described is truly the human world, the *wherein* where Dasein lives and dies and experiences everything in between. The unity of these paths and relations that constitute "for the human being the shape of its destiny" is "first structure[d] and gather[ed]" by the temple-work (Heidegger 2002: 20–21). Heidegger points out that: "The all-governing expanse of these open relations is the world of this historical people. From and within this expanse the *people first returns to itself for the completion of its vocation*" (2002: 20–21, my italics). It is no small task the temple-work accomplishes in force of being a work. The temple-work fulfilled the world of the ancient Greeks, let the earth "presence as the protecting one" and housed the god (2002:21). However, when the world died, the temple-work was no longer a work and the god fled. All that remains is a "building, a Greek temple, [that] portrays nothing" (2002:20).

The *unity* of world and earth is won in strife, because "the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion [*Selbstbehauptung*] of their essences" (Heidegger 2002: 26, 37). Whilst in strife, their intimacy grows into a co-dependent unity, so that the two cannot break apart, but must continue to fight (2002: 26–27, 32). This is how the particular happening of truth in the artwork is a *constant* struggle. It is not, then, a peaceful, empty unity where the entities do not concern each other; the world as "self-opening will tolerate nothing closed, [… and] the sheltering and concealing … earth tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there" (2002:26). There is a constant struggle where neither earth nor world gets the upper hand. "By setting up world and setting forth earth, the work accomplishes … strife," Heidegger writes (2002:27). Even though the artwork is the origin of the strife, that does not mean that the struggle will be settled by the work as well; rather, the artwork *ensures* that the strife remains a strife (2002:27). Thus, in order for the artwork ['kunst-werk'] to *work* ['wirken'] properly, the opposition between world and earth must remain a conflict. It is only in the constant "fighting of the fight" that there is a happening of truth at work in the artwork, and it is this fighting that is the work-Being of the work (2002:27).

One objection to Heidegger's claim that primal strife

of world and earth is the artwork's work-Being is presented by Young (2001). He claims that to suppose that the work-Being of every artwork has this essential trait of *enmity* and *agitation* is to disregard the many artworks – if not whole schools of art – that are clearly pervaded by harmony (2001:62). Young does not deny Heidegger's *duality* of world and earth, but that there should be enmity between them, resulting in the fighting of the constant fight, Young finds incredulous. He agrees that truth happens awesomely in the artwork as the self-secluding earth rises up through the self-disclosing world. However, he does not agree that the harmoniously beautiful Greek temple is to be the *locus* of a never-ending ur-strife of world and earth (2001:62).

On the other hand, why should it not? Why would it be that the strife between world and earth *excludes* the possibility of harmonious works of art? Heidegger writes: "It is because the strife reaches its peak in simplicity of intimacy that *the unity of the work happens in the fighting of the fight*" (2002:27, my italics). Unity is reached through the *intimacy* of the strife. Without primal strife and fierce agitation, world and earth would not be *sufficiently concerned* with each other to become something more than mere opposites, i.e. they would remain wholly distinct entities without inhering to a whole. As it is, the strife is that which happens – it triggers the consequent happening of truth that is the wholesome work-Being of the work. If the relation between the unconcealing world and the concealing earth were static, truth as *aletheia* could not be. The structure of *aletheia* and the structure of strife between world and earth are both one of constant flux and agitation. The happening of truth cannot happen in "serene harmony" by the fact that truth is in itself the ur-strife (2002:31).

Young's criticism falls short by his seemingly ignorance as to the notions of *rift* ['*Riss*'] and *repose* ['*Ruhe*']. Rift and repose are characteristic of the strife. The rift is the co-dependence and closeness of world and earth which manifests their intimacy, i.e. world and earth together *marks* a rift (Heidegger 2002:38):

> The strife is not rift [*Riss*], in the sense of a tearing open of a mere cleft; rather, it is the intimacy of the mutual dependence of the contestants. The rift carries the contestants into the source of their unity, their common ground. It is the fundamental design [*Grundriss*]. … This design [*Riss*] does not allow the contestants to break apart. … The structured rift is the jointure [*Fuge*] of the shining of truth. (2002:38)

Heidegger's rift thus largely explains how world and earth can be agitated opposites and create a whole at the same time. The rift is like a seam between two pieces of cloth – they form a bigger whole but are still apart. The rift can literally be the fixed design engraved by the goldsmith – it is still a gold locket, but a design has been *set into* it. It is in this rift-design Being itself is brought, and seeing as the design ['*Riss*'] is set, it does not allow its contestants (viz. world and earth) to break apart (2002:38). The golden locket is an example, where the engraved rift-design now has become a necessary part of the locket. In this design the gold glimmers more, as the light catches the lines of flowing arabesques and make them dance. In this way, the material is brought forth, and you can see how the rift becomes a jointure in the whole of the gold locket.[14]

If one can accept that rest is, in fact, a mode of extreme agitation, then Heidegger would be well on the way.

The repose, on the other hand, presences in the agitation as the artwork's *self-subsistence*, its *resting-in-itself* ['*insichruhen*'] (2002:33). There is, then, room for rest in the work of art. According to Heidegger, this resting-in-itself can only be as a result of already existing movement as "only what moves can rest" (Heidegger 2002:26). Rest is the opposite of movement; but, it is an opposite that *includes* the other, so that the artwork's repose becomes "a state of extreme agitation" (2002:26).[15] This is difficult to grasp – how a thing can be moving and not moving at the same time – it goes against any logic ever learnt. The painting on the wall does not, in fact, move. Perhaps he has in mind how a painting depicts a passing moment of a movement or action, as when Marianne stands on the barricades in the painting *La Liberté guidant le peuple* by Delacroix, and how she in that moment is still, in rest.[16] Such an interpretation would, however, mainly apply to representational art. However, Heidegger's thesis of the happening of truth in the artwork requires movement. If one can accept that rest is, in fact, a mode of extreme agitation, then Heidegger would be well on the way. The work of art that has the quality of serene harmony can thus also have the primal strife as its work-Being. The strife is how world and earth brings each other to the fore, thus letting the shining of truth happen in the seams of their agitation. Harmony in the work of art is thus not necessarily inconsistent with the primal strife, seeing as where there is agitated movement there is also rest.

Illustrasjon: Lisa Marie Mrakic

The self-subsistence of the artwork – the artwork, *Ereignis* and Dasein

So far we have explored Heidegger's ontology of the artwork without much reference to a *subject*. In the first section we discovered that unconcealment is the primordial truth that gives Dasein access to contemplating Being, and we have learnt how the world disclosed by the artwork manifesting itself in the strife is, in fact, the world wherein Dasein lives. We have not, however, figured out whether Dasein is active or passive in relation to the artwork proper; whether Dasein has a contributive role when truth is set to work in the artwork, or whether the artwork, as self-subsistent, truly is independent of Dasein. This will be our point of departure in this section.

In order to understand how Heidegger regards the work of art as the *locus* for a happening of truth, it must be kept in mind that, due to Heidegger's phenomenological approach, there is a strong connection between Being and 'thing' and between Being and the happening of truth. In the appendix to *The Origin* Heidegger writes: "Art is accorded neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs, rather, to the Event out of which the 'meaning of being' … is first determined" (2002:55). Art is thus neither the product of a sophisticated, cultural society nor a sign of the artistic mind and genius, rather, it inheres to the happening of truth where Being is disclosed. It is, then, indeed *emphasized* that art does not belong to any Dasein-involved activity. Instead, art belongs to 'the Event', out of which the *meaning of Being* is to be determined. This would, *prima facie*, suggest that art is more fundamental than Dasein, and if so, this would mark a radical change from *Being and Time*. 'The Event' is here a translation of the German '*Ereignis*'. Whilst speaking of the happening of truth, Heidegger tends to employ a different word, namely '*Geschehnis' (der Wahrheit)*. '*Geschehnis*' can also be translated as 'event', which suggests that the meaning of '*Ereignis*', with the English, capitalized 'Event', bear another, richer meaning.

In *Art Matters* (2009) Karsten Harries understands *Ereignis* as meaning the "event or happening of the truth of being, i.e. the emergence of beings" (2009:111). It seems, then, that in *The Origin*, *Ereignis* comes to denote the conflict between world and earth, and the happening of truth that follows. However, according to Harries, Heidegger had already differentiated between a mere happening ['Geschehnis'] and *Ereignis* long before *The Origin*. While a happening should be understood more or less in the traditional way (i.e. activity leading to a change in state of affairs), *Ereignis*, on the other hand, is "a happening to which I belong and that belongs and therefore matters to me" (2009:111). This understanding of *Ereignis* reminds one of the notion of 'care' from *Being and Time.* There Heidegger writes: "[The] Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as *care.* … Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern[17]" (1962: 83–84/ H 57). An *Ereignis* is thus a happening that falls under Dasein's *care*, i.e. a happening that is an issue for Dasein itself, which means that an *Ereignis* will have impact on Dasein's existence.

Ereignis thus has an impact *on* Dasein, but can Dasein actively contribute? "The event ['Ereignis'] is more like *the event of meaningfulness itself*," Pippin writes (2013:109). If *Ereignis* is elevated *beyond* Dasein's reach, Dasein cannot participate. Dasein's active role thus depends on whether there is room for Dasein in *the meaning of Being*. Whereas the meaning of Being in *Being and Time* was to be revealed from Dasein's Being,[18] this is not expressed in *The Origin.* In the appendix to *The Origin* Heidegger gives some clue as to Dasein's role, referencing the ambiguity of the 'setting-to-work of truth'. He points out some difficulties as to the "*relationship of being to human being*," a problematic which he deems he has "inadequately" accounted for and is "a distressing difficulty that has been clear to me since *Being and Time*" (2002:55). As art is thought of out of *Ereignis*, and as the happening of truth belongs to the essence of the artwork, we must return to the *self-subsistence* of the artwork (Heidegger 2002: 33, 55). If Dasein is active in establishing this 'pure self-subsistence', i.e. that which ensures that the work exists as work, then the happening of truth will partly *depend on* Dasein.

As the nature of art has already been characterized as a 'becoming and happening of truth', the investigation of the artwork's self-subsistence must begin with its very *existence*. How has the artwork come into Being? "A work is always a work, which is to say, something worked or produced [*ein Gewirktes*]. If anything distinguishes the work as a work it is the fact that *it has been created*," Heidegger writes (2002:32, my italics). The artwork's existence is thus (rather intuitively) a consequence of its *creation*. In what, exactly, lies this *createdness*? "The workly character of the work consists in its being created by the artist," Heidegger writes (2002:34). From this it seems to follow that the artwork's createdness is *due* to the artist, the material used and perhaps some set of the cultural and historical structures at the time of creation, i.e. regarding the work *as the product of the artist's labour*. However, the creation of an artwork is never the product of some craft activity, if so;

that would juxtapose the artwork to equipment and thus rob it of its truth-bearing function (Heidegger 2002: 35, 39).

> That createdness stands forth out of the work does not mean that it should be a salient feature of the work that it is made by a great artist. ... What is announced is not "*N.N. fecit.*" ['N.N. did'] Rather, "*factum est*" ['it is done'] is what is to be held forth into the open by the work: in other words this, that an unconcealment of beings has happened here and, as this happening, happens here for the first time; or this, that the work *is* rather than is not. The thrust that the work, as this work, is and the unceasingness of this inconspicuous thrust constitute the constancy of the self-subsistence of the work. Precisely where the artist and the process and the circumstances of the work's coming into being remain unknown, this thrust, this "that [*dass*]" of createdness, steps into view at its purest from out of the work. (Heidegger 2002:39)

It is not what the *artist* has done that matters to Heidegger, but "the fact that some unique thing has been created, having itself an unmistakable 'personality'" (Harries 2009:159). It is the "that ['*dass*'] of createdness" which truly matters. Dasein as artist is thus a *prerequisite* for the work's createdness, but not, however, the interesting point.

Heidegger writes that: "The essence of creation is determined by the essence of the work" (2002:35). It is not, then, the creation of the artwork that determines the work, but the opposite. If the essence of the work determines the essence of creation, it follows that the essence of the work determines the artist's contribution to the creation. Dasein as the artist is not decisive for the essence of the work, and is consequently merely a passive participant. How can the work-Being supervene on the essence of creation, that is, how can the existence of the work be secondary to the work? This will need some further analysis. The createdness of the artwork has two pronounced qualities. The first is how the strife *as* rift is set back into earth (2002:38). Creation is here how the rift is brought back, into the self-closing earth that is forth, i.e. it is *the fixing of place of the strife* (2002:38). When strife is fixed in place as rift-design, the shining of truth happens, which means that in creation of the work the happening of truth *is made*. The second quality is that "*createdness itself is specifically created into the work* and stands as the silent thrust into the open of the 'that'" (2002:40, my italics). "Createdness itself is specifically created into the work," Heidegger writes, but how, exactly, are we to understand this? It seems as if we are to take the first quality, i.e. createdness as "the fixing of place of the strife," and put it into the next. If so, it is "the fixing of place of the strife" that is created into the work. The work-Being consists of fighting the fight of world and earth, i.e. instigating the strife. The fixed-in-place-rift (createdness) is in fact created in the artwork. Createdness thus described is, then, indeed determined by the work, thus reducing Dasein's active even more.

Along with createdness, the *preservation* is equally important for the work's existence. As the work cannot be without those who create it, so the work "cannot come into being" without those who preserve it (Heidegger 2002:40). The preservers are thus absolutely necessary in order for the work to *be* a work. "If it is in other respects a work, it always remains tied to preservers … even the oblivion into which the work can fall is not nothing: it is still preserving," Heidegger writes (2002:41). As the preservers are Dasein, the work is thus dependent on Dasein, i.e the work awaits the preservers for "their entry into its truth" (2002:41). The work cannot be in truth without the preservers, which means it cannot become a happening of truth without them. Preservation is not, however, the acceptance of a work in the artworld or physically securing the ruins of the Greek temple. The Greek temple is beyond preserving, as preserving is a sort of *knowing*. It is knowing in the sense that it is "the standing within the openness of beings" (2002:41). As the Greek world has perished, there is no openness to stand within – the temple has lost its power to place us into that world (Harries 2009:163).

> Preservation of the work does not individualize human beings down to their experiences but rather, brings them into a belonging to the truth that happens in the work. … Most particularly, knowing in the mode of preservation is far removed from that merely cultivated connoisseurship of the formal features of the work, its qualities and intrinsic charms. Knowing as having seen is a being-decided; it is a standing-within the strife that the work has fixed into the design [*Riss*]. (Heidegger 2002: 41–42)

Preservation is thus not at all the same as curatorship, and has nothing to do with *conservation* of artworks. It is, rather, *knowing* in the sense of bringing the work into truth, i.e. standing within the clearing "in the midst of beings" so that the awesomeness of truth can happen.

Art's nature has been revealed to be the setting-itself-to-work of truth. This 'setting-itself-to-work of truth' is ambiguous, where the two possible sides to it are i) the fixing in place of the self-establishing truth in the figure, i.e. *creation*, and ii) bringing the work-character of the work into motion and happening, i.e. *preservation* (Heidegger 2002:44). This is how art is "the creative preservation of

the truth in the work" and "*a becoming and happening of truth*" (2002:44). Createdness and preservation of the artwork thus constitute the artwork's *reality*, i.e. how it comes into existence and how it comes to *be* what it truly is. The artwork's self-subsistence lies in its repose ['*insichruhen*'] (2002:33). This resting-in-itself now comes to denote something like the work's contentment of being what it is. Once the work has come into existence, and its true Being has come to the fore, the work *is* a work, and has thus reached some completion and self-fulfilment.

As createdness and preservation forms the reality of art, and art is the origin of the artwork, one should think that it was art that determined the work (Heidegger 2002: 1–2). However, as we have already seen, it is the essence of the work that determines the essence of createdness. How is it, then, with preservation? "But it is the work which makes the creators possible in their essence and which, in virtue of its essence, needs the preservers," Heidegger writes (2002:44). The preservers are thus not determined by the artwork in the same way that the creators are. Whereas the artwork 'makes the creators possible', the preservers *are needed* on account of the artwork's essence. For the artwork to come fully into Being as the fighting of the fight of world and earth, there must be someone who stands within the openness who are *receptive* to the happening of truth. This seems to be a passive role. However, this knowing as standing-within the openness of beings is, in fact, *willing*, because if you truly know what is, you know what you will in the midst of what is (2002:41).[19] As actively willing, the preserver "allow[s] himself ecstatic [*ekstatische*] entrance into the unconcealment of beings" (2002:41). Preservation is thus not merely a passive activity for Dasein. Dasein as preserver is a necessary condition for the work to *be* a work, and thus also for truth to happen. Dasein is not necessary as an existing *receptive entitiy* for truth, but as *actively willing* to stand within the awesomeness of truth. Dasein is thus making a *decision* to act, though it is an act of will.

Preservation thus brings human beings into a belonging to the truth that happens in the work, which is a *community* of belonging together with other human beings (Heidegger 2002:41). According to Heidegger, this fellow belonging to truth is Dasein's "historical standing out of human existence [*Da-seins*]" (2002:41). Preservation is thus *historical*, i.e. Dasein becomes historical *qua* preserver.

> Whenever art happens, whenever, that is, there is a beginning, a thrust enters history and history either begins or resumes. … History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task [*Aufgegebenes*] as the entry into its endowment [*Mitgegebenes*]. (Heidegger 2002:49)

The "historical existence of a people" thus indicates how the people is "transported to their appointed task," which is to be the creator and preserver of artworks (2002:49).[20] Art is the creative preservation of truth in the work (2002:49). The historical existence of a people thus *ensures* that truth is set into the work. Art is, then, an origin, "a distinctive way in which truth comes into Being, becomes, that is, historical" (2002:49).

In the appendix to *The Origin*, Heidegger writes: "Reflection on what *art* may be is completely and decisively directed solely toward the question of *being*" (Heidegger 2002:55). *The Origin* is thus a questioning into Being. We have seen that the primordial truth renders us access to Being. "Being, however, is a call to man and cannot be without him," Heidegger writes (2002:55). The setting-itself-to-work of truth in the artwork is established by the creation and preservation of the historical people. It is through creation and preservation Dasein is able to participate in the happening of truth. Whereas in *Being and Time*, where the "Being of truth [was] connected *primordially* to Dasein," in *The Origin* Dasein's role is reconstructed (Heidegger 1962: 272/H 230, my italics).[21] It is not explicitly expressed that Dasein plays an active part in bringing forth truth. However, as we have seen in our account of creation and preservation, Dasein is, in fact, important. Dasein is not ascribed an active role in the work's createdness, seeing as it is the work proper that determines createdness. As to preservation, it has been showed that Dasein actively *wills* its admittance into the awesomeness of truth. However, this is not massive activity on Dasein's part. Where does this leave us? Can there really be truth as unconcealment happening in the artwork without a central Dasein? I should believe not. The primordial truth is the original illuminating of Being necessary for Dasein to function in its world. Dasein thus depends on truth. However, Dasein is *that* entity which, in its Being, Being is an issue for. Being as such can thus be said to *depend on* Dasein. Truth as unconcealment of Being can thus not take place without a Dasein for which it matters. Thus, truth depends on Dasein. As to the happening of truth in the artwork, Dasein must consequently be included. Not included as a passive entity, on the contrary, but as a *co-constituent of truth* as such. Heidegger's ontology of the artwork *qua* happening of truth is not, then, devoid of interference from Dasein, but wholly dependent on Dasein's participation in the questioning into Being.

NOTES

[1] 'Dasein' is the word used in *Being and Time* designating human beings. 'Dasein' as 'Da-sein' is translated 'there-Being'. Dasein is "distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it" (1962: 32/H 11–12).

[2] I have chosen to capitalize the word 'Being' whilst referring to the verb that is 'to be'. Otherwise, I will understand the non-capitalized 'being' as entity.

[3] One usually refers to the difference between the early and the late Heidegger as *the turn* [die Kehre], and it is said to have taken place in the 1930's and to have been completed by 1940 (Grondin 1987: 9–11). See Grondin (1987) for a thorough discussion on *die Kehre* in Heidegger's philosophy.

[4] Heidegger does start *The Origin* by investigating the thingly character of the work of art. However, he concludes his chapter with a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion, and thus starts to explore the work-Being of the artwork and its connection to truth instead (Pippin 2013:102).

[5] 'Thrownness' is a notion from *Being and Time*, introduced to capture how Dasein is always already in the world as Being-in-the-world: "This characteristic of Dasein's Being – this 'that it is' – is veiled in its "whence" and "whither", yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the '*thrownness*' of this entity into its "there"; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there". The expression "thrownness" is meant to suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*." (Heidegger 1962: 174/H 135).

However, Dasein's thrownness is introduced in *The Origin* as well, as the "opening up of that in which human existence [*Dasein*], as historical, is already thrown [*geworfen*]" (Heidegger 2002:47). This is what Heidegger calls "poeticizing projection," which originates in his view that all art is essentially *poetry* (2002:47). Due to space-limitation, I do not have the liberty to go into that discussion. See Harries (2009) for discussion on art as poetry and the threefold *founding* ['Stiftung'] of truth.

[6] This reminds one of the Dasein-oriented point of view from which Heidegger tries to understand Being in *Being and Time*, where he speaks of a "relational totality of significance". In ¶ 18, Heidegger writes: "[…A]long with [Dasein's] Being, a context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: Dasein, in so far as it *is*, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this *submission* belongs essentially to its Being." (1962: 120/ H 87). It is this submission which can be seen as the illuminated realm in which we find ourselves, i.e. that which allows us to think of Being.

[7] If paintings are regarded as artefacts, there is no substantial difference between them and mere equipment, i.e. they would not have disclosable powers. Furthermore, decryption based on external principles is exactly what traditional aesthetics do, according to Heidegger, where the artworks' aesthetic qualities are *measured* from afar by a displaced *ego*, who not at all engages with the artwork *qua* artwork (2002:15).

[8] In *Being and Time* Heidegger differentiates between three different modes of Being: Dasein (human beings) for whom Being itself is an issue, equipment as entities within-the-world that are ready-to-hand, in the sense that they have an "in-order-to" for Dasein (the hammer is most a hammer when someone is hammering with it), and thirdly, the entities which are present-at-hand, i.e. entities that merely exist and are decontextualized for Dasein, i.e. they are not usable to Dasein, but merely 'there' (e.g. when a rock lies on the ground, not being an issue for anyone or when an object is theorized about from a disengaged spectator) (1962: 98/H 69, 67/H 42; Han-Pile 2011: 142–143).

[9] For discussion on whether great artworks can survive world-withdrawal, view Bernasconi (1999).

[10] 'Worldhood' is a notion from *Being and Time*, meaning the Being of the 'wherein' in which we live, as will be further explained below. It is the fourth meaning of 'world' presented by Heidegger in ¶ 14 (1962: 93/H65).

[11] 'Native' is here translated from 'heimatlich' which has the etymological root of 'Heim', meaning 'home', as in the place you live and not your birthplace (Haar 1993:62). The word 'Heim' carries several different, etymologically derivative meanings, such as 'secret' or 'intimate' ['heimlich'] and familiar ['heimisch'] (Haar 1993:62). 'Native Earth' or 'native ground' as used here has thus less to do with birth, and rather more to that which is 'familiar' (Haar 1993:62). 'Homeland' would capture this meaning better, which is also the word used in the 2002 edition of *Off the Beaten Track*.

[12] Harries and Pippin both argue that it is not possible to know exactly which temple Heidegger speaks of (2009:100; 2013:106). However, the particularity of the temple is not relevant here. Furthermore, it would render Heidegger's account of it nonsensical, seeing as "it is the temple work that first structures and simultaneously gathers" the human world (Harries 2009:100; Heidegger 2002: 20–21). If each Greek temple would be the "first" to establish the Greek world, Heidegger's account would fall apart as there would be no constancy to the Greek world at all (Harries 2009: 100–101). See Harries (2009) for an interesting discussion about the Heideggerian Greek temple in relation to Hegel's discussion of architecture.

[13] Immediately after Heidegger writes that: "[T]he Greeks called this coming forth and rising up in itself and in all things *phusis*. At the same time *phusis* lights up that on which man bases his dwelling. We call this the *earth*" (2002:21). However, I will not go into the notion of *phusis* here. If interested, view Haar's discussion in *The Song of the Earth* (1993).

[14] The only times Heidegger mentions 'Beauty' in *The Origin* is in connection to the rift and in the afterword, where beauty is described as belonging to the advent of truth (Heidegger 2002:52). Heidegger describes beauty as "*one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to presence*", whereas the beautiful is "the shining that is set into the work" (2002:32). This shining of truth is set into the work in the jointure ['*Fuge*'], i.e. the structured rift (2002:38). Beauty is thus redefined in *The Origin*. As it cannot be an aesthetic quality, and as it is certainly not 'in the eye of the beholder', beauty must designate something else. In order to *keep* the notion of beauty, beauty must conform to the artwork *qua* happening of truth and find its place there.

[15] This is a general idea in Heidegger. We find another example in *Being and Time*, where Dasein understands its 'here' in terms of its environmental opposite 'yonder' (1962: 142/H 107).

[16] This reminds one of a quote by Paul Klee: "Art does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible" (Wrathall 2011:17). In rest, motion is made visible as the lack thereof.

[17] In German *concern* is *Besorgen,* whilst *care* is *Sorge*. The etymological closeness between *care* and *concern* is thus lost in the translation to English.

[18] In *Being and Time*, we learn that: "If to Interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question" (1962: 35/H 14–15).

[19] Heidegger here brings up *resoluteness*, a notion from *Being and Time*, where it is characterized as "*only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care* ['in der Sorge gesorgte'], *and which is possible as care – the authenticity of care itself*" (1962: 348/H 301). "Willing is the sober resoluteness [*Ent-schlossenheit*] of that existential [*ex-istierenden*] self-transcendence which exposes itself to

the openness of beings as it is set into the work," Heidegger writes (2002:41).

[20] View Taminiaux (1993) for discussion on the historical Dasein of a people.

[21] In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger expresses a similar view: "Man is the site of openness, the there. … Hence we say that man's being is in the strict sense of the word 'being-there'. The perspective for the opening of being must be grounded originally in the essence of being-there as such a site for the disclosure of being" (1959:205).

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TRUTH AND IMMEDIACY
A FEW REFLECTIONS ON EDITH STEIN'S IMAGINARY DIALOGUE BETWEEN AQUINAS AND HUSSERL

By friar Antoine Lévy

Speaking about truth, the one thing we know for sure is that truth and Truth are not exactly the same thing. When I say that the sky is cloudless today in Oslo, this is about truth because it might be a false statement as well. Let us call the propositional notion of truth the one that refers to the correspondence – or lack of it – between statements and states-of-affairs. When I say that Buddha is the Truth, I am dealing with a slightly different notion of truth – not that this statement might not be false like the previous one, but because what I designate here is not a particular state-of-affairs. Buddha is the Truth: this is about the ultimate principle of a boundless series of state-of-affairs; namely, those that have made, are making and will ever make the world what it is. Of course, our approaches to the ultimate Truth of the universe can be partial, but they still belong to a very different logical register from propositional truths. This specific area usually goes under the name of beliefs. In everyday life, we tend smoothly to jump from one logical register to the other. Think of a political debate. For those who follow the only thing that really matters at the moment; that is, the American Elections, just try to mentally put a Bernie Sanders and a Ted Cruz face to face – something that we now know will never happen. Materially, the whole discussion will be at the level of propositional truths: they will speak all the time about facts and they may well prove each other factually wrong on a particular issue. And yet at the same time the way they refer to facts will continuously stem from two sets of distinct beliefs: On the left-hand side stands the one who thinks that Wall Street is responsible for just about every evil in the world, on the right speaks the one who is convinced that the survival of civilization rests on the conjunction between traditional moral values, strong military deterrence and free market economy. Whatever be the truths each one will come up with or the falsities each one will be blamed for, neither will budge from their respective stands on Truth. Actually, the moment they give these up the debate will immediately lose its purpose.

If we human beings engage in dialogue, it is because truths as such do not contain Truth – this reality that we try to impose on others since, if it ever is, it cannot be but one for all of us. And yet there is hardly any other way of achieving a common understanding about Truth than through discussing about truths.

In the civilization that is ours, the Western civilization, there is, however, one area where this functional, creative and quasi-automatic overlapping between truths and Truth does not or does no longer work – one area where dialogue has become difficult to the point of being almost impossible. I have in mind the dialogue between science and Christian faith, between the truths/Truth that are open to rational enquiry and the truths/Truth included in what Christians call God's Revelation. Of course, my colleague-theologians will find it easy to dismiss this statement as a gross exaggeration. They will point to this expanding area of research called Fundamental Theology, a discipline that precisely explores the multiple connections between science and the content of Christian Revelation, to which I will say two things. First, I am talking about the attitude of the man on the street towards the Christian religious discourse: Whether he accepts it, rejects it or selects bits of it, his attitude is generally based on the assumption that this whole religious register has nothing to do with what science has to tell us about truths or the Truth. Second, by contrast to Apologetics, its disowned predecessor in the Catholic academia, what we today call Fundamental Theology is supposed to respect the fundamental epistemological heterogeneousness of the two registers – science and faith – at the very moment when it goes in search of their points of connection. A homogeneous language that would display the truths of science and Christian dogmas from the point of view of one and the same Truth appears

to be excluded from our modern Western horizon. One might even go so far as to claim that the loss of such a homogeneous language is the constitutive feature of our modern horizon. Indeed, there was a time – I am speaking here about the Western Middle Ages – when the prevailing view was that Faith was required in order to achieve true knowledge or real science of the universe. The homogeneous language that was developed, a language that would ensure the continuous going back and forth between the truths of the world, as explored by scientists, and the ultimate Truth of the universe, as revealed in the Christian dogmas, was that of metaphysics. For us Dominicans, preachers of the Word, this language was of the essence. If Albert the Great and especially Thomas Aquinas played a pivotal role in its elaboration, it is because we Dominicans would naturally speak this tongue each time the proclamation of the Good News, as entrusted to the doctrinal care of the Church, came across a resistance buttressed against rational grounds. Metaphysics was our only instrument of dialogue with people who held fast to a Truth that we found incompatible with the Truth of Christian faith.

What I would like to call your attention to is the fact that the invention of this language is a unique achievement in the History of Biblical monotheism. Medieval metaphysics implies an integral rethinking of the core Mystery of Faith according to the categories of Greek – especially Aristotelian – philosophy, to the effect that Christian discourse becomes transparent to rationality without straying from its supernatural core-Truth. The prodigious attempt of Muslim philosophers to produce similar results, an attempt that started roughly in the 9th century and to which Christian medieval theologians are thoroughly indebted, ended up with a dramatic failure in the 12th century. As for Jewish philosophers, Maimonides, the greatest example of this limited species, showed himself weary of emphasizing the fundamental irreducibility of God's being and historical manifestations to the categories of Greek philosophy.

As mentioned above, I believe that what defines our modern Western horizon is the disintegration of Medieval metaphysics as this unifying language. This process resulted from the combined influence of a new insight into the Truth of Christian faith that accused this metaphysical language of betraying it – I am referring to Luther's Reformation – as well as of a new way of doing science, a way that saw this language rather as a hindrance – I am referring to Galileo Galilei's concept of physics. This disintegration lies behind the fact that the contemporary man in the street, when he goes in search for a Truth that lies beyond the truths of science, finds himself deprived of a rational criterion that would enable him to discriminate between the different options he will come across. Conversely, the Dominican,

Illustrasjon: Lisa Marie Mrakic

the one who has a precise conviction about what Truth is and who wants to share this conviction with others, is accused of ignoring the teachings of modern science every time he tries to show that all the truths of the world lead to this Truth which lies beyond the world. When he or she tries to establish the superiority of his Truth, he or she stands under the constant suspicion of committing the most elementary logical mistake; that is, of having to imply the existence of an object in order to demonstrate it. The only option he is left with is to speak to those who are already convinced about the same Truth – but what becomes then of his calling as a Preacher? This is a dangerous situation, and not only because it ruins Dominican business. It gives credit to the idea that becoming a religious person is some arbitrary all-or-nothing type of decision: Either you stay out of it, in a world deprived of access to Truth, or you accept it integrally; you submit to it, which means that you give up your ability to apply any rational or critical judgment in the field of ultimate Truths. Hence the temptation of religious fundamentalism is creeping at the very heart of Western ultra-sophisticated societies. The question, however, is whether trying to establish a logically valid connection between the truths of this world, the truths that science encompasses, and the Christian Truth is truly a useless undertaking. Should we take for granted that no dialogue, in the Medieval sense of the word, can henceforth take place between the one who is convinced of the truth of Christ and the one who rejects it without *ipso facto* disregarding the teachings of modern science?

The only option he is left with is to speak to those who are already convinced about the same Truth – but what becomes then of his calling as a Preacher?

From this point of view, I firmly believe that the philosophical reflection of Edith Stein has something important to tell us. You may have heard of Edith Stein, this brilliant German Jewish intellectual who worked some time as an assistant to Edmund Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology, who converted to Catholicism, was baptized in 1922, became a Carmelite nun, was arrested by the Gestapo and eventually died in Auschwitz in 1942. She was made a saint and a Patron of Europe by John-Paul II in 1998. But one thing is to have heard about Edith Stein, another is to have read her works, which is a fairly demanding, although greatly rewarding, achievement. Among her abundant writings that in so many ways relate to the issue I am dealing with here, I would like to reflect upon a short, unfinished and until very recently unpublished essay she wrote in 1929, just after working on a translation of Aquinas' *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*. Edith used the content of this essay in a contribution to a *Festschrift* offered to Husserl on the occasion of his 70th birthday and published the same year. The *Festschrift* article is entitled "An attempt to contrast Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas". I am focusing on the unfinished essay that gave birth to this article, not only because it has been recently translated into English, but also because of its original form which was lost in the article. Indeed, what Edith originally had in mind was not a paper in the conventional academic sense of the word, but a short drama built as a dialogue between Aquinas and Husserl.

It is late in the evening in the study of Privy Counsellor Husserl in Freiburg. The old professor, tired of all the chatter around the celebration of his 70th birthday, says to himself: "I would appreciate a decent conversation on philosophy to get my mind back on track". At that moment he hears a knock on the door: "At this late hour, come in please!". There appears a religious in white habit and black mantle who declares that he is really sorry to bother Husserl at this hour but that he had no other chance to have a serious conversation with him due to the circumstances of the day. Husserl is unable to place him: "I've had religious as students before, but to tell the truth I don't remember any with your particular color-scheme". The religious explains that he is Thomas Aquinas and the conversation begins. Strikingly, Stein will use the same dramatic plot many years later in a play that she composed at the Carmel of Echt a year before she was arrested. But that time, the late visitor who knocked at the door was Esther, the Biblical queen, and the one who welcomed her was the prioress of the Echt convent. That night, the discussion did not roll on philosophy, but the extermination of Jews. But let us return to the dialogue between Husserl and Aquinas which witnesses the very last moments of another Germany, a country where intellectuals of Jewish descent like Stein and Husserl himself could still happily live and work at the heart of the academia.

In order to explain how this specific dialogue relates to what I have described as the dialogical problem of Western modernity, I first need to recount some aspects of Husserl's phenomenology and its place in the history of modern philosophy.

As is well known, the starting-point of this history is Descartes' doubt or the suspicion cast on our spontaneous attitude: that the things I see really exist outside of me.

Descartes reinvents the reality of the outside world based on the thinking subject's inner point of view. However, the reality of the outside world became very fleeting after Descartes. On the continent, the two major philosophical currents that emerged dramatically questioned the reliability of our spontaneous attitude. According to Kant, the way things are in the outside world is said to be unknowable by the subject since whatever the subject perceives or can think of, is already pre-informed by the structural conditions of its apprehension of the world. For German idealism or those who, like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, reacted against Kant's critical attitude, the exteriority of the world was a mere appearance hiding a deeper or higher type of unity between the thinking subject and the world. At the time of Edith Stein, the prevailing philosophical line in German universities furthered Kant's a priori doctrine by establishing new connections with spheres of knowledge as diverse as logics, mathematics, aesthetics, morals, history and religion. This multifarious movement was labeled as neo-Kantianism. In this intellectual landscape, Edmund Husserl's approach, the so-called *phenomenology*, broke totally new grounds by tracing a way back to the starting-point of modern philosophy; namely, the pivotal moment of Descartes's *Cogito*. "Back to things themselves!" was the motto, and what was meant by that was the very content of our spontaneous attitude, although purified from its alleged "naivety". Naivety was identified with the belief in the external existence of the things we perceive – the mental act of positing their reality beyond our mental act, the reliability of which Descartes had famously put into doubt. In contrast to Kant and German idealists, Husserl would not claim that this existence was unknowable or different from what it seemed – this was already too much of a dogmatic or uncritical approach according to him. He would not even try to recover the reality of this external world using rational means as Descartes did. No, what Husserl suggested to do, as he repeatedly wrote, was simply to put the existence of the external world between parentheses – to decide not to bother with it. As Husserl claimed, this suspension, or "epoché" in Greek, opened the possibility for the subject to focus on what it would spontaneously neglect by engaging with the objects of its experience in a practical way; namely, the possibility to "see," contemplate and analyze the content of our everyday experience in a theoretical manner. Successfully managing to distinguish in this content – be it the perception of an object, a feeling, an association of ideas or anything else – what was essential from what was accidental, Husserl called *Wesensschau*, "vision" or "intuition" of the essence. For instance, my feeling of joy has an essence that makes it immediately identifiable by other human beings even if many do not know the circumstances that produced it and none will ever be able to experience my joy the way I experience it.

"Back to things themselves!" was the motto, and what was meant by that was the very content of our spontaneous attitude, although purified from its alleged "naivety."

Clearly, the philosophical approach of Husserl, formerly trained as a mathematician, is faithful to the *Wissenschaft* ideal in the strictest possible manner. No reasoning based on a reality that would lie beyond the ken of our experience, and therefore implying a questionable induction from it, is allowed in the field of phenomenology. The paradigmatically scientific character of Husserl's phenomenology makes us understand the philosophically dramatic challenge that lies behind Stein's hypothetical conversation between Aquinas and Husserl: As he is allowed to visit a world that has become very different from the one he once knew, will the Dominican Saint be able to show that phenomenological truths point towards Christian Truth without indulging in rationally unwarranted inductions – without infringing the purely scientific *modus operandi* of the ageing but still innovative German philosopher?

At this point, I need to mention an additional element pertaining to Husserl's philosophical approach. I said that the phenomenological epoché was about leaving aside the question regarding the external existence of the objects we perceive. But this left open the issue of the origin or the constitution of our experience. When he published his *Ideen* in 1913, Husserl made a very bold step in that regard, a step so bold that it actually alienated most of his closest disciples at the time, including Edith Stein. In his *Ideen*, Husserl claimed that the task of phenomenology was to describe how the transcendental Ego or the knowing Subject would animate or give a meaningful structure to the "blind" sensory matter of our experience through an indefinite series of intentional acts. Husserl's first disciples saw here an uncritical or dogmatic return to Kant's critical idealism, a move that, coming from the one who had taught them to sever all dogmatic claims from philosophical research, remained by and large unexplainable. As realists, they wanted to reserve the possibility for phenomenology to discover from within the transcendental Ego's experience, envisaged without any presupposition regard-

ing the existence and nature of the external world, that the content of this experience, far from being constituted by the Ego, could not ultimately come but from the external world. It is at this point that Edith Stein relies on Aquinas against Husserl's idealism. But this is not simply about Aquinas' theory of knowledge in the modern sense of the term. It is about God's reality as implied by Aquinas' original theory of knowledge. In other words, what Stein wants to prove is that a truly non-dogmatic, purely rational or faithfully Husserlian approach to the process of knowledge is bound to replace the transcendental Ego of Husserl's idealism with Aquinas' God as its ultimate founding principle.

Stein's imaginary dialogue is but an instance not only of what can be, but what should crucially be done; namely, to unleash the rational power that cannot be separated from the truth of Christian faith.

In Stein's unpublished essay, just as in her published article, the whole discussion focuses on the notion of immediacy. What does Husserl mean, exactly, when he claims that Wesensschau, the intuition of essences, is immediate? Stein's Aquinas distinguishes between the immediacy of the object known and the immediacy of the act that leads to it. Only logical principles, as well as the perception of the Good, are immediate in both senses. As for the stable conceptual content that I discover when I explore my experience of joy, that which makes this joy of mine part of joy as a general type of feeling, but also a uniquely distinct joy that I will always remember as such, it is certainly a given in the sense that it is not derived *a posteriori* from the objects of my experience – it is itself an object of immediate inner experience. However, this object does not manifest its essential content; namely, as endowed with an ideal structure that enables me to identify it as one very specific feeling of joy, without an effort of the mind that distinguishes this ideal structure from all the elements – feelings, perceptions, memories and so on – in which it is entangled but that do not relate to it. At the same time, this stable ideal structure, that which Aristotle used to call *eidos* and Aquinas *species*, does not encapsulate the whole reality that the *Wesensschau* brings to the fore: The essence of *this my joy* is a much deeper and more complex reality than the abstract idea that merely helps me to explore it. As Stein's Aquinas declares: "Intuition of essence aims at the *whole* essence, but this intention is only partially *fulfilled*" (Stein 2000:60). Accordingly, one could say that this unfulfilled intuition is sufficient to provide me with the certainty that there is an ideal reality located beyond my intentional reach – and that this is the very ideal reality from which my experience within space and time, in *status viae* as Aquinas would say, derives. There is simply no other way to account for the intelligible or logical structure of my experience than to posit ideas to which my world owes its order and structure, ideas that are everything that mentally perceptible essences are except actual spatiotemporal existence. As Stein's Aquinas – who by now must really know what he is talking about – declares: "The seeing of the blessed encompasses the whole essence in one simple intuition, *uno intuitu*" (2000:59). In this manner, the immanent definition of truth as the correspondence between our ideas and their origin in the external world *intellectus mensuratus et non-mensurans*, is discovered to imply another notion of truth, a more fundamental and transcendent one; namely, the correspondence between things in the external world and their origin in God's creative mind, *intellectus mensurans et non-mensuratus*. What Stein establishes is that Husserl's Egocentric cosmos in the transcendental sense of the word, this apparently self-contained world of our modern immanent reason, once critically analyzed, opens up from within to Aquinas' Theocentric universe; namely, to the contemplation of the first Truth in relationship to which we can speak of truths. Ultimately, it opens to Christ as Word-Logos of the Father, the eternal Truth in which all the truths of the world were conceived and continue to hold together.

Here is what can only be a rough sketch of Stein's imaginary dialogue between Aquinas and Husserl. I dare say that, with all its limitations, it conveys the picture of a both genuine and ingenuous attempt at restoring the metaphysical flow between the truths of Christian faith and that associated with the modern scientific attitude. This is but an instance not only of what can be, but what should crucially be done; namely, to unleash the rational power that cannot be separated from the truth of Christian faith. Let us therefore hope this type of dialogue will happen again and again, so that the final words of Stein's Aquinas will prove to be true: "Here we must stop for today. We shall meet again, and then, from the depths we shall understand one another" (2000:62).

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READING THE ANCIENTS

AN INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS KJELLER JOHANSEN

By Åsne Dorthea Grøgaard *&* Adrian Kristing Ommundsen

Thomas Kjeller Johansen studied philosophy and the Classics at Cambridge University, where he did his doctoral work on Aristotle and the sense-organs under the supervision of Myles Burnyeat. He has taught at the Universities of Bristol and Edinburgh, and for the last ten years he was University Lecturer and Professor in Ancient Philosophy at Oxford University. Earlier this year, he took up position here at IFIKK, and he'll be teaching, among other things, ancient philosophy, which was the very general subject of our conversation.

First of all, welcome to the University of Oslo! After ten years at Oxford, what was it that caught your interest here at IFIKK? Was it the new master's programme in Ancient philosophy?

That's not the first time I've had that question! Being sort of Scandinavian, my mum is Danish, my dad is Norwegian, and as I've been abroad for thirty years now, I thought now was probably the best time – I don't want to get too old. But I also love Norway, and it's a great department. It's quite unique to have that many colleagues in Ancient philosophy, so that makes for good seminars and discussions – and *help* with your research, which is a really important thing! I think it's going to take some time to get the new programme off the ground, but I'm optimistic because, as I said, we've got a great team of Ancient philosophy teachers here, so I think Oslo should be a very attractive place for people to come to. There are some structural challenges to do with setting up a new MA, which any university would face, and one of them in a smaller subject like Ancient philosophy is the question of how many ancient philosophers the world can actually accommodate. And how do we do it in a way so that it would be attractive to the sort of people who may not have a background in ancient philosophy, but would like one, or would like to explore it. So on one hand to make it open, but at the same time a tool for people – sufficiently serious, you know, for a research degree, so that they can go on to do a PhD, here or elsewhere. So those are just general challenges. I haven't been involved in setting it up because I've just arrived, so I look forward to learning more about it.

It could be said that many, or maybe even most, modern philosophical debates can be traced back to the debate between Plato and Aristotle. Would you agree that this is the case, and if so, to what extent?

Whitehead came up with this quote that Western philosophy is footnotes to Plato. I think that's a wild exaggeration. I mean, there are so many areas of modern philosophy today that have moved beyond. I think one important fact is that philosophy so often today is philosophy *of*: philosophy of physics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of psychology or whatever. And that means that because of all these developments in the sciences, philosophy itself has to change too, and the theorizing has to change to accommodate that. One could press the claim for Plato, but I think this claim just becomes less and less interesting. There are probably some areas where it's more true than in other areas. If you're talking about the status of universals, or the role of teleology in biological explanation; those are areas where modern philosophers might still want to look at Plato. I did my

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PhD on Aristotle and the sense organs at a point when people were very excited about the question whether Aristotle was the first functionalist in the philosophy of mind. And I didn't think so. But it was a really interesting debate, and people got a lot out of it, also in terms of reading Aristotle in new ways. I think the consensus ended up being that Aristotle was *not* the first functionalist. But it was a nice try!

It poses a particular challenge to read ancient philosophers as if they were precursors of modern debates, of modern positions. And whether that's the right way of reading ancient philosophy I'm not sure, but quite a lot of people have approached it like that. So you've kind of done a good job when you've shown that Aristotle is interesting to a modern philosopher who is in the middle of this debate. But to try to argue that ancient philosophers already occupied positions familiar from modern debates may not be the most interesting thing to do in ancient philosophy. Philosophy, of course, moves on all the time; sometimes you may actually want to move beyond a particular current debate. Sometimes ancient philosophers can make you think in a completely *different* way, and that I think is even more exciting.

You mentioned teleology in relation to Plato. Would you say that there is teleology in Plato's philosophy, and if so, how does it compare to that of Aristotle?

That's a really interesting question. There are quite a lot of students of ancient philosophy who are Aristotelians in a way that they see Aristotle as developing his key positions as a rejection of Plato. That's the Aristotle versus Plato school of thought. And they've done that on the subject of teleology in particular. Plato wrote a work, the *Timaeus*, his cosmology, about how a divine creator set out to make the world as beautiful and good as possible. So the entire world is structured in such a way as to display order – and that's also beauty. It's a particular kind of order, mathematically informed order. And though the world is not completely beautiful or completely ordered, it is still kind of the best of all possible ones. That gives you a teleological agenda in trying to explain how the world is put together. What you are trying to do is reconstruct what the divine maker was thinking when he tried to make the world as good as possible. What were his ends?

Now put that on one side. Then we've got Aristotle. Aristotle has got a teleology which is what we call natural teleology, whereby there are ends in nature that are also causes – final causes more specifically – and that means that things happen in nature; things grow, change, things have parts that serve the ends that are natural to those kinds of living beings. Now here *ends* operate as seen from *within* the kind of being we're talking about, and not as objects of a mind, a divine creator's mind. But Aristotle also sometimes, in particular in *Metaphysics Λ*, talks about how there is a world order. So it's not just that each kind of living being has its own kind of ends, but also that those kinds of ends are sort of coordinated. It seems like there's a kingdom in nature, with God as a king, ensuring somehow that there's not just order to be found at the level of individual species but also in the totality of the cosmos. Now, that reading is very controversial because you can hear that it's beginning to sound like Plato's teleology. So, the battle lines are perhaps twofold. One is: Do natural ends work from within the living beings, in which they work as final causes, or do they work from the outside? And the second is: Do final causes, ends, have to occur as objects of a consciousness, a mind, in order to be efficacious? On those two points you can say that Aristotle and Plato differ on their teleological thinking.

But it gets more complicated than that. Some people have gone as far as to say that Plato wasn't really a teleologist, at least not by Aristotle's standards, exactly because he doesn't understand how ends work internally in living beings and not as objects of consciousness, as objects of the mind. The problem is that Aristotle consistently uses craft, art – the Greek word is *techne* – for final causes and ends' work in nature. He will in fact conduct some of his argument in *Physics book II*, which is the key text here, just in terms of this craft analogy. He will say: If this is how it works in craft – craftsmen have ends and do things with a purpose, and the purpose is good and whatever else they do serves as means to those good ends – then that's final causation. Well, if that's what happens in the crafts then that's also what happens in nature. So people who think that Aristotle and Plato's teleologies are entirely different struggle a bit with this. Because here you have Aristotle using craftsmen who are conscious operators, working on materials from without to make them as good as possible, in fact very much like Plato's divine creator who is exactly a craftsman. So it becomes harder, really, to keep this strong division between Aristotle and Plato's teleologies, given how much Aristotle insists on

using the craftsman model to explicate what's involved in natural teleology.

What would you say is Aristotle's stance on Platonic forms?

Well, again that's a really interesting question, and again the battle lines are drawn. We have sort of a stereotype going back to Raphael's *School of Athens*: Plato pointing up and Aristotle pointing down. It's probably not about *forms*, that's not the right reading of the painting, but in any case that's how people have seen the two philosophers. So for Aristotle the forms are immanent in things, whereas for Plato they are transcendental, separate from the things of which they are the forms. Aristotle has an account of why Plato came to believe this, which is in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, where he says that Plato developed the theory of forms out of two kinds of theories or beliefs he had inherited from other philosophers. The first one was from Socrates, that knowledge is about definitions, and definitions are of forms, common universal characteristics. These are, as Plato describes them – for example in the *Meno* – things that make the things that participate in them what they are. So the form of the Bee is what makes bees bees; it is by somehow participating in or having the features of the form of Bee that bees become bees. So, the forms are some sort of universals and have some sort of causal role. That's what we're defining when we are defining things according to Socrates, and we have knowledge of something when we can define that thing.

That's one influence, and the other influence is from Heraclitus. So, Heraclitus says that everything changes, and Plato took this to be true of the physical, perceptible world. But that, in turn, meant that if you ask 'What is it knowledge *of*?' and the answer is 'universal features' that we define – then there is nothing corresponding to that in the physical world, because everything changes. So, it doesn't seem that there are any objects in the physical world that our knowledge could be about, and that's where Plato introduced these forms, which in a way are the perfect objects for definitions to correspond to. That's how Plato's forms came about. Then Aristotle criticises this, particularly this point of the forms somehow being causes of the particular things, because he says, among other things, that you can't really understand how the forms can be causes if they are *separate* from that of which they are the causes. So, that attaches particularly to what Aristotle calls efficient causes. He doesn't see how the forms can play that role. Now, whether Plato ever thought that the forms should play that role is quite unclear: If we go back to his *Timaeus*, we've got this craftsman, the divine creator, who looks to the forms and creates a copy; this world is a copy of the forms. So, the efficient cause here is not the forms, but the divine creator, and there seems to be this particular sort of role for that in the picture. Aristotle ignores this. So, perhaps behind this critique there is actually a lot more agreement. Our impression that Plato and Aristotle's theories of forms (because Aristotle has a theory of forms too, as immanent forms) are completely different is partly a result of Aristotle's rhetoric against Plato, particularly in texts like the *Metaphysics*. But when we read Plato's entire work, it actually seems that Plato's theory accommodates quite a lot of the points that Aristotle uses to criticise him.

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In the second book of his main psychological work De Anima*, Aristotle writes that the soul "cannot be separated from the body". But he immediately goes on to say: "Still, some parts of the soul might well not be actualities of any body and might therefore be separable". Could you give an explanation of this, as related to the Platonic forms – is Aristotle suggesting that there can be forms without matter? What parts of the soul could he be thinking of here?*

So, he's talking about the soul here, and he's particularly interested in the intellect, and whether there's a kind of intellect that might be separate or separable from the rest of the *soul*. And because the rest of the soul is not separable from the *body*, it requires the body of which it is the form, this kind of intellect would be separable from the body as well. So, if that part of the soul is separable from body, what is it? It would certainly make it *like* the Platonic forms, rather along the lines of the argument in Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates suggests that the soul, like the forms, might be immortal. So there's a kind of essential kinship between the soul and the forms. There's a bit of that going on, just with different ontological categories, in Aristotle too. But I think his primary interest is not really in the question of forms, but this kind of *theoretical soul*. And then there's a long, long debate

about this as with almost anything else in Aristotle: Whether this intellect then is part of our human nature, so that we have this theoretical intellect in us, that is part of our souls while we are alive, but when our bodies die then that part kind of gets separated and drifts off and leads a life somewhere else. That's a thought. Or whether this theoretical soul, once narrowed down and really understood – this would be in *Γ 3.5* – is actually God. This separable intellect was actually God all along, and not part of our individual souls. We did not each have our own theoretical intellect; it was somehow God we were dealing with.

This is a really obscure issue, and we don't get that much in the *De Anima*, we have to piece together the story in some other texts. I happen to agree with this last point: I think God is what is traditionally called the agent intellect, the active intellect, which is a condition of our successfully thinking of things. The thought goes back to Plato's *Republic* with the Image of the Sun, where you have the form of the good, which provides a medium of successful thinking and understanding, and it's God that provides that – but as I said this is very contentious.

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In your book from 2012, The Powers of Aristotle's Soul*, you investigate Aristotle's* De Anima*, and claim that the soul's capacities serve as causal principles. Could you explain why you think this is the case?*

In a way the thesis is not too controversial: that we have these different capacities in our souls, faculties, abilities to do things and to be affected in certain ways and that those capacities are constitutive of our nature. The question is, I suppose, just *how* you understand these capacities, how you understand their relationship to each other, and how it works out in practice as an explanatory agenda for Aristotle's psychology. In fact, not just for his psychology, but also for his biology; that follows from his study of the soul, because the soul is the principle of the life activities of living beings. So all of that gets a lot more complicated and you easily get involved in a lot of debates about various activities of the soul. There's also a modern context, which was part of the reason I got interested in this, and that is that *faculty psychology* has had a revival in recent years. People have become interested in this idea that one can think of there being different sorts of functional units within the mind, with a certain kind of functional independence, and then one could understand the function of the mind as a whole, as a sort of aggregate or cooperation of these different kinds of units. I think this also applies to Aristotle at least in a sort of broad brush way, and part of why this is a good agenda for somebody like Aristotle to adopt is its explanatory economy: You can just assume a few basic principles, capacities, and then you can do a lot of explaining with those, you can explain a whole range of different psychological phenomena. So that's a nice thing; the hunt is on for the fewest possible principles and capacities, because the fewer you have the more explanatory power they have. So I thought that was also part of what Aristotle was doing in his psychology, and that's why there's an argument in the book that for a lot of the psychological phenomena we might be tempted to assume *distinct* capacities where the same explaining can be done with the few existing capacities that we have. I tried to show that in the case of a range of perceptual activities like imagination, dreaming, and various of other kinds of high order perception, they can all actually be understood as functions of a single perceptual capacity. In the case of animals' ability to move, do we need to posit a distinct kind of locomotive capacity, an ability to move in space, as a distinct capacity, or can we explain it in terms of already accepted capacities? The latter is what I argued for: We can explain their ability to move in terms of perception and reason, because these can be understood as having desiderative aspects. Both reason and perception in their full functioning involve desires for certain kinds of things, and that's why we can understand these capacities already as moving us in certain characteristic ways, so we don't need to introduce any further ones. So those are just examples of how you can achieve explanatory economy within a faculty psychology of Aristotle's kind.

Where would such an explanatory economy leave the capacity of intellect? Does it fall outside of natural philosophy?

This theoretical intellect we were talking about? That's a good question, because I do think it falls outside, and I don't think it's part of natural philosophy. The psychology of Aristotle is part of natural philosophy; it operates with the same causes and perhaps most importantly with compounds of form and matter. And we see that throughout

Aristotle's explanations of various psychological capacities: They are capacities that are realised in matter, that's part of what they are. But with the theoretical intellect that doesn't seem to be the case, it's separable from the body as we said. So one of the advantages for my overall line of argument, of saying that the theoretical intellect at least understood as the active intellect is God, is that I don't need to fit it in into the account of the human soul as part of the study of natural being.

Would you say that these capacities of the Aristotelian soul could be considered parts of the soul? And in that case, how does this differ from Plato's partition of the soul?

That's probably the bit I found most difficult in writing this book. Again we have to separate what Plato says, what we think Plato says, and then what Aristotle thinks that Plato says. So we have texts like the *Republic* book 4 with the division of the soul into three parts, and each of those parts seem to have a distinct kind of desire, that's in book 9. The intellect has a desire for truth, the spirited part has a desire for honour, and the appetitive part has a desire for bodily pleasures. Now, it's easy to come to think of them as independent agents, these parts, and in a way Plato invites us to think like that when he compares the intellect to the human within us, the spirited to a lion, and the appetitive part to a many headed beast. So it's almost like treating these different parts as if they were individual substances with their own distinct agency. That's the sort of view that most people who talk about parts are worried about, it's what we think of as *homunculi* and that's supposed to be a bad thing. But I'm not sure Plato is guilty of this. When he introduces these parts of soul he just asks "Is it the case that when we think and desire and so on, that we do this as a whole or do we do these different things with one part or another part?" And the way he talks strongly suggests that he still thinks that we are the agent and that these are instrumental parts in relation to what we do as agents. So if we end up with this problem I don't think it's what Plato is trying to say.

Aristotle reads Plato as if he takes spatial distinctness to be a criterion of psychic parthood, that's to say if the psychological part is located at a distinct part of the body then it's a distinct part. He probably got this from the *Timaeus* where these three parts have their own region in the body. Aristotle disagrees with this, and that becomes the apparent disagreement with Plato. Aristotle says: "These parts of the soul cannot be understood as spatially distinct". He uses the example of a worm; he cuts up a worm and he says: "Look, each of these parts has the same functions – they can still wriggle and perceive!" So it's not spatial discreteness that constitutes psychological parthood, but rather a kind of *functional* distinctness: the ability to do different things. You understand the capacity to perceive as being just that, and the other capacities are defined differently. It's still not clear whether that's sufficient to make those capacities distinct parts. What I've tried to argue in this book – building on other people's work, Jennifer Whiting and others – is that when we're talking about parts we're actually talking about psychological capacities that are not just definitionally different, that's to say there are different elements in their definition, but that they are definitionally *independent* or *separate*: They don't make reference to each other. Going back to my earlier example of imagination, which I take to be an aspect of the perceptual part, I can define imagination, and Aristotle does define imagination, using rather different terms than just the way in which you would define perception proper. But it's still quite clearly a functional aspect of perception and makes reference to perception in its definition. Thinking, on the other hand, doesn't make any definitional reference to perception. So we can treat that as a distinct part and the other things that depend on thinking as analogous to the way in which imagination relates to perception. That goes back to the point about using these parts to establish explanatory economy. You can lump or cluster together various psychological functions around key capacities that then have the status of a part of the soul. So that is what I'm trying to argue for, though again, Aristotle's text is really difficult.

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How would you say that Aristotle's thoughts about the soul could be relevant to modern philosophy, especially to the philosophy of mind?

I mentioned the point about functionalism earlier, as a possible kind of avenue of exploring similarities between modern and ancient philosophy.

When I was at Oxford I was working with David Charles, who's now working at Yale, who thought that what is actually really interesting about Aristotle is that unlike very many philosophers of mind since Descartes, he does not think of how we can explain the correlation or relation of physical and mental events. Ever since Descartes we've had this idea of the mind–body problem. They seem to be different kinds of things, mental states and physical states, and there are many different ways in which one can relate them to each other, from dualism to reductive physicalism. But what's interesting about Aristotle in this context is that he treats mental events as intrinsically psychophysical; you can't really separate the mental from the physical in these events. This follows from his *hylomorphism*. David uses some examples that Aristotle also uses, for example weaving. Weaving, is that a physical activity? It's something you *do*, you are moving, and for Aristotle it would be something involving the soul, since soul is the principle of movement. You are of course doing things with the body, but you can't really separate what you are doing with the body from what you are doing with your soul; in a way you have two descriptions, at most, of the same event. I'm not sure if this interpretation quite works out, but it's an interesting way of using Aristotle to give a completely different perspective on well-known debates. It would be nice if it worked out, both philosophically and as an interpretation of Aristotle.

We've been touching on how we as modern philosophers should read ancient philosophers, and this could be seen as a general problem: Do you think we should use our own logical and philosophical apparatus when treating problems in ancient texts?

In the 1950's, people like Gregory Vlastos or Gwilym Owen started doing what we think of as analytical ancient philosophy: You formalize arguments and see what goes wrong or right – as you would do reading a modern philosopher. Gilbert Ryle did that too; he thought that the greatest compliment that you could pay to ancient philosophers was actually to treat them like modern philosophers. And I think the last fifty plus years show that there's been a lot of truth to that; there's been a lot of progress in our readings of ancient philosophers.

There is of course the question about whether this is sometimes anachronistic: using conceptual terms that are not the terms of the philosophers themselves. I'm not sure that's too much of a worry, presumably anthropologists are allowed to use a theoretical framework to explain the people that he or she is studying, but it's certainly worth being reflective about those terms we're using to make sure that they are appropriate. There's also of course the danger of creating debates around the function of our own interpretive terms rather than the function of the texts themselves. To take one example: One question we've raised in the ancient metaphysics class this semester is whether Parmenides and Plato argue using different senses of *being*: existential, veridical, predicative etc., and then the search is on for which one we have in this particular passage. And there's pretty good evidence that ancient writers didn't distinguish in those ways. Of course we're still free to use these terms ourselves in part of our assessment, and to say: "I think that that's actually what's going wrong here, even if the ancient philosopher wouldn't conceptualize things like that." So, I'm not too worried about this – I'm not a conceptual relativist myself who thinks that there's a sort of an unbridgeable gap between the ancient and the modern concepts so that we can't even talk to each other.

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How important is language, then, in the study of ancient philosophers?

It's hugely important, and in my own experience of reading texts it's only when you read it in the original language that you actually get the sense of the range of possible meanings and can make informed choices. But even then, of course, we're in this position of abject mediocrity as far as our knowledge of the ancient languages is concerned. Most schoolboys in the nineteenth century who had been learning Greek from an early age would master it better that I do, probably, and that's just a function of the modern education system. But there is also the fact that we don't *speak* ancient Greek. I always thought that it's a very odd way of relating to a language, just reading it. I was delighted when I started learning modern Greek, because I thought: "It's not ancient Greek, but it's still a

way of relating to a strikingly similar language," in the way in which I think one should relate to a language, which is by speaking it and hearing it and so on. So if only we had that with ancient Greek, it would be so much better.

We've touched upon your work on Plato's natural philosophy and the Aristotelian soul. What projects are you currently working on?

I'm working on *craft*. It was a result of my study of Plato's natural philosophy, this idea that God is a craftsman. But I got interested, basically, in what the ancients thought craft was, such that they could use it as an explanatory model – not just in natural philosophy, in the natural teleology we talked about, but also in ethics and aesthetics: Ethical knowledge is a lot like having craft knowledge – perhaps it is the craft of how to construct your life; aesthetics is a matter of knowing how to make things. There are a lot of areas where the ancient philosophers turn to craft as a model for what it is to know something, so I thought it would be interesting to be clear about what those kinds of comparisons involved from different philosophers. I've been working on this for a while, and I hope at some point there will be a book coming out of it.

Then I'm also doing something more specific, which is a translation and commentary of the first two books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which also deals quite a lot with craft, but more generally with Aristotle's relationship to his predecessors. I'm quite interested in the Pre-Socratics, and questions about the beginnings of philosophy.



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Speaking of the Pre-Socratics: Is there a discontinuity between the Pre-Socratics and Socrates, or the philosophers following him?

Philosophers *after* Socrates, like Plato, return to things that the Pre-Socratics were concerned with too. So, people say that there's sort of a break with Socrates, because Socrates is no longer concerned with natural philosophy. He says it's far too complex, when he doesn't even know who or what he himself is, so ethics becomes his focus it seems. I don't think that means that Socrates completely forgets about the cosmos or natural philosophy. Xenophon reports on how Socrates uses cosmic order like the beauty of the eye as a parallel for goodness in the ethical realm. I think he's still interested in the cosmos even if he's not studying it in the manner of a cosmologist. And of course, the Pre-Socratics are also interested in ethics, so it's a kind of artificial break. It's also artificial chronologically, because ancient philosophers like Anaxagoras are actually contemporaries of Socrates. Still, there's clearly a difference – we haven't got Socrates's writings but I suppose we can tell from Plato – there's a difference in the manner of doing philosophy, a difference that Plato himself highlights repeatedly. Socrates does dialectic in a certain way, questions and answers; he's going for conceptual clarity. He very often breaks up people or interrupts people. In the *Protagoras*, for instance, when someone is about to give a long speech, Socrates says he's a forgetful type and that he's unable to follow it. And obviously he's not forgetful at all, he can cite long reams of Homer, but he's insisting on this to get conceptual clarity, argumentative clarity. Now that's a different way of doing philosophy.

Well, perhaps there's one interesting point. In Plato's *Parmenides* you get Pre-Socratics together with Socrates, talking to each other, and they actually end up doing a kind of dialectic anyway, one that's supposed to achieve conceptual clarity, and it's Parmenides talking. And Plato elsewhere expresses great respect and admiration for Parmenides, and they're presented as agreeing about *being* as something that is stable and unchanging. It's as though Parmenides's Being becomes Plato's forms, and they are presented as a condition for intellectual discourse. So, Plato presents it as if there's quite a lot of continuity. I also mentioned earlier the point about Heraclitus; if Aristotle is right then Plato kind of takes Heraclitus's view of the sensible world into his system, then there's quite a lot of continuity there. So, that's one reason why we study the Pre-Socratics, because they had a very palpable, clear influence on Plato and Aristotle. In his first book of *Metaphysics*, as I mentioned, Aristotle tries really to use the Pre-Socratic philosophers as a way of teasing out the basic principles of reality. He says that different philosophers have understood parts of the picture, and if you piece them together you actually get a pretty good picture of the basic principles of reality. They didn't get it quite right – they need Aristotle for that – but there's a sense that Aristotle and Plato are still working with the Pre-Socratic philosophers. They see themselves as being in a tradition, introducing new dialectical techniques, new methods of conceptual clarification and argument, but still building on the Pre-Socratics. And that is why we're studying the Pre-Socratics today, because if it weren't for Aristotle picking out Thales as the first philosopher, there wouldn't be a very strong compelling reason to include him as departure point in our history of Western Philosophy. It's really because Aristotle has a narrative about how these people fit in that we're still studying them as philosophers.

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I've only published one article on the Pre-Socratics as such, and that was about Parmenides. Parmenides is a very mysterious philosopher. He is the one who says that being is one and changeless, and that you can't talk about not-being, or know it. So there's only one true way, one proper way of inquiry, which is to talk about what *is*. And then he's got this whole other part of his poem, which is about the cosmos, which is premised on change and plurality and things not being in certain ways. This has been a standard puzzle in the literature: Why does he have this other way of talking about things, the way of opinion, when he's just insisted that there's only one proper way of talking about things? So, like many others I tried to give an answer to that; I tried to understand at least what kind of status this other way, the way of opinion, would have as a kind of image of the way of being. That was my idea, it's a way of talking about change in a way that maximises its likeness to being, and therefore gives it some degree of intellectual credibility.

There's a similarity between Plato here and

Parmenides which I try to bring out, particularly in the *Timaeus*, where Plato figures the cosmos as an image, as a likeness of eternal being, and therefore as having a degree of intelligibility. And the world for Plato has been made, as I said there's this craftsman, divine maker, who's made the world to be like that and that's *why* it's like that. It's beautiful *because* it's been made on the model of being. Parmenides has the same idea, that one can give a degree of intelligibility to the world of *becoming*, the cosmos, insofar as it resembles the way of being on certain points – not on all – but there's a degree of similarity and that gives it a degree of intelligibility. The difference between Plato and Parmenides is that there's no clear sign that Parmenides thinks that the world, the cosmos, is a likeness of being because it has been *made* to be a likeness of being. There isn't anything in Parmenides that corresponds to a divine craftsman or maker who has brought this likeness about. But nonetheless, the point about intelligibility through degree of similarity to being remains.

So again, in a way this continues our earlier discussion about the degree of continuity between Pre-Socratics and Plato and Aristotle. I like to think of these philosophers as being in dialogue with each other. Some of your questions in the beginning were very much about Plato *versus* Aristotle, and I think in some ways that's a false opposition. On some points it can be illuminating, but on other points I think it's more illuminating to think of it as a dialogue about forms, say, "Okay, we accept that there are forms, just how are we supposed to understand those?" Or: "We understand that there are final causes, ends, in the world, just how are we supposed to think of how they come about?" Sometimes the similarity is much greater than the difference. If you compare both Plato and Aristotle to the *atomists*, say, they're much more together. So this kind of question always has to be related to a background of comparison, a point of comparison with something. And if you don't have points of comparison we often end up exaggerating the differences between Aristotle and Plato. There's a book by Lloyd Gerson called *Aristotle and other Platonists*, a very nice title!

For a student of ancient philosophy, what are the five books or texts that one should read?

Well, goodness… I mean I always found Bernard Williams really inspiring to read, there are some articles one just comes back to time and again, say on the *Republic*, "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's Republic," that's a kind of thing one wants to read again and again. His book *Shame and Necessity* is a wonderful book. He's not even a classicist but he has a solid grounding in classics. And the sort of overall message of this book is that developmentalism is wrong. This goes back to our discussion about anachronism. There used to be a school of thought that said that the early Greeks, particularly in Homer, didn't have a concept of the body. They didn't have a concept of body because they always talk about body-parts, and never really talk about one unified body. And Williams really shows how nonsensical this kind of idea is, even though it was very influential. And he also talks about shame, how central shame is in early ancient ethics – not guilt, but shame, which is this idea of the external gaze, somebody who judges you by looking at you from the outside. And it's also how this gaze can be internalised, so it also works to prevent your own wrong actions. It's a wonderfully written book, and it's weaving together philosophical insights with lovely readings of ancient texts. I've always been very inspired by Bernard Williams' student, Myles Burnyeat, who was my PhD supervisor at Cambridge, and he also has a way of writing that is extremely inspiring. Somewhat similar as an exercise in classical scholarship with philosophical acumen is Burnyeat's *Culture and Society in Plato's Republic*. That's also an amazing web of observations and philosophical points and so on, it's great. So for me, Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have been the most influential writers on ancient philosophers. But if I was going to recommend five works in ancient philosophy to a student taking up ancient philosophy I'd say Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Plato's *Republic* and *Theaetetus*, Parmenides's *Poem*, and Seneca's *On Anger*.

TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS

Review of
Truth and Truthmakers
D. M. Armstrong
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004)

By Mariona Eiren Bohlin Sturm

The relation between a truth and the world
Is a truthmaker, he holds, – the things that make a truth be true.
"A man exists" is true, what makes it so?
Why, a man existing – so Armstrong wrote, a while ago.

He walks us through the different ones
– The possible, the general, the future truths –
A clearly written quest for what
Makes truths like these truths come out true.

A truth, a world, and a relation betwixt.
But what is the truth thus to the maker related?
Armstrong asks and quickly answers:
A proposition, but do not ask for details!

He takes propositions to be
Intentional objects of the sort that true or false can be.
Some of them, not part of his ontology: This makes it not
Easier to see how they – internally, necessarily –
Coupled to their makers are.

Among the central claims of his is that
A truthmaker necessitates its truth, and every truth a maker has.
Concisely and intelligently on the world-part, yes,
But to satisfy us that the truth on truth is his
Much more on truthbearers and the relation needed is.

FRA FORSKNINGSFRONTEN

IS TRUTH A PROPERTY?

By Carsten Martin Hansen

There's a distinctly modern take on truth, an appropriate and common label for which is *Deflationism*. A number of philosophers have advanced different versions of this view. The ones I'll be focusing on here are the prosentential theory of truth, the minimalist theory of truth and the pure disquotationalist theory.[1] These theories differ from each other in a number of respects, but also share an important common core. At the very heart of the deflationary conception lies a negative claim about truth's nature. Truth, deflationists insist, is not a 'substantive' or 'explanatory' property. *But what does that mean, and what turns on it?*

Getting one's mind around the question, and the debate to which it has given rise, is not a straightforward matter. It really is a very basic issue. Furthermore, it can quite quickly – and for good reason – demand a level of precision to which I cannot aspire here. Finally, there is the fact that though the issue may sound interesting enough, it can easily seem to be a relatively narrow one. This is not so. I shall say very little about the differences between the three abovementioned theories, and will instead focus on what it is they have in common. My aim is to provide something that might serve as a way into the topic, in a manner which reveals its wider significance. Rather than simply being about which among several theories of truth we should choose, the question that underlies this debate constitutes a fault line: it is one of philosophy's *pivotal* issues.

The question about truth's nature is *au fond* one about truth's relations – or lack of such relations – to other things. It's about truth's place in the world, so to speak. It's for this reason that taking a stand on the matter has implications that aren't confined to the philosophy of truth (as it is customarily pursued). The most striking consequence, perhaps, is that coming down on one side or another of the debate has immediate implications, at the most fundamental level, about the nature of mind. If deflationism is right, then *intentionality* is nowhere to be found.[2] If so, then whether the deflationary conception of truth is correct depends on the nature of mind. Thus, an informed decision on the question about truth's nature has to involve consideration of our best theories of mind. I am myself convinced that this involves careful scrutiny of the most advanced sciences of the mind, which I shall argue for in the last section of the paper.

Deflationary theories compete with more traditional ones, such as the correspondence and coherence theories of truth. If deflationism is right, they are wrong.[3] A quick look at the disagreement between them can not only help locate the views in relation to one another, but also give us an initial handle on what it means to assert or deny that truth is a 'substantive' property.

Traditional theories seek to answer the question: What is it for a statement or a proposition to be true? In what does something's being true *consist*?[4] (Some of these theories should be seen, not as directly trying to answer this metaphysical question, but rather as attempting to provide an analysis of the concept of truth. But this needn't concern us.) The correspondence theory, for example, starts from the idea that a statement's being true is a matter of its

being in accord with reality. Unpacked ever so slightly, on such a theory, a statement's being true *consists in* its standing in a particular relation – the correspondence relation – to the appropriate part of reality.

Though the initial idea obviously has immense appeal, correspondence theorists more or less immediately ran into a host of problems trying to work out the details of their proposal, not least that of giving a precise account of the specific correspondence relation they envisage, and settling on a workable conception of the *relata*. This is where we can see the deflationist as proposing to slice through a Gordian knot. For the correspondence relation is *precisely* an instance of a 'substantive' property – it's a relational property that obtains between things. And that, according to deflationists, is where the traditional theories make their most basic mistake. By denying that truth is a substantive property, deflationists deny an assumption that underlies the traditional debate between correspondence and coherence theorists. Rather than seeking to provide a different answer to the question that occupied the latter theorists, deflationists *reject* it.

At this point, a little more needs be said about the notion of a substantive (or explanatory) property.[5] Consider the world (so to speak). It contains all manner of things – cabbages and kings and even propositions (if philosophers are to be believed). Now, of some of the myriad things that comprise the world, we want to know if they have natures, or how they are constituted, and we also want to know how they causally interact with one another, if they do. Substantive properties are the ones we would have to invoke in giving *correct* explanations of (some part or aspect of) the world's constitutive and causal structure. This is why the properties in question are also called 'explanatory' properties. (My preference for the term 'substantive' stems from the fact that a property's being 'explanatory' is ultimately a matter of its figuring in world's constitutive and causal structure.)

My weight is an example of a substantive, or explanatory, property. If I step on a sturdy cardboard box, say, what happens will roughly speaking depend upon some of the box's properties and some of mine – *inter alia* my weight. Consider, then, the property of being a place where my mother loved to go shelling (collecting sea shells). Many places have it: The mud flats of the Old Dhow harbour in Mombasa (home to the dark Onyx cowry and the extremely rare *Marginalis*), the outer reefs at Shimoni and Tiwi, and a rugged beach, north of Nyali, on whose rocks – but only when the tide had *just* begun to recede – one could find the exquisite Black Humped cowry.

Is there *really* such a property as being a place where my mother loved to go shelling? Well, there *is* a conception of what a property is – corresponding roughly to the semantic value of a predicate – on which it is indeed a property, and on which the aforementioned places have it. What it is not is a *substantive* or *explanatory* property; it is merely a reflection of the structure of our language. Deflationists hold that it is with the property of being true just as it is with the property of being a place where my mother loved to go shelling. Neither is a part of the fabric of the world. Both are reflections of the structure of our language.

If God were to make an inventory of all the properties that make a difference in the world, truth would not be among them; that's one way of formulating deflationism's key metaphysical thesis. Deflationism denies, in other words, that truth can be identified with *any* substantive property. This thesis cannot rest on its (allegedly) having been shown that truth cannot be identified with one, two or three of them. And a full-dress defence of deflationism requires more than showing that the traditional theories of truth are inadequate.[6] (One might suppose that there is at least a decent inference to the best explanation to be made in deflationism's favour, but, for reasons that will emerge, that too is doubtful.) *How, then, might one argue for as strong a metaphysical claim as the one that deflationists want and need to make?*

It's time to turn to the other two principal elements of a deflationary theory. Words have a purpose, they answer to the needs of a community and its individuals. If a fragment of language were to lose its function, it would very likely wither away. (Unless, of course, the words that comprise it are put to new use.) The second element in a deflationary theory is an account of why we have, and often use, a truth-predicate (and cognate expressions). On that basis, and as its third principal element, a deflationary theory puts forward an account of the rules and principles governing its use (which may be said to account for its meaning, or the concept it expresses).

These are very interesting issues. But they present themselves with particular force to the deflationist. For the word 'true' (or 'is true') is, from a grammatical perspective, clearly a predicate. And, at least upon reflection, a considerable number of us (not just philosophers) would agree that it is used to speak about something highly significant. After all, in the lives of rational, reflective beings *truth* is the (or at least a) fundamental dimension of assessment of our beliefs, assertions, theories, etc.

According to deflationism, however, truth – whatever

it is that is the worldly correlate of the *word* – is something utterly trivial. But if it really is *that* trivial, how come we have a word for it? What is its point, its *raison d'être*? One can perhaps see why philosophers could have made a mistake about truth's *nature*, prone as they are to lofty speculation based on highly controversial assumptions. But no philosopher is responsible for the existence, and continued use, of a *word* for truth in natural languages. So, surely, the deflationist owes us an explanation for its existence.[7] As we shall soon see, the account they give of the matter turns out to be of huge importance for their overall view.

Deflationists disagree among themselves both about the point of the truth predicate – what it does for us – and about the concept it expresses (or its meaning). These, I have said, are two of the three main elements of a deflationary theory of truth. In addition, deflationists disagree on several issues that also loomed large in the earlier debate – about what are the primary *bearers* of truth (sentences, utterances, or propositions, for example), and whether truth can be defined. Thus, there's a perfectly natural perspective from which it seems that just about the *only* thing deflationists agree on is the (negative) metaphysical thesis. Whence the significant common ground I have been insisting upon?

Here it is important to remember that the claim that truth is not a substantive property is the sum total of what deflationists think is worth saying about the metaphysics of truth. (Insofar as there is anything more one could add to their account, it is, on their view, of no significance.) So they agree on what there is to say about the nature of truth. And that is no small thing. Furthermore, the suggestion that this is still the only thing they have in common overlooks the crucial *unifying* feature of these otherwise disparate accounts. Each of the competing sets of answers to the last two questions – what the point is of our notion of truth, and what its content is – are in the *service* of the metaphysical thesis. They comprise variants of the deflationists' *master argument* for their position(s).

The basic idea is very simple (as good ideas often are). It begins by acknowledging that, grammatically, 'true' is indeed a predicate. But – and this is their crucial claim – if we reflect on the point of the truth predicate, and then carefully consider the actual uses to which it is put, we will see that none of them really involve attributing the property of being true to anything in the world. As an ordinary predicate, it could have been used, as many of them are, to ascribe a substantial property to things. But as a matter of fact, it never is. And, once we understand its actual role, we can see that there is little to suggest that it ever will be. (What that role is, according to deflationism, needs some spelling out, which I shall attempt to do shortly.) At a minimum, deflationists take this argument to show that their position has earned the right to be considered the *default* position unless and until contrary evidence is found. In philosophy this is a lot as it means that deflationists are in possession, and that the burden of proof lies with its opponents.

A second main line of argument for deflationism has played a role in the debate, though not as prominently. It rests on the assumption that truth can only be a substantive property if it can be *reduced* to other ones.[8] To which it is then added that we know by now, or can begin to see, that no reductive account of truth is possible. The two arguments are related as follows: The second argument essentially amounts to the claim that the notion of truth as a substantive property of the world is *illegitimate* because it cannot meet the appropriate naturalistic or reductionist standards. Thus, however much we might feel we need to use it, we cannot do so. The first and most prominent argument, on the other hand, amounts to saying that we needn't worry about this, because the idea of truth as a substantive property is otiose, it's an idle wheel that does no work. (The mistake was to think otherwise.) This is part of the reason why the first line of argument figures so prominently in the debate: Reductionists can breathe a sigh of relief because there is one less thing they have to worry about (the pesky business about giving a reductive account of truth), and anti-reductionists are less likely to dispute the force of an argument that doesn't involve an assumption they reject.

Here, then, is a *sketch* of the master argument, crucial parts of which I shall go on to unpack:[9]

> P1: The reason why we have the truth predicate, and the only point of having a concept of truth, is "to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations" (such as "Every statement of the form 'If *p*, then *p*' is true"). So truth is "nothing more than a device of generalization" (Horwich 1990:146).
>
> P2: To fulfil its only role, all that is required is that the truth predicate be governed by (instances of) the equivalence schema: The proposition *that p* is true if and only if *p*.
>
> C: Thus, there is no good reason to suppose that there is more to the concept of truth than what is collectively expressed by the (uncontroversial) instances of the equivalence schema, and so there is no need to go beyond the deflationist account of truth's nature.[10]



Assuming a more rigorous formulation, it's safe to say that the argument is valid, i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises. Furthermore, though I don't have the space to explain why, the second premise is correct. This highlights the *critical* argumentative significance of deflationism's claim about the point, or utility, of our notion of truth – that it is "nothing more than a device of generalization" (Horwich 1998:146).

Understanding exactly what this claim comes to is obviously very important. But the explanations we are given are often compressed to something along the following lines: We are told that "the function of the truth predicate is to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations" (Horwich 1998:37), and we are given examples such as

> Every statement of the form 'If *p*, then *p*' is true

This is unsatisfactory, however. For it is perfectly natural to want to respond: why is the generalization not simply an illustration of the *attribution of a property* – that of being true – to statements of the form 'If *p*, then *p*'? And, if so, we seem to have gotten nowhere – for the question whether the property in question is *substantive* has not been addressed.

But characterizations such as these leave out a *crucial* element of the deflationist's claim. It's uncontroversial, or at least seems to be, that the quantified sentence generalizes over an infinite number of statements:

> If snow is white, then snow is white
> If lionfish are poisonous, then lionfish are poisonous
> If seaweed is good for you, then seaweed is good for you

In saying that truth is an instrument of generalization, the deflationist says something significantly more than this. Indeed, the *key* element of the deflationary conception of truth's utility is that schematic generalizations serve as *substitutes* or *surrogates* for sentences or propositions that are framed without the use of the truth predicate. In the present case, the deflationist maintains that what you would have asserted, if only you could, is the infinite conjunction: If snow is white, then snow is white; and, if lionfish are poisonous, then lionfish are poisonous; and, if seaweed is good for you, then seaweed is good for you, etc. But since we can't assert, or think, an infinite conjunction, we use the generalization *as a surrogate* (Horwich 1998:2–3)

This is not obvious. Nonetheless, I propose to leave the matter at that. For our purposes, the most important thing to keep in mind is that, according to deflationists, sentences involving the truth predicate only ever stand proxy – they are substitutes or surrogates – for ones that don't. If so, it follows that we never use the truth predicate to attribute a substantive property – that of being true – to anything.

I now turn to the beginnings of an assessment of deflationism as well as of the master argument for it. (In the course of considering the argument's second premise I shall also say a little more about the last of deflationism's central claims.) Roughly speaking, the over-all assessment of an argument involves weighing the evidence for its premises up against whatever reasons there might be for thinking that the conclusion is false, or at least doubtful.

Deflationist's have looked extensively at various uses of the truth-predicate in ordinary life, in philosophy, and, though less so, science. And it's fair to say that they have confirmed what Michael Dummett noted quite some time ago: Namely, that these standard uses of the truth predicate can be accounted for within a deflationary framework. Is it then reasonable to suppose that sufficient evidence has been provided for the initial, and only controversial, premise of the argument? Here's why I think not.

For the purposes of defending deflationism it is *not* enough to focus on explicit uses of the truth predicate in what I shall call first-order explanations (or explanatory practices). By a first-order explanation, I simply mean one that doesn't have, as its *explanandum*, something that is itself an explanation. Such explanations are, of course, to be found all over the place: in ordinary life and science, of course, but also in philosophy. The reason why this just won't do is that an explanation of something may invoke truth essentially, but nevertheless do so only implicitly. This is so if any of the basic explanatory concepts it uses themselves require elucidation (at least in part) in terms of the concept of truth. There may well be aspects of our *concept* of truth – as manifested in our explanatory practices – that cannot be uncovered simply by reflection on our explicit use of the *predicate* 'true'. (If you are already convinced that deflationism is right, then you will have no reason to suppose that that is in fact the case. But if what you want to do is provide a solid *argument* for deflationism, you simply cannot assume that the full content of our concept of truth can be read off of the rules governing the use of the predicate.)[1]

I now turn to a brief consideration of the content and import of the argument's second premise. This may ap-

Illustrasjon: Yin Yi Look

pear to be an altogether different topic, but in fact it's not. According to the view we are currently looking at, 'true' is implicitly defined by the equivalence schema

The proposition *that p* is true if and only if *p*.

But what does this tell us about the meaning of 'true' (or the concept it expresses)? I take it that that's not immediately obvious. But we should, in fact, be focusing on a *different* (though of course related) question. All parties to the debate accept the (uncontroversial) instances of the equivalence schema, and can agree that they contribute to an implicit specification of the meaning of 'true'. Deflationism's characteristic claim is that there is *nothing more* to truth than what they express. As stated here, the equivalence schema is an equivalence schema for propositions, and for present purposes we can simply identify propositions with the meanings of declarative sentences (with what they express). Now, the dominant conception of linguistic meaning in the philosophy of language is one that holds that a key component of the meaning of a declarative sentence is its truth-conditions. In other words, one understands (grasps) this aspect of its meaning when one knows what has to be the case for it to be true.

But if truth and meaning are related in this way, then deflationism about truth is false. For then there *would* be something more to truth than what the equivalence schema expresses. (This point goes back to Dummett's seminal paper *Truth* from 1959.) Deflationism about truth *presupposes* that meaning is prior to truth, that meaning can be explained without appeal to the notion of truth. Deflationists, then, need an account of meaning that is not framed in terms of the notion of truth-conditions.

It's fair to say that deflationists have – to date – come up with no such thing. Paul Horwich, one of the leading deflationists, has worked on the matter for years and written several books on meaning. What he currently has – as he has conceded – is a *research program.* A research program is, of course, not a theory. It stands to a theory roughly as my wish to visit Madagascar stands to my actually being there. A research program is a framework within which one might hope to arrive at a theory. The point, then, is that the plausibility of the deflationary conception of truth is hostage to there being a theory of meaning that comports with it. That being so, it's hard to see how one could reasonably suppose that our current evidence counts in *favour* of deflationism. (To put it slightly differently: The evidence we have that is based on our explicit use of 'true' cannot be taken as supporting the idea that deflationism is the default position, because we already know that there is a crucial question that remains unaddressed, and concerning which the question of our explicit use of the truth predicate has no bearing.) And there is more to come.

For a deflationist is not only proscribed from explaining linguistic meaning in terms of truth conditions, he or she cannot use the notion of truth conditions in *any* explanatory context. And the fact is that the notion figures prominently in the philosophy of mind as well – in standard accounts of the nature of beliefs, desires, and so on; the so-called propositional attitudes. (It also figures in what is probably the most prevalent view of the nature of perceptual states.) Take a particular belief, say, the belief that lionfish are beautiful, have venomous fin rays, and are very tasty (think sashimi). What makes it the mental state that it is, and not some other one, is partly a matter of its being a belief and partly a matter of its *content* (that lionfish are beautiful…). Contents are standardly characterized in terms of truth conditions, and it is no straightforward matter to come up with an alternative that does not – even implicitly – draw on the notion of a truth condition.[12]

Deflationism about truth presupposes that meaning is prior to truth, that meaning can be explained without appeal to the notion of truth.

At this point, you might find yourself inclined to agree that deflationists have a good deal of unfinished business that they need to attend to. And you may even be on the cusp of agreeing that, things being as they are, it's hard to see deflationism as more than an extremely interesting alternative to traditional ways of thinking about truth. All well and good, but how is any of this related to the bold claim, made initially, that deflationism entails that there is no such thing as intentionality? And what of the alleged bearing of perceptual psychology on the metaphysical question of the nature of truth? These are the questions to which I now turn. (That I have waited so long is simply because a number of things needed to be said, and at least partially explained, before they can fruitfully be addressed.

Perceptual psychology, and visual psychology especially, provides a particularly salient illustration of the relevance of cognitive science for one of the basic questions in philosophy. One of its fundamental concerns is that of explaining 'visual constancies.' For our purposes, these can be understood simply as the capacities a visual system has to perceive features of its environment (including, central-

ly, objects and their properties). Vision science makes *explicit* use of the notion of truth, for what it seeks to explain is how visual systems manage to get things right (when they do). Its aim, that is, is to explain how visual processes that take place after light has impinged on the retina result in *veridical* perceptual states. Now, it's not at all unlikely that the science's explicit use of the truth predicate comports with the deflationist account of how we use the truth predicate. But that's not where the issue lies. One of the fundamental concepts in all of cognitive science is that of *representation*: Cognitive states are taken to be representational states and cognitive processes (e.g., trains of reasoning) are taken to be (often complex) transformations of representational states. And the central – and outstanding – question that has a bearing on the metaphysical issue of truth's nature is how to understand the notions of representation that figure so prominently in the science.

Do the cognitive sciences make use of a notion of representation that essentially but implicitly presupposes the notion of truth? [If] the answer is 'yes', that amounts to an exceptionally strong argument against deflationism.

Do the cognitive sciences make use of a notion of representation that *essentially but implicitly* presupposes the notion of truth? When mental states are said to be representational states, is that tantamount to *individuating* mental states in terms of the conditions under which they represent things correctly? If the answer is 'yes', that amounts to an *exceptionally* strong argument against deflationism. For then the notion of truth really is being used substantively – in a scientific explanation of a part of the world's causal and constitutive structure

Finally, we get to the matter of deflationism and intentionality: There are, very roughly, two ways in which intentionality is ordinarily characterized. When Brentano originally (re)introduced the notion, he did so in terms of a special notion of 'aboutness' or, equivalently, in terms of the notion of the mind's 'taking an object'. Nowadays, intentionality is often explicated in terms of a state's having representational content, as a matter of a state's representing things as being one way or another.

How are the two related? First of all, and this is not controversial, they are two ways of getting at one and the same thing – the very thing most philosophers take to be one of the fundamental features of the mind (the other being consciousness). What is more difficult to show – again a matter that really requires further discussion – is that the Brentanian *concept* of intentionality, and the more modern one framed in terms of the notion of representational content, are, in fundamental respects, one and the same. So the two explications, as different as they may seem to be at first sight, are different attempts to explicate the same concept. If that's correct, as I believe it is, then the Brentanian characterization of intentionality must be seen as *implicitly* relying on the notion of truth (or, more generally, of veridicality). One way of noting how this can be – and *thereby* pointing to a fundamental connection between the two accounts – is by focusing on a well-known difficulty with Brentano's original explication. The word 'take' is relational – it requires *relata*. It is impossible to reach out and *take* an apple, if the apple doesn't exist. And whoever does the taking must exist too. But – as Brentano himself insisted – we can think, hope and dream about things that don't exist. What, then, could possibly be meant by a mind's 'taking' an object that doesn't exist? This is a point at which the other way of characterizing intentionality – the way often used today – is arguably superior. Properly used – and by employing constraints I haven't mentioned here – the notion of representational content captures the relevant sense of 'aboutness' without generating the difficulty we have just considered. A belief, say, can be about something that doesn't exist insofar as its content is a representation *as of* there being such an object.[13]

If, as I maintain, the two notions are one and the same, then deflationism *precludes* the characterization of anything as exhibiting intentionality. Given that the notion of intentionality presupposes the notion of truth (because they are correlative notions), the claim that minds exhibit intentionality entails that truth is, after all, a substantive property. For by saying of something that it has intentional properties, we would thereby be committed to the view that truth is needed in giving a correct account of a specific part of the world's constitutive and causal structure – in giving an account of the nature of mind. If deflationism is correct, that can only be because intentionality is nowhere to be found.

The view that there *is* such a thing as intentionality, and that it's one of the characteristic features of the mind, commands a *very* widespread assent. Indeed, it's more or less taken for granted, as something that can be established with very little effort. It's one of the things that the majority of philosophers working in the continental and the so-called analytic tradition have in common. Only rarely is it a subject of serious debate. Rather, it forms the background against which *other* issues are debated hotly – how

to think of the relation between language and thought, what giving an account of intentionality involves, and whether we need naturalistic accounts of these things, to mention but a couple of examples. Many, perhaps most, philosophers would therefore be inclined to take deflationism's incompatibility with the existence of intentionality as an immediate *reductio* of the view.

How would deflationists themselves respond to the claim that their conception of truth presupposes that intentionality is nowhere to be found? We have, in fact, already seen how - only it wasn't framed *as* a response. A slight reformulation of the second line of argument in favour of deflationism serves to highlight the point: (P1) Had there been such a thing as intentionality, it would have had to be reducible. (Because intentionality couldn't be a basic fact about reality.) (P2) Attempts to give reductive accounts of intentionality have failed systematically. (C) From this it follows, at least as an inference to the best explanation, that there is no such thing – nothing in the world has the property of 'aboutness', or represents anything in a sense which requires explication in terms of the notion of truth. Deflationists, in other words, don't dispute the claim, they dispute its *significance*. They don't see the claim as a bullet that must be bitten or somehow dodged, they *embrace* it.

This is why the issue over deflationism is correctly described as a *fault line* in philosophy: it's a basic issue with profound implications, that is connected with numerous other pivotal issues, and about which philosophers have completely opposing views. The question which anyone with an interest in the matter should ask themselves is what *they* themselves would say, upon reflection.

My own view – and this will also take us back to the question of the significance of scientific explanations of cognitive phenomena – is that we shouldn't, as things currently stand, align ourselves with either camp. I have already explained why I think there are currently no good reasons for thinking that deflationism ought to be viewed as the default position. I should probably add that I think that the argument from reductionism has little force. Whether reductive accounts are to be sought can only be decided case-by-case. So the basis for rejecting the argument shouldn't be a general opposition to reductionism. It's rather that reasons for believing that truth (via the idea of truth conditions) is a substantive property are to be had irrespective of whether a reductive account can be found. It's quite sufficient if we find successful explanations that employ intentional or representational notions. (This claim needs to be sharpened, and will be soon.) And that's why it's extremely unlikely that a strong case for deflationism can be made out *unless* the modes of explanation employed in mature cognitive sciences have been found not to involve such notions. To date deflationists have made no serious attempt to consider those explanations.

Philosophers belonging to the traditional camp – intentionalists we could call them – also tend to ignore scientific explanations of cognitive phenomena when it comes to providing *reasons* for supposing that there are things – minds – whose correct characterization requires appeal to intentional concepts. And this is because it's generally supposed that doing so is unnecessary; it would merely serve to replicate the reasons that we already have. What they point to is our *pre-theoretical* use of intentional idiom in explaining, predicting and making sense of ourselves. Our intentional idiom and our use of it in framing explanations are *surely* in good standing, so the thought goes. For we have absolutely no idea how we might do without such explanations, nor have we been given any good reason for supposing that we ought to try. The burden of proof, it is claimed, is on anyone who claims otherwise. And hence there is no need to enter into the debate until such reasons have been provided.

It's extremely unlikely that a strong case for deflationism can be made out unless the modes of explanation employed in mature cognitive sciences have been found not to involve representational notions.

It's easy to appreciate the appeal of such a line of thought. However, what's at issue is *not* whether our pretheoretic concepts and explanatory schemes should be kept as is or abandoned wholesale. Natural languages are tremendously flexible instruments and have to be, given the multitude of functions that they serve, and of uses to which they are put. But this *also* applies to intentional discourse. People – *we* – use it to explain and describe all sorts of things – computers, of course, but also – at least on the floor where I work – photocopying machines (one of them is wilful, the other generally not) and dishwashers, and the list goes on. We're not, of course, committed to a literal understanding of all of our ascriptions of intentional states – to calculators and fruitflies, say.[14] And this is neither an invitation to reject the intentional idiom wholesale – in the manner of the Churchlands – nor to suppose that it's nothing more than an 'intentional stance' that can only ever be justified pragmatically – in the manner of Dennett

Illustrasjon: Redaksjonen

The point is rather this: we don't – or certainly *shouldn't* – in general take the structure of our language, or the things we say, to be a reliable guide to reality. And, in the present case, we need guidance about when to take the idiom seriously and when not. (A quick answer to the effect that it is to be taken literally in the cases where we are dealing with clear cases of minds will not do – because the question is *precisely* one about the nature of those things.) Thus, we can never *just* rely on pre-theoretic modes of explanation, or linguistic structures for that matter. Rather, we have to consider whether intentional notions are really needed to explain the phenomena in question, and that is to say whether alternative explanations of them are available.[15]

Now, we've already noted the relevance of explanations in cognitive science for the issue over deflationism. And here we can note one of the advantages of considering them. Explanations in science differ from those we employ in the hustle and bustle of ordinary life: for at least *some* of them are precisely geared, and single-mindedly so, towards yielding an understanding of how things are in the world. In vision science, for example, the notion of representation is used to delineate a natural kind. Furthermore, there are generally accepted standards by which one can judge the success of a scientific explanation or theory: in terms of whether it yields agreement among the science's practitioners, whether it serves to make questions more testable and precise, and whether it serves to open new questions – to mention a couple (cf. Burge 2010:298).

More than anyone else, Tyler Burge has explored the question how best to understand the notion of representation employed in visual psychology (Burge 2010). And though he has not himself done so with a view to engage in the debate about deflationary conceptions of truth, his conclusions are of immediate relevance. For he has argued, with great care and at great length, that the science's explanations are framed in terms of an *intentional* notion of representation. Ultimately, however, I don't think that his arguments succeed. As much as I would like to do so, I cannot here explain what has led me to that conclusion. If I am right, however, it follows that opponents of deflationism have their work cut out for them too.

Ultimately – and most importantly – it should be kept in mind that the task at hand is not just one of seeking out evidence that would support one or another view. For I don't think we understand the issues nearly as well as we should. Deflationism's claim that truth is a simple and transparent notion, devoid of metaphysical significance, only seems justified as long as one ignores the question of its (possible) role in a correct characterization of the nature of mind. But, human as they are, intentionalists too (or some of them at least) seem to make life too easy for themselves. The notions of truth, and of intentionality, are fundamental elements in our conceptual scheme. And illumination is only to be had by careful probing, by considering arguments not just as providing reasons for belief – which of course they do – but by actively using them as *vehicles of understanding*. Arguments serve to elucidate the content of thoughts and concepts by exhibiting the relations between them. They are probably the best means we have available for arriving at the kind of understanding philosophy requires. And then there is the ubiquitous phenomenon of *confirmation bias*. We all have a tendency to look for, and favour, evidence that confirms our pre-existing beliefs. This is *especially so* for those we hold most deeply. Wittgenstein once wrote: "This is how philosophers should greet each other: 'Take your time!'" At least for those of us who have tenure, he was surely right.[16]

NOTES

[1] Grover (1975), Horwich (1998) and Field (1994). Henceforth, when I write of deflationism, I have these three theories specifically in mind. Frege and Ramsey are often mentioned as being the earliest proponents of the deflationary conception. But Frege most certainly did not think that truth is 'metaphysically trivial' as these modern theorists do, and it is doubtful that Ramsey did so either. For a discussion of Ramsey's views, see Field (1986).

[2] One of the principal aims of this paper is to explain why this is so. For reasons that will hopefully become apparent, this will not happen until the last section of the paper.

[3] It should be noted that they are related as contraries, not contradictories: both cannot be right, but both may be wrong. In other words, they do not exhaust the space of possibilities.

[4] I am, of course, simplifying and idealising a great deal, but not, I think, in a way that is prejudicial to the issues at hand.

[5] Given limitations of time and space, I can only hope to provide a 'working understanding' of the matter.

[6] I'm inclined to think that at least the traditional versions of the correspondence and coherence theories can be shown to be wrong – but since the reasons are not ones that provide support for deflationism, I shall side step the matter here.

[7] The need to consider why we have the word 'true' originally arose in response to a different but related question: Saying that snow is white and saying that it is true that snow is white appear to come to the same thing. And if 'true' doesn't contribute anything to the *meaning* of sentences in which it occurs, what real purpose could it possibly serve? Modern day deflationists took their answer to that question and made it the linchpin in their argument for their view of the nature of *truth*.

[8] The intuition here is that such things as truth and meaning couldn't possibly be basic features of the world. For that reason, many naturalistically inclined philosophers feel that truth and meaning have to be explicable in terms of more basic concepts. The issue over naturalism – what stance one ought to take on the matter - is another fault line in philosophy. And this is one of the ways it has a bearing on the issue over deflationism.

[9] I am presenting the argument as it would be stated within the framework of Horwich's minimalist theory of truth. But the *same* argument for the deflationary conception of the nature of truth, modulo the issues on which deflationists disagree, is present in the writings of all of the deflationary theorists whose work I'm discussing. That it is the *principal* argument is also apparent in their work.

[10] Any theory of truth has to find a way of addressing the vexed problem that is illustrated by the Liar paradox – namely that our ordinary notion of truth appears to be inconsistent. Deflationist's insist, probably correctly, that they face no *special* problem, that is to say no problem that is not shared by everyone. So they set it aside for separate treatment. Hence the restriction to uncontroversial, or non-paradoxical instances of the equivalence schema, instances where the schematic letter *p* is not replaced by a paradox-generating proposition.

[11] It's only if deflationists could claim that they have *also* looked at what I have here called second-order explanations, the explanations we would need to give of all the (relevant) concepts we employ in our explanatory practices – to see whether the concept is used implicitly – that it would suffice to consider explicit uses of the truth predicate. But that's *exactly* what they cannot do. As we shall see, the issue ultimately turns on how we are to think about the relation between truth and meaning, as well as the relation between truth and mental content.

[12] An admittedly crude example may help with understanding the nature of the problem. Suppose you are presented with a theory which tells you, not that meanings and mental contents are to be identified with truth conditions but rather with sets of possible worlds, say. Is that an idea that may be of use to a deflationist (barring ontological scruples)? The difficulty here is that the relevant set of possible worlds, with which a sentence's meaning might be identified, is very likely to be the set of worlds in which the sentence is *true*. How else might one circumscribe them? If the notion of truth is not explicitly used, it is often a sign that the theory isn't attempting to give you a *general* account of meaning or content. Rather, it is providing an explanation of what it is for any content to be the content that it is and not some other one. That is to say, it provides an account of how meanings or contents are to be *individuated* – leaving aside the question what makes something a *content*, as it were. This is in no way to be taken as an objection to such theories: They may be highly useful for their intended purpose! It's just very unclear, to say the least, whether they are of any use to a deflationist, *given* his or her views about the nature of truth. Deflationists in effect acknowledge this, because no deflationist has attempted to make use of any extant account. This only scratches the surface, I'm afraid. Much more needs to be said about what options are available to a deflationist, including those differing from Horwich's particular brand. Some of what I go on to say is, implicitly, a response to some of the things they could try to say.

[13] For a careful explication of intentionality that is centered on the notion of representation, see Burge (2010:30–46)

[14] Did you know that male fruitflies who have been spurned in courtship consume considerably more alcohol (when it's provided) than the happy ones? Perhaps, just perhaps, the difference – at least among the males of the species – isn't that great after all. (Male elephants, I'm told, have been known to vent their grief by smashing cars.)

[15].At this point, we may also appeal to the fruitfulness of intentional notions as employed *in philosophy*. What would the philosophy of mind be like without it? There is much to be said for doing so. Nevertheless, I'm reluctant to put much weight on it, in the present context, because I'd like to see how close one can get to finding reasons for beliefs about truth and intentionality that would convince someone who doesn't already have a view of the matter.

[16] Though I have done my best to explain things clearly, I worry that the paper may be about as enlightening as the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* when read prior to the book. Thanks to Mariona Eiren Bohlin Sturm and Thomas Hanssen Rambø for their attempts to steer me in the right direction.

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SANT OG USANT I MASKINENES VERDEN

Av Jan Tore Lønning

«Datamaskiner forholder seg bare til 0-er og 1-ere», hører vi ofte. Er det da noen plass til begreper som sannhet? Det enkleste svaret er at vi kan sette *sant* lik 1 og *usant* lik 0.

Totallsystemet

La oss først se litt nærmere på påstanden om at maskinen bare forholder seg til 0 og 1. Internt bruker maskinene totallsystemet, også kalt det binære tallsystemet, for regning. I stedet for å telle *0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, …,* teller en i totallsystemet *0, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110,…* Oversettelsen fra totallsystemet til desimaltallene gjøres ved toerpotenser. Et binært tall som *10011* svarer til $1 \times 2^4 + 0 \times 2^3 + 0 \times 2^2 + 1 \times 2^1 + 1 \times 1 = 16 + 2 + 1 = 19$ i titallsystemet. Regnereglene for totallsystemet er som for titallssystemet, blant annet med tall i minnet ved addisjon. Det som i desimalsystemet ser ut som *19 + 14 = 33* blir i totallsystemet *10011+1110=100001*.

Selv om det finnes flere forløpere, tilskrives gjerne totallsystemet geniet Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). En av Leibniz' gjennomgående ideer var at utviklingen av gode notasjonssystemer var avgjørende. Leibniz og Newton utviklet hver for seg integral- og differensialregningen – dagens kalkulus som alle matematikk- og «science»-studenter må gjennom. For Leibniz var en god notasjon avgjørende for hans bidrag, og denne notasjonen ligger til grunn for notasjonen som brukes i dag.

Leibniz utviklet også en regnemaskin. For oss i dag er det kanskje ikke imponerende at den kunne utføre multiplikasjon og divisjon i tillegg til addisjon og subtraksjon. (Andre maskiner på den tiden kunne bare utføre de to siste regneartene.) Men det er langt i fra opplagt – i hvert fall ikke for meg – hvordan en slik maskin skal konstrueres. Maskinen var basert på roterende hjul med tagger (avanserte tannhjul) og maskinen kan i dagens terminologi beskrives som en digital maskin.

Leibniz' interesse for notasjonssystemer og regnemaskiner kommer til uttrykk i hans store visjoner om et universelt språk (*Characteristica universalis*) og en universell maskin (*Calculus ratiocinator*). I det universelle språket skulle all mulig kunnskap kunne beskrives på en transparent måte, og med den universelle maskinen skulle en kunne regne på disse representasjonene. Ved uenighet, for eksempel i diplomatiet, skulle en så kunne regne seg frem til konklusjoner som ingen ville være uenige i. Leibniz' drøm ikke bare inkluderer dagens universelle datamaskin – den går langt forbi den. Et vesentlig punkt i denne drømmen er at kunnskap kan formaliseres og – ikke minst – at en kan regne på disse representasjonene.

Tilbake til de binære tallene. Det finnes mange andre tallsystemer, som romertallene, der *seks* skrives *VI* og *nittini* skrives *IC*. Vi beskriver de samme tallene med ulike

Illustrasjon: Matilda Söderling

tallsystemer, og vi kan enkelt gjøre om mellom dem. Men titalls- og totallsystemene har klare fordeler sammenliknet med andre tallsystemer når vi skal regne med dem, siden de er posisjonssystemer og bruker sifferet *0*. Sammenliknet med titallsystemet utmerker totallsystemet seg ved å være enklere – det bruker færre sifre. Men det er også en kvalitativ forskjell, noe som var viktig for Leibniz. Forskjellen mellom 1 og 0 er – ganske enkelt – forskjellen mellom noe og ingenting, forskjellen mellom at noe er eller ikke er. I stedet for å si at maskinen bare opererer med 1 og 0, vil det være like korrekt å si at maskinen bare opererer med *noe* og *intet*, eller med *sant* og *usant*, der *sant* er det samme som at det er sant at det er noe. De følgende representasjonene er alternative notasjoner for det samme binære systemet:

1	0	0	1	1
noe	intet	intet	noe	noe
sant	usant	usant	sant	sant
ja	nei	nei	ja	ja
+	-	-	+	+

Fysisk forankring

En datamaskin er en konkret fysisk innretning. Hva vi beskriver som en 1 eller 0 i vår beskrivelse av maskinen refererer til en bestemt fysisk posisjon som kan være i en av to tilstander, for eksempel kan en magnetisk kjerne være rettet i en av to retninger.

Ofte blir sannhet betraktet som en form for korrespondanse mellom et språklig uttrykk på den ene siden og et (fysisk) forhold på den andre siden. Utsagnet blir sant hvis det korresponderer med saksforholdet og usant hvis det ikke gjør det. På dette laveste representasjonsnivået i datamaskinen er sannhet annerledes. Den er ikke en relasjon mellom en representasjon og et forhold, men snarere en identitet mellom dem. Bitet *1*, eller *sant*, er det samme som at et bestemt fysisk forhold opptrer. Det kan ikke bli usant.

Boolsk algebra

Leibniz kom aldri til å utvikle sitt universelle språk. Den som har fått æren av å utforme logikk som kalkyle, som matematikk, er George Boole (1815-1864), omtrent midt imellom Leibniz' og vår tid. Booles' hovedverk hadde den ubeskjedne tittelen *The Laws of Thought* (1854), og hans mål var å utforske nettopp disse «tankens lover»; å etablere et symbolspråk for dem med en kalkyle som kunne danne grunnlag for logikk som vitenskap. Men det språket og den kalkylen Boole utviklet var svært beskjedne sammenliknet med Leibniz' visjoner.

Boole så at predikater kan organiseres som et algebraisk system som oppfører seg lovmessig. Her kan *A*, *B* og *C* stå for hvilke som helst predikater, f.eks. *engelsk*, *kvinne* og *ung*. Da symboliserer *AB engelsk kvinne* og *CAB* symboliserer *ung engelsk kvinne*. Symbolet + uttrykker en disjunksjon, slik at *B+C* vil stå for *kvinne eller ung*, og symbolet - uttrykker en negasjon slik *B-C* står for *kvinne som ikke er ung*. Boole observerte lovmessigheter som

$$AB = BA$$
$$(AB)C = A(BC)$$
$$A(B+C) = (AB+AC)$$
$$A(B-C) = AB-AC$$

Denne logiske kalkylen har mye felles med vanlig tallregning med addisjon og multiplikasjon. Boole introduserte også en *0* og en *1* med liknende egenskaper som ved multiplikasjon, og som tolkningsmessig stod for *ingenting* og *universet*.

$$0A = 0$$
$$1A = A$$
$$A+0 = A$$

Det er likevel forskjeller fra de tilsvarende regneartene mellom tall som at

$$AA = A$$
$$A+A = A$$
$$A+1 = 1$$

Det algebraiske systemet er siden blitt hetende boolsk algebra.

Neste skritt for Boole var å observere at det samme systemet også beskriver utsagn, at de har tilsvarende egenskaper, når *AB* symboliserer *A og B*, *A+B* symboliserer *A eller B* og *1-A* symboliserer *ikke A*. For utsagn blir det naturlig å identifisere *1* med *sann* og *0* med *usann*, og dette er de eneste verdiene utsagn kan ha. Boole viste at vi kunne regne med sannhetsverdier på liknende måte som med tall.

Boolske kretser

Booles logikk spiller en avgjørende rolle innenfor design av maskinvare («hardware»). En digital krets kan ses på som en realisering av en boolsk sannhetsfunksjon. Omvendt kan sannhetsfunksjoner brukes til å beskrive digitale kretser. En strømførende ledning svarer til 1, *sant*, mens en ledning som ikke fører strøm, svarer til 0, *usant*. Spesifikke «logiske» porter svarer til de utsagnslogiske konnektivene.

En AND-port har to ledninger inn og en ledning ut. Den fører strøm ut bare hvis det er strøm på begge de to ledningene som går inn. For en OR-port er det tilstrekkelig at det er strøm på en av ledningene som kommer inn, mens en NOT-port har en ledning inn og en ut, og fører strøm ut hvis og bare hvis det ikke kommer strøm inn. Med slike porter vil for eksempel den lille kretsen i (figur 1) svare til utsagnet $(A \wedge \neg B) \vee (B \wedge C)$. Da blir sannhet ikke bare noe som kan representeres fysisk og regnes med i en formell kalkyle, det blir også noe som kan prosesseres av en fysisk maskin.

Dette er en del av et program som beregner om en student er berettiget til reisestipend fra Lånekassa eller ikke, og i så fall hvor mye hun skal få.[2] Det er to typer symboler i et slikt program. Symbolene som er vist i fete typer, som *if*, *not*, *and, else*, *return*, har en fast betydning bestemt av programmeringsspråket i likhet med + og =. De andre symbolene, som *avstand*, *behov* og *bor_med_foreldre*, er variable som er innført av programmereren for dette programmet. De likner på variable i matematikk eller i utsagnslogikk. Under kjøring av programmet vil en variabel ha en verdi, f.eks. et tall. Det spesielle med variable i dataprogrammer,



(Figur 1)

Programmering

Så langt har vi betraktet datamaskinen på det laveste nivået og hvordan *sant* og *usant* svarer til enkle lagerceller eller strømførende ledninger. De færreste som bruker datamaskinene forholder seg til dette nivået. Det er mange lag i en maskin hvor høyere lag kan reduseres til lavere lag. For en programmerer i et typisk moderne høynivåspråk (for eksempel Python) kan det se ut som i (figur 2).[1]

```
1  if (not bor_med_foreldre and
2      (2016 - foedsel_aar) <= 25 and
3      avstand >= 630):
4      behov = 300*1.72
5      if avstand <= 1500:
6          behov += (avstand-300)*0.95
7      else:
8          behov += 1200*0.95
9          behov += (avstand-1500)*0.34
10     return 4*behov - 3314
11 else:
12     return "Ikke noe stipend"
```

(Figur 2)

sammenliknet med variable i matematikk eller i logikk, er at en variabel vil kunne skifte verdi underveis. Ser vi på linje 4, *behov = 300*1.72*, skjer det to ting.[3] For det første multipliserer maskinen sammen tallene *300* og *1.72* som gir *516.0*. Dette er effekten av symbolet *. For det andre setter den verdien av variabelen *behov* til dette tallet. Dette er effekten av symbolet =.[4] I linje 6 øker vi innholdet i *behov* med resultatet av å regne ut (*avstand - 300*) * *0.95*. Men mest interessant for oss er det som skjer for eksempel i linje 5. Her sammenlikner regneenheten innholdet av *avstand* med tallet *1500* og returnerer en av verdiene *True* eller *False*. Hva den så gjør videre, avhenger av resultatet. Hvis verdien er *True*, utføres linje 6, hvis *False*, utføres linjene 8 og 9.

I programmeringsspråket opererer vi med ulike typer tall, som *float* for desimaltall og *int* for heltall. Ved siden av disse er *bool* en egen type. I programeksempelet vil *avstand* og *behov* være variable av typen *float*, mens *bor_med_foreldre* vil være en variabel av typen *bool*. Mens det er ubegrenset mange ulike tall og verdier som en tallvariabel kan ta, er det bare to mulige verdier for noe av type *bool*: *True* eller *False*. På liknende måte som maskinens regneenhet

kan multiplisere sammen *300* og *1.72*, kan den regne ut sannhetsverdien av *27 < 25* og returnere en verdi, *True* eller *False*. Et program kan også ta vare på slike verdier på samme måte som tall og lagre dem i variable som i

```
ung = (alder <= 25)
```

Her får variabelen *ung* av typen *bool* verdien *True* hvis og bare hvis variabelen *alder* inneholder et tall mindre enn eller lik *25*. For programmeringsspråket er *True* og *False* størrelser som det kan regne på, og som det forholder seg til omtrent som til tall.

Representasjon og det representerte

Vi bruker datamaskiner til å gjøre beregninger om verden rundt oss. Vi kan bruke programmet over til å beregne om en bestemt person, Kari Nordkvinne, er berettiget til reisestøtte eller ikke. Vi legger inn opplysninger om henne, som at *foedsels_aar = 1994* og at *bor_med_foreldre = False*. Disse representasjonene i maskinen forholder seg til den ytre virkeligheten omtrent som utsagn i vårt daglige språk forholder seg til virkeligheten. De kan være korrekte eller gale, eller med andre ord sanne eller usanne. Setningen *Kari er født i 1994* er sann hvis hun ble født i 1994, men usann hvis hun ble født i 1990. På samme måte kan påstanden *foedsels_aar == 1994* være sann eller usann om den virkelige verden. Hvis Kari er født i 1990, men har opplyst at hun er født i 1994, og vi har lagt inn *1994* som verdien til *foedsels_aar*, så vil maskinen evaluere *foedsels_aar == 1994* til *True*. Men det betyr ikke at det er sant. På liknende måte som at vi mennesker kan ha gale oppfatninger, kan også en maskin ha det.

Beregninger og bevis

En datamaskin utfører beregninger. Et program er en serie av instruksjoner til maskinen. Maskinen kan settes til å utføre programmet. Underveis vil den lage nye representasjoner og endre representasjoner. Når maskinen skal utføre addisjonen *10011+1110*, vil den et sted lage en ny representasjon *100001*. Maskinen endrer sine fysiske representasjoner. Samtidig skal den nye representasjonen, *100001*, beskrive det samme som den gamle, (*10011+1110*). Tilsvarende gjelder for boolske uttrykk. Maskinen kan gjøre om $(A \wedge B) \vee (A \wedge \neg B)$ til A fordi de alltid vil ha samme sannhetsverdi.

Etter Boole ble logikken utviklet videre av blant andre Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) til å kunne behandle langt mer kompliserte sammenhenger. Sentralt i logikken står begrepet gyldig slutning. En slutning er gyldig hvis konklusjonen blir sann under enhver omstendighet der alle premissene er sanne. Et bevis er en syntaktisk omforming fra premisser til konklusjon, og for at et bevissystem skal være sunt, må alle konklusjonene det trekker være sanne hvis premissene er det. Datamaskinens utføring av et program kan langt på vei betraktes som en utføring av et matematisk logisk bevis. Det skal føre oss fra sannheter til sannheter. Ser vi på de tre første linjene i programmet i (figur 2), så kan *bor_med_foreldre* ha verdien *True* eller *False*, *foedsel_aar* kan være et hvilket som helst tall og det kan *avstand* også. Men hvis *bor_med_foreldre* har verdien *False*, *foedsel_aar* har verdien *1994* og *avstand* verdien *1000*, så skal en korrekt maskin evaluere det sammensatte uttrykket til *True* og gå videre og beregne hvor stor støtten skal bli i linje 4.

Feil

For at vi skal kunne stole på en beregning, må den være korrekt. Den må gi riktig resultat gitt de opplysningene vi mater den med. Det som kommer ut, skal være sant hvis det vi setter inn er sant. Kan vi være sikre på at det er slik?

Feil kan oppstå på mange nivåer. Det kan være feil på maskinvare eller strømbrudd. Men i tillegg til de rene maskinfeilene, kan det være feil i programmene som er skrevet av mennesker. Et program er ment å være en serie instrukser som til sammen får maskinen til å løse en oppgave. Intensjonen for hva programmet skal utføre, er klar nok. Men som oftest sniker det seg inn feil når en skriver et program. En kan forveksle to variable *a* og *b*, en kan glemme et innrykk, eller komme til å sette et ulikhetstegn gal vei, eller forveksle fot og meter osv. En stor del av en programmerers arbeid består i å rette slike feil og teste ut programmene før de blir tatt i bruk. Men det er alltid en risiko for at feil ikke blir oppdaget. Dette kan være feil som ser tilforlatelige ut, men som kan bli kritiske når forholdene programmet blir brukt under er et annet enn de det ble testet ut for. Et eksempel er det forventede år-2000-problemet i 1999, der mange program bare opererte med to sifre for et årstall og forutsatte at det var på 1900-tallet. Problemet ble mindre alvorlig enn antatt fordi en var klar over det på forhånd. Andre eksempler er satellittoppskytninger som går galt av uforklarlige grunner, og der en ikke får en ny sjanse til å rette opp feilene.

En datamaskinberegning er ment å være korrekt. Men det er alltid en sjanse for at vi har gjort feil i byggingen av maskinen eller i instruksjonen vi gir den, slik at de svarene vi får likevel ikke er korrekte.

Numerisk nøyaktighet

For noen beregninger leverer maskinene svar som ikke er 100 % korrekte, ikke helt sanne. Maskinen må gjøre avrundinger som aldri vil bli helt nøyaktige. Maskinen presenterer et svar som desimaltall og kan bare ta med et visst antall sifre. For et tall som pi, vil dette aldri kunne bli noe annet enn en tilnærming, 3,14159… Vi tar med så mange desimaler som vi trenger for at resultatet skal bli nøyaktig nok for det formålet vi skal bruke det for. Optiske instrumenter krever en annen nøyaktighet enn en bygningssnekker, der millimeter gir tilstrekkelig nøyaktighet.

Det er også oppgaver som er slik at vi ikke har metoder for å regne oss frem til helt riktig resultat. For eksempel viste den norske matematikeren Niels Henrik Abel (1802-1829) at det ikke finnes noen metode for alltid å finne løsningene av en femtegradslikning. Men det finnes numeriske metoder som lar oss finne nesten riktige løsninger – så nær de riktige løsningene som vi bare måtte ønske. Strengt tatt vil ikke de løsningene maskinen gir oss, være sanne i absolutt forstand, men de vil være korrekte nok for alle praktiske formål.

Induksjon og sannsynligheter

Datamaskinene kan også gjøre en annen type feil. Hvis du merker opp bildene av lille Ola med navnet hans, kan datamaskinen i kameraet eller telefonen din foreslå at bilder du ikke har merket opp, også er bilder av Ola. Ofte vil den ha rett, men den vil også kunne gjøre feil. Facebook foreslår nye venner til deg. Ofte er det mennesker du har vært i kontakt med, men Facebook kan også gjøre feil og foreslå personer du aldri har hørt om. Billedgjenkjenningen og vennegjenkjenningen er basert på *maskinlæring*. På grunnlag av modeller og tidligere observasjoner – ofte svært mange slike – prøver maskinen å generalisere, å se mønstre og så bruke disse til å si noe om nye observasjoner. Implisitt sammenlikner maskinen en observasjon med tidligere observasjoner og prøver å klassifisere på grunnlag av det. Når maskinen ser et nytt bilde, vil den beregne en sannsynlighet for at dette er et bilde av Ola. Er det 35 % sjanse for det, eller er det 90 % sjanse? Noen systemer returnerer sannsynlighetene direkte. Andre systemer vil gi en konklusjon og si at det er et bilde av Ola hvis sannsynligheten for dette internt er større enn 50 %. Slik vil denne klassifikatoren snakke sant en viss andel av gangene den foreslår en billedmerking, kanskje 75 %; og snakke usant 25 % av gangene.

Denne typen systemer spiller en større og større rolle i alt vi omgir oss med. Selv om disse systemene ikke gjør noen feil i selve beregningene, har de en omtrentlig omgang med sannheten.

Hva er sant?

Vi har sett at begrepet sannhet opptrer på flere forskjellige måter i møtet med datamaskinene. For det første er den absolutte basis for en digital datamaskin forskjellen mellom at noe er (sant) og det motsatte.

På høyere nivåer i maskinen er det et skille mellom to nivåer av sannhet. Det ene er det interne nivået: det maskinen «oppfatter» som sant. Dette er måten utførelsen av et program evaluerer et logisk uttrykk, altså den boolske verdien *Truth* i diskusjonen vår over. Det andre nivået er det eksterne nivået, **korrespondansen** mellom maskinens representasjoner og det (vi antar at) disse representerer. Det er klart at maskinens interne representasjoner kan være usanne i forhold til fortolkningen og bruken vi gjør av dem. Det skjer hvis de opplysningene vi legger inn i maskinen er usanne. Men det er et mål at maskinens interne oppfatning av sannhet er **koherent**: hvis de opplysningene vi har gitt maskinen («input») er sanne i forhold til vår fortolkning av dem, ønsker vi også at det maskinen gir tilbake («output») er sant i forhold til de samme fortolkningene.

I praksis vil vi ofte være **pragmatiske** og ikke stille krav til at det maskinen returnerer er absolutt sant. For numeriske beregninger vil vi være fornøyd med «nesten-sannheter»: verdier som er nøyaktige nok for de formål de skal brukes til, for eksempel til å sende romskip til Mars. For datasystemer basert på maskinlæring, hvor maskinen gjør induktive slutninger basert på tidligere observasjoner, må vi som oftest nøye oss med at maskinen ofte snakker sant.

NOTER

[1] Linjenummereringen er lagt til her. Den er ikke en del av programmet.
[2] For lettere å skjønne programmet, kan en sammenlikne med reglene, www.lanekassen.no/reisestipend (besøkt 22.10.2016).
[3] Programmet bruker engelske regler for desimaler og skriver *1.72* der vi i norsk ville skrevet *1,72* og tilsvarende for de andre tallene som følger.
[4] Det kan være litt forvirrende å bruke symbolet = for dette. Andre programmeringsspråk bruker andre symboler, for eksempel :=, som kanskje gjør det klarere at de to størrelsene ikke er like, men blir gjort like. For å sjekke om to størrelser er like, bruker Python symbolet ==.

UTDRAG FRA DEN LEKSIKRYPTISKE ENCYKLOPEDI

Thomisme. En retning innen filosofien som følger, tolker og videreutvikler Sankt Thomas Aquinas' tenkning.

Transcendental ekvivalens. Sankt Thomas Aquinas' tese om at transcendentalene ontologisk sett er én og samme ting. *Transcendentaler* er i middelalderfilosofi fenomener som blant annet væren, sannhet og godhet. Thomas' tese kan formaliseres på følgende måte:

P1: Gud eksisterer
P2: Gud er væren, sannhet og godhet
P3: Gud er *enkel*
K: Væren, sannhet og godhet er identiske

Disse premissene er selv konklusjoner i andre argumentasjonsrekker i Thomas' tekster om Gud, og kan sammenfattes som følger.

P1: Gjennom flere argumenter forsøker Thomas å påvise Guds eksistens, og ett av disse går ut fra den aristoteliske læren om aktualitet og potensialitet. Ethvert vesen er en blanding av aktualitet og potensialitet, argumenterer Thomas. De kan forandres ved å gå fra potensialitet til aktualitet, en forandring som krever at *en annen* aktualitet er *årsak* til forandringen, for potensialitet kan ikke spontant og uavhengig gå over til aktualitet. En uendelig rekke av årsaker innebærer en kontradiksjon, fortsetter Thomas, og det må derfor ha vært en *opprinnelig* aktualitet, forut for alle vesener og ting, som kunne sette i gang all forandring. Denne opprinnelige aktualiteten kan også beskrives som ren aktualitet, *actus purus*. Det er dette Aristoteles kaller primus motor, og det Thomas kaller Gud.

P2: Alle vesener har aktualitet, i kraft av å ta del i (sammenlign dette med platonske idéer) actus purus. Derfor kan vi si om vesener at de har væren, da væren og aktualitet på mange måter er det samme. Gud, som er ren aktualitet (jf. argumentet for P1), kan derfor sies å være væren i seg selv. Thomas argumenterer på lignende måter for å vise at Gud er sannhet og at Gud er godhet.

P3: Med at Gud er *enkel* mener Thomas at det i Gud ikke er noen komposisjon av elementer (hva nå disse skulle ha vært). Gud er én ting, i ordets strengeste betydning. For Thomas er det slik at dersom man kan si at Gud er *A* og at Gud er *B*, så impliserer dette alltid at *A* er *B*, siden påstanden «Gud er *A*» er synonym med påstanden «Gud og *A* er én og samme ting».

Det er dette siste punktet hele argumentet hviler på: det medfører at dersom Thomas påviser at Gud er væren, at Gud er sannhet og at Gud er godhet, så kan han konkludere med at væren, sannhet og godhet er identiske. **T.H.R.**

Turingtest. En test foreslått av Alan Turing, med det mål å avdekke om en maskin simulerer et intelligent vesen på en tilfredsstillende måte. Maskinen har bestått testen dersom et bevisst menneske ikke kan skille dens svar fra et menneskes svar.

Illustrasjon: Matilda Söderling

SALUT MEC

Av Inger Bakken Pedersen

Paris : tu peux pas résumer la ville où tout arrive[1]

Jeg valgte Sorbonne og Paris litt om hverandre. Jeg vet ikke om det var på grunn av universitetet eller byen i seg selv. Mest av alt var det kanskje språket. Jeg hadde allerede brukt åtte år på å prøve å lære meg fransk, seks år på skolen som valgfag og to år på universitetet. Så et helt år i Frankrike var egentlig det jeg syntes måtte til for å få fransken ordentlig på plass. Siden jeg hadde bodd i en mindre by i Frankrike før, tenkte jeg at jeg skulle gå for den største denne gangen, og da er det bare Paris. Det finnes jo en del skildringer av hvordan og hvorfor Paris er den flotteste og viktigste byen i verden, så det skal jeg la ligge her. Det jeg derimot kan si en del mer om er universitet jeg gikk på, Paris-Sorbonne IV.

Det er to av universitetene i Paris som holder til i det *ekte* Sorbonne, altså den gamle bygningen med borggård, marmor, fresker og kapell med bladgull gjenreist av kardinal Richelieu i første halvdel av 1600-tallet. Det ene er der jeg gikk, og er hovedsakelig viet humaniora. Til vanlig kalles skolen bare La Sorbonne eller Paris IV. Noen av fagene, særlig på lavere nivå, holder til i Centre Universitaire Malesherbes i 17e arrondissement eller i Centre de Clignancourt i 18e. Men all undervisning i filosofi fra og med tredjeåret på bachelornivå er enten på Sorbonne eller på La Maison de Recherche, som også ligger i 5e arrondissement, eller Latinerkvarteret. Alle de eldste og viktigste utdanningsinstitusjonene i Paris ligger rett i nærheten av hverandre, så på andre siden av Rue Saint-Jacques ligger også Lycée Louis-le-Grand og Collège de France (tidligere Collège royal, oppretta av François I i 1530) som opprinnelig bestod av kongens bibliotek og var et alternativ til

universitetene, hvor det ble undervist i disipliner som disse bevisst ignorerte.

I Frankrike innebar nemlig en stor del av Reformasjonen en universitetsreform, hvor det blant annet ble kjempa for at studentene skulle ha *tilgang* til bøkene (og at de ikke bare skulle studeres via professorens forelesninger). Etterhvert ble også de franske universitetene mer slik som vi kjenner dem i dag, og studentene fikk etterhvert også lov til å studere oversatte verk. Likevel er latin, gammelgresk og tysk vanlige fag å ta i tillegg når man studerer filosofi, og man har egne språkfag i filosofi hvor man utelukkende leser tekster på det aktuelle språket. Dette gjelder da også engelsk, og jeg tok et fag som het Anglais hvor vi leste Kuhns *Structure*. Akkurat det er jo litt pussig for oss som til vanlig studerer ved UiO. Men i motsetning til i Norge er så å si *alt* oversatt til fransk. Det er mye vanskeligere å finne Russells *Problems of Philosophy* på engelsk enn det er å finne den på fransk. Hele Paris er stappfullt av små, uavhengige bokhandler, og brukte bøker er ofte svært billige. Dette med språk gjør at det er helt nødvendig å ha et fransknivå som er rimelig solid før man drar ned, med mindre man altså holder seg til språkfagene i filosofi.

Franske universiteter går for å være konservative i undervisningsformen, og da særlig Paris IV. Undervisninga er prega av at professorene anses for å være så å si allvitende. De sitter også på en enorm mengde kunnskap og kan i løpet av en forelesning lire av seg sidevis med ordrette sitater fra de fleste filosofer relevante for emnet. I motsetning til universitetene i Norge forventes det i mye større grad at man skal *mestre* et verk. Hvis faget handler om Husserls *Logique formelle et logique transcendentale* forventes det at man på en skoleeksamen skal kunne plassere et tilfeldig utdrag på sidetallsnivå. Ikke at professoren faktisk vil at man skal skrive hvilke sider i boka utdraget er henta fra, men at man må kunne vite akkurat hva som kommer rett før og hva som kommer like etter, og hvordan utdraget er en del av et mindre, lokalt argument. Denne måten å lære på gjør at franske studenter, i mye større grad enn norske, er flinke til å tilegne seg filosofiske verk i store kvanta. Og etterpå kan de også kaste ut sitat på sitat fra franske oversettelser av alle de store klassikerne i filosofien. Nå går jo Frankrike for være det landet hvis innbyggere leser aller mest, og det gjenspeiles i hvert fall blant studentene på Sorbonne.

Interaksjonen mellom professor og student er også annerledes. I forelesningene kan professoren sitte i tre timer (gjerne uten pause) mens alle studentene tar notater som gale. Og ikke notater i stikkordsform eller med piler og symboler – de fleste transkriberer hele forelesningen og ender opp med å ha 10 velskrevne sider i vakker løkkeskrift. En av professorene jeg hadde ba alltid alle skrive et ark om seg selv i den første timen, hvor han ville vite hvor i løpet man var, hvilke særskilte filosofiske interesser man hadde, hva man skulle skrive om på masteroppgaven, hvilke språk man behersket, om man ville ta en PhD etterhvert og, heldigvis, hvorvidt man var Erasmus eller ikke. Første timen leste han så opp alle arkene om alle 30 studentene eller så, og kommenterte de ulike arkene. Innimellom anbefalte han bøker relevante for masteroppgaven, ble imponert over de usedvanlig språkmektige eller kommenterte at det var festlig at en persons hovedinteresser kunne omfatte både Frege og Heidegger. Resten av semesteret leste han opp navnet til hver student fra arkene, og ble etterhvert ganske så godt kjent med den enkelte. Men jeg hadde også noen forelesere som knapt smilte en eneste gang, som forbød å ta notater på datamaskinen eller som sa, da en student rakte opp hånda i første timen, at dette var en forelesning hvor man ikke stilte spørsmål. Men når man er omkring hundre studenter i et enormt amfiteater er egentlig akkurat det greit for effektiviteten.

Siden jeg reiste gjennom Erasmus hadde jeg tilgang til utrolig mange fag. Jeg tok bare filosofifag (med ett unntak), og kunne da velge mellom alle fag på bachelornivå og alle fag på masternivå. Jeg tok to fag fra tredjeåret på bachelornivå og resten på masternivå, men syntes generelt at det var fryktelig vanskelig å velge med det enorme fagtilbudet. Hvert fag er cirka 5 ECTS, som gjør at man må ha seks fag i semesteret. Når man er vant til å ha kun tre fag i semesteret virker dette litt avskrekkende i begynnelsen, men det går seg egentlig veldig til etterhvert. Det virker også som om professorene har større valgfrihet til å velge hva faget skal handle om, og navnet på faget trengte ikke å stemme overens med temaet i det hele tatt. Jeg hadde for eksempel et fag som het «Epistemologie» fra andreåret på master, men som handla om leibniziske temaer i kontemporær filosofi med særlig vekt på asymmetriske relasjoner. Et utrolig kult fag forøvrig.

Året mitt på Sorbonne har vært lærerikt, spennende og supert på de aller fleste måter. Språket falt også til slutt på plass, og jeg fikk bo i den flotteste byen i verden. Jeg vil nok si at Paris er en perfekt by å studere filosofi i, og at jeg savner det litt mer enn det jeg liker å innrømme.

Jusque dans tous les départements à ses portes/
On revendique tous une appartenance assez forte[2]

NOTER

[1] Flynt: «J'éclaire ma ville» (2007).
[2] (ibid.)

PERSISTENCE: A MATTER OF IDENTITY

MESTERBREV VED SOLVEIG NYGAARD SELSETH

Hva handler masteroppgaven din om?
Oppgaven tar for seg tredimensjonale og firedimensjonale teorier om hvordan ting vedvarer, altså hvordan ting fortsetter å eksistere over tid og gjennom forandring. Jeg setter opp et kort argument som ender i en kontradiksjon når man forsøker å forene identitet gjennom forandring med Leibniz' lov. Deretter diskuterer jeg hovedsakelig to firedimensjonalistiske løsninger: David Lewis' *perdurantism* og Theodore Siders *stage theory*. Begge teoriene fremmer temporale deler, men er uenige i om det er grupper av eller enslige temporale deler som skal anses som vanlige objekter. Dette får flere interessante ringvirkninger som jeg diskuterer i oppgaven.

Hva argumenterer du for/mot i oppgaven?
I diskusjonen av *perdurantism* og *stage theory* ser jeg på problemer og løsninger til hver av teoriene. Mest interessant er kanskje Siders forslag til relasjonen mellom temporale deler av samme vedvarende ting. Siden Sider argumenterer for at det er enslige temporale deler som er de vanlige objektene, trenger han en forklaring på hvordan de forskjellige temporale delene av det vi aksepterer som den samme vedvarende tingen er relatert til hverandre. Teorien han lanserer kalles *temporal gjenpartsteori* (*temporal counterpart theory*) og baserer seg på Lewis' modale gjenpartsteori. I oppgaven foretar jeg en kritisk undersøkelse av oversettelsen av Lewis' teori til en temporal versjon.

Hvorfor bør andre lese oppgaven din?
Oppgaven vil gi en dypere innføring i firedimensjonalisme, og større forståelse for spillerommet innad i teorien. Teksten vil også gi leseren et inntrykk av hvor svakhetene til de firedimensjonalistiske teoriene ligger, og forhåpentligvis pirre leseren til å utforske disse videre.

Hva er dine planer for fremtiden?
Fremover kommer jeg til å utvikle min arbeidskarriere. En gang i fremtiden ønsker jeg å fortsette med en PhD i filosofi, men bare på grunn av min egen interesse for fagfeltet, ikke for arbeidsmulighetene.

INTERVENTIONISM, REALISM AND INVARIANCE – THE KIND OF METAPHYSICS THAT MATTERS

MESTERBREV VED MORI DIAKITE



Hva handler oppgaven din om?
Oppgaven min handler om invariansbegrepets rolle og metafysiske forpliktelser i intervensjonismens rammeverk. Intervensjonisme referer til teorien om kausalitet (og kausal forklaring) utviklet av James Woodward. Den baserer seg på ideen om at kausale relasjoner er utnyttbare for formål om manipulasjon og kontroll. Denne ideen er basert på tanken om at invarians (under intervensjoner) utgjør bindeleddet mellom årsak og virkning, en egenskap kausale relasjoner utviser når de forblir vedvarende under intervensjoner.

I oppgaven gir jeg først en analyse av forholdet mellom metodologi og ontologi i det intervensjonistiske rammeverket, før jeg redegjør for intervensjonismens logikk og semantikk, med særlig henblikk på forholdet mellom invarians, intervensjoner og metafysikk. Oppgavens siste del er en diskusjon av de metafysiske forpliktelsene som følger fra invariansbegrepets formål og egenskaper.

Hva argumenterer du for/mot i oppgaven?
Jeg argumenterer for at intervensjonisme har metafysiske forpliktelser som gjør at realismen Woodward forplikter seg til strekker seg forbi det han betegner som 'moderat realisme'. Konsekvensen av forpliktelsen til realisme og metodologiske og ontologiske hensyn gjør at man ender opp med en 'substansiell realisme', hvor metafysikk spiller en sentral (og selvstendig) rolle i intervensjonismens rammeverk.

Hvorfor bør andre lese oppgaven din?
Oppgaven gir forhåpentligvis innsikt i de ulike avveiningene og problemstillingene knyttet til forholdet mellom metodologi og ontologi. I motsetning til de tradisjonelle dikotomiene mellom subjektivitet og objektivitet, antirealisme og realisme, tegner denne oppgaven et alternativt bilde som fremstiller dem som gjensidig utfyllende i motsetning til gjensidig ekskluderende.

Hva er dine planer for fremtiden?
Mine planer for fremtiden er å utvide min akademiske kompetanse og nedslagsfelt ved å satse på å videreutvikle en interdisiplinær tilnærming til filosofi. Hovedinteressene mine innenfor filosofi er vitenskapsfilosofi, språkfilosofi, epistemologi og metafysikk, så jeg planlegger å fordype meg i ett (eller flere) fagfelt som gir meg mulighet til å arbeide og kombinere filosofisk interesseområde med faglig bruksområde.

FILOSOFIQUIZ

Det åpnes for at gode argumenter kan gjøre flere svar riktige.
Interessante løsningsforslag sendes til **redaksjon@filosofisksupplement.no** *og* kan *belønnes!*

SPØRSMÅL

1. **Hvis du har 3 utsagn *p*, *q*, og *r* som alle kan tilskrives én sannhetsverdi, enten SANN eller USANN, hvor mange mulige kombinasjoner finnes det? (Med andre ord, hvor mange rader vil det være i en sannhetstabell for tre utsagn?)**
2. **I «Two Dogmas of Empiricism» fra 1951 argumenterer W.V.O. Quine imot et påstått skille mellom to typer sannhet. Hvilket?**
3. **Hvem beviste ufullstendighetsteoremene?**
4. **Fyll inn: I følge Leibniz er en nødvendig sannhet en hvis konsept ikke inneholder en _____.**
5. **Hvem skrev «Amicus Plato – amicus Aristoteles – magis amica veritas» (oversatt: «Platon er min venn – Aristoteles er min venn – men min beste venn er sannheten»)?**
6. **I hvilken film fra 1997 møter vi advokaten Fletcher Reede (spilt av Jim Carrey) som på mystisk vis er forhindret fra å lyve et helt døgn som en følge av sønnens bursdagsønske?**
7. **Ifølge Gettier sier den tradisjonelle analysen av kunnskap at «S vet at p hvis og bare hvis (i) p er sann…». Hva er det to andre betingelsene?**
8. **Hva kalles ofte skjemaet «'p' er sann hvis og bare hvis p»?**
9. **Hvis du tar livsløgnen fra gjennomsnittsmennesket, hva mer, ifølge Doktor Relling (5. akt), tar du fra ham med det samme?**
10. **Sant eller usant: Denne setningen er ikke sann.**

SVAR

1. 8 (Mer generelt, for n antall utsagn finnes det 2 mulige tilskrivelser av sannhetsverdi)
2. Skillet mellom analytiske og syntetiske sannheter
3. Kurt Gödel
4. Selvmotsigelse
5. Isaac Newton, Quaestiones Quaedam Philosophicae (cirka 1664)
6. Lystløgneren (Liar Liar)
7. (ii) S tror at p og (iii) S er berettiget i å tro at p.
8. Tarskis T-skjema (hvor «T» står for «truth»)
9. Lykken
10. Svaret kommer an på hvordan du løser løgnerparadokset!

NESTE NUMMER
SANSNING

De fleste tar til enhver tid sansene sine i bruk, men selve det å sanse har vist seg vanskelig å karakterisere. Hva er sansningens objekt, hvor befinner det seg? Hva er forskjellen på sansene, og hva skiller sansningen fra nærliggende fenomener, som intuisjon eller opplevelse?

Er det *gitt* at vi må skille mellom persepsjon og rene sansedata? Empiristene og rasjonalistene har inntatt motsatte posisjoner. I følge Kant var det ikke nok med ren *Anschauung*, for uten begreper er sansningen blind. Er persepsjon en terskelerfaring mellom sansning og begrepslighet? To tusen år tidligere hadde det greske *aisthesis* en bredere anvendelse enn *sansning* har i dag. Fenomenologien ønsket å vende tilbake til denne mer holistiske ideen om sansning, som gikk utover den empiristiske forestillingen. Den rene stimulus på retina er ikke nok for å redegjøre for fenomenet persepsjon, skrev Merleau-Ponty.

Descartes la merke til at sansene av og til bedrar oss. Og vi gjør vel klokt i å mistro de som før har bedratt oss? Et mulig motsvar til en slik skeptisisme er påstanden om at selv kunnskapen om sanselig bedrag oppnås gjennom sanseinntrykk. Spørsmålet som gjerne stilles til skeptikeren er «Uten sanser – hva står man da igjen med?». Fornuften, svares det kanskje. Vel, ifølge indisk og buddhistisk filosofi får fornuften, eller sinnet, rollen som den sjette sansen. Sinnet og mentale objekter er to sider – den eksterne og den interne – av *Āyatana*, eller sansegrunnlaget.

Hvordan gjør vi best rede for hallusinasjon og illusjon i teorier om persepsjon? Er persepsjon og hallusinasjon grunnleggende den samme mentale tilstanden eller er visuelle opplevelser en disjunktiv kategori? Kommer persepsjon med representerende innhold, og i så fall hvilke egenskaper og objekter er representert i persepsjon?

Det er mange måter å belyse sansning på fra et filosofisk perspektiv. Dersom du har en god idé, en ferdig tekst, en skisse du kan arbeide videre med, et tidligere arbeid du vil omarbeide, eller et forslag til intervju eller anmeldelse, er du velkommen til å sende inn bidraget ditt til neste nummer av *Filosofisk supplement*. Vi tar også imot tekster som går utenfor tema.

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Frist for innsending av tekster, utkast, eller ideer er **15. januar 2017**. Du vil få grundig tilbakemelding fra redaksjonen, og hjelp til å arbeide videre med teksten.

Til illustratører

Vi ønsker bidrag som kan illustrere ulike vinklinger av temaet. Illustrasjonene kan være figurative eller abstrakte, små eller store. Filer sendes som 300 ppi/dpi, minimum 15 cm høyde eller bredde, TIFF/JPG, til **illustrasjon@filosofisksupplement.no**, sammen med fullt navn, fødselsår, studiested og adresse. Se våre nettsider for mer informasjon: **filosofisksupplement.no**

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