Forfatter: Hans Robin Solberg

An Interview with Timothy Williamson

PDF tilgjengelig

——–Illustrasjon: Åsne Dorthea Grøgaard——–

Few subjects in modern academia are as self-reflective as philosophy. Much effort has been spent on understanding what the aim of philosophical inquiry is, and which practices and methods will get us there. An instructive way of getting a handle on these issues is to compare philosophy with other forms of inquiry. Look at all the branches of science and see what similarities and dissimilarities in subject matter, aims, and methods between them and philosophy you can find, and maybe that way you’ll learn something about the nature of philosophy. A first question to ask: Is philosophy a science?

Timothy Williamson is the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. He has published influential work in several fields, amongst other philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics. Williamson has also greatly contributed to philosophy’s view of itself, by his writings on the methodology and nature of philosophy. Therefore, when we had the chance to interview Williamson, we decided to ask him about his thoughts on the scientific status of philosophical inquiry, and its relationship to the other sciences. We are happy to present his thoughts on these matters to the reader:

Les mer

Some Thoughts on the Second Gettier Case

In his seminal paper “Is justified true belief knowledge?” Edmund Gettier shows how the classical definition of knowledge which all philosophy students now know by heart, JTB, is not a sufficient definition. In case you haven’t heard the definition I’ll give it here:

S knows p if and only if

(i)                 p is true

(ii)               S believes that p

(iii)             S is justified in believing that p

Gettier gave two counter-examples where the three conditions listed are met but for some reason or other most would deny S knowledge. In this text I’ll willfully forget and ignore most of the discussion that Gettier spawned and only investigate Gettier’s second counter-example or case II.1

Les mer

Er alt verdifullt? Om panverdiisme

I denne teksten skal vi undersøke en mulig konsekvens av å være «ekte fysikalist» slik Galen Strawson er i sin artikkel («Realistic monism») om panpsykisme.1 Teksten er delt i fire. Vi starter med å undersøke Guy Kahanes argument (i «Our Cosmic Insignificance») for at menneskeheten har kosmisk betydelighet.2 Deretter, i del II, ser vi hvordan dette fører til panverdiisme (og muligens panmoralisme) hvis vi antar Strawsons ekte fysikalisme. I del III vurderer vi panverdiisme og sammenligner det med panpsykisme. Til slutt kommer jeg med noen motforestillinger til Strawsons «ekte fysikalisme» og hvordan dette forholder seg de foregående delene. Vi skal altså fra kosmisk betydelighet til panmoralisme, og så videre til emergens – så heng med!

Les mer