-Bilde: Pallas and the Centaur, Botticelli (1482)-
Fredag den 9. november skal Kim Phillips Pedersen, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets femte og siste Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.
Hearing utterances in a familiar language typically provides us with knowledge of what was said by the speaker in making those utterances. For example, hearing your friend utter the sentence, «Hedgehogs have about five thousand spines,» you straight away come to know that she said that hedgehogs have about five thousand spines. How does one come to know what was said in cases like this? Given the phenomenological immediacy with which the knowledge is formed – one seems to just hear the speaker as saying such-and-such – one might think that the knowledge is immediate, not dependent on further knowledge. Many philosophers are committed to this claim. In this talk I will argue that the knowledge is not immediate: knowledge of what is said in ordinary cases depends on further pieces of knowledge – specifically, knowledge of word meanings. I’ll show that knowing what words mean plays an epistemic role, not just a causal one.
Tid: 9. november 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Knowing What Was Said
Foredagsholder: Kim Phillips Pedersen, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi og medlem av ConceptLab ved IFIKK (UiO)
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