Arrangement: Filosofisk fredagsseminar

Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 25. januar 2019

Fredag den 25. januar skal Sivert T. Ellingsen, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO), holde vårsemesterets første Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Tittel på seminaret vil annonseres omtrent to uker i forveien. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Tid: 25. januar 2019, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: (Tittel kommer!)
Foredagsholder: Sivert T. Ellingsen, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 9. november 2018

-Bilde: Pallas and the Centaur, Botticelli (1482)-

Fredag den 9. november skal Kim Phillips Pedersen, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets femte og siste Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Sammendrag:
Hearing utterances in a familiar language typically provides us with knowledge of what was said by the speaker in making those utterances. For example, hearing your friend utter the sentence, «Hedgehogs have about five thousand spines,» you straight away come to know that she said that hedgehogs have about five thousand spines. How does one come to know what was said in cases like this? Given the phenomenological immediacy with which the knowledge is formed – one seems to just hear the speaker as saying such-and-such – one might think that the knowledge is immediate, not dependent on further knowledge. Many philosophers are committed to this claim. In this talk I will argue that the knowledge is not immediate: knowledge of what is said in ordinary cases depends on further pieces of knowledge – specifically, knowledge of word meanings. I’ll show that knowing what words mean plays an epistemic role, not just a causal one.

Tid: 9. november 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Knowing What Was Said
Foredagsholder: Kim Phillips Pedersen, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi og medlem av ConceptLab ved IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 19. oktober 2018

—-Bilde: Melancolia I, Albrecht Dürer (1514)—-

Fredag den 19. oktober skal Joost Vecht, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets fjerde Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter. Foredraget vil bli holdt på engelsk.

Sammendrag:
We regularly make claims that people partially master something. For example, we can say that a student of mathematics has some idea of what a derivative is, but doesn’t fully «get it» yet; or claim that a researcher was «on to something» without quite knowing what it was yet.

I will propose an account of what it means to partially master a mathematical concept. This is not done from any established metaphysical theory, but from an investigation of partial mastery attribution in historical practice. Using a case study of Newton and Leibniz, I show how we frequently re-interpret historical mathematicians who we consider to have «partially grasped» something. I suggest that this offers an argument for an attributive, projective theory of concepts, and against more Fregean theories of grasping fixed concepts.

Tid: 19. oktober 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Partial Mastery of Mathematics
Foredagsholder: Joost Vecht, doktorgradskandidat i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO) og medlem av ConceptLab

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 5. oktober 2018

–Bilde: A Modern Olympia, P. Cézanne (1874)–

Fredag den 5. oktober skal Dag August Schmedling Dramer, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets tredje Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Sammendrag:
My cat and I find ourselves in the kitchen. We are both endowed with excellent visual systems, eyes, that is, allowing us to take in the world in all its multifarious splendor. We perceive the table, the chairs, and the food, my cat and I, and as such, we can be said to perceive the same right? Not so fast, for if perception for us humans is dependent on culture, rationality, or both, then it seems that my cat and I cannot even be said to inhabit the experiential world in the same way, or rather, I as a encultured and rational being inhabit a world, whereas my cat simply respond to an environment. So is the experiential gulf long held to be unbridgeable by Western philosophers, still a thing even in todays exceptional findings in animal cognition studies? Join this Filosofisk fredagsseminar for an epic tour down perception lane, where the end goal of the journey is to find out whether we are warranted in talking about animals and humans as residing in different experiential spaces or not. What can it even mean to say that animals and humans inhabit the world differently? Where does the natural environment end and the cultural world begin? The talk will evolve around the thinkers of my Master Thesis, McDowell, Dreyfus, Gibson and McIntyre

Tid: 5. oktober 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: The Spaces of Human and Animal Perception
Foredagsholder: Dag August Schmedling Dramer, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 14. september 2018

—-Bilde: By the Mediterranean, Cross (1895)—-

Fredag den 14. september skal Ken Mikkelsen, snart uteksaminert Master i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets andre Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Tema for seminaret annonseres omtrent to uker i forveien. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Sammendrag:
The Extended Mind thesis proposed by philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posits that cognitive functions are extended into physical objects. Accordingly, thoughts are not confined to skin and skull. The proposition is that, in a very real way, a smart phone is part of your brain; enabling memory, communication, organisational tasks, and various computational functions. Every development cycle adds to the arsenal of applications these smart devices engage in. As a nexus of cognitive and cultural power, both potential and actual, smart phones enjoy an unprecedented access to our daily lives. But do they make us happy? Do they make us excellent?

To answer this question this talk will delve 2500 years into the past to explore Socratic and Aristotelian insight concerning the eudaimonic life and the nature of knowledge. If I do my job right, you’ll be smashing your phones at the end of the talk.

Key texts:
The Extended Mind (1998), Clark and Chalmers
The Question Concerning Technology (1977), Heidegger
Ion and Phaedrus (400 BC), Platonic dialogues

Tid: 14. september 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Virtual Virtue: Exploring the intersection between smart phones and happiness
Foredagsholder: Ken Mikkelsen, Master-student i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 24. august 2018

—-Bilde: The Rape of the Sabine…, Cortona—-

Fredag den 24. august skal Simon Opheim, snart uteksaminert Master i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), holde høstsemesterets første Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter. Seminar vil bli holdt på engelsk.

Sammendrag:
The metaphysician Sally Haslanger has argued that the concept ‘woman’ should be ameliorated to (roughly) mean ‘oppressed female,’ and consequently eliminated as a possible identity. The pragmatist Richard Rorty, on The other hand, has argued that ‘woman’ should–rather than being reduced to what it may mean today– function as an old identity in which to organize groups where it can be created new, positive, identities as women. Their respective positions reflect their differing attitudes to both philosophy and language. While Haslanger is proposing a (possibly) revisionary definition, she is still concerned with getting something right, that is, for her proposed new definition to properly denote something ‘in the world’: the structural oppression of those with female bodies. Rorty is on the other hand concerned with the need for new concepts and descriptions that fits our vision of what reality should be, in this case women’s vision of what it should be. In this talk I argue that Rorty’s view of language shows us that while Haslanger’s proposal is a good summarization of feminist insights, what we really need is a change, not a sharpening, of our linguistic tools.

Tid: 24. august 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: How should we change language in order to achieve social justice?
Foredagsholder: Simon Opheim, Master-student i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 27. april 2018

-Bilde: Portrett av Kierkegaard, Janssen (1902)-

I høst forsvarte Mattias da Silva Bjartveit sin Master-avhandling Narrative Identity in Kierkegaard: An analysis of Anthony Rudd’s narrative theory of selfhood in Søren Kierkegaard’s Either/Or and The Sickness unto Death–og fredag den 27. april skal han holde vårsemesterets fjerde og siste Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Sammendrag:
I dette seminaret ønsker jeg å presentere Søren Kierkegaard’s teori om selvet, med hovedfokus på verket hans Sykdommen til Døden. Målet med seminaret er å skape en god forståelse rundt Kierkegaard’s syn på selvet og hvordan vi kan best analysere og forstå det kompliserte synet han presenterer i Sykdommen. Kierkegaard’s analyse av selvet i Sykdommen foregår i en negativ forstand, dvs. analysen omhandler mer om hva som ikke er et selv. Dette er best forstått i lys av Kierkegaard’s begrep om fortvilelse og hvordan dette fenomenet er sterkt tilknyttet til hans syn på den negative tilstanden til et selv. Ved å fokus på Kierkegaard’s forståelse om fenomenet fortvilelse vil jeg ekskludere de mest sterke religiøse aspektene ved hans syn på selvet. Dette er grunnet i forsøket om å gjøre Kierkegaard’s teori mer relevant for en kontemporær forståelse av selvet og Kierkegaard’s filosofi, og følgelig vektlegge de mer fenomenologiske og psykologiske aspektene ved et slikt selv. Jeg vil også ta utgangspunkt i Anthony Rudd’s tolkning av det Kierkegaardianske selvet. Rudd’s tolkning viser hvordan et slikt selv er både teleologisk og grunnet i en narrativ selv-forståelse. I lys av dette håper jeg å kunne vise hvordan begreper som fortvilelse, selv-forståelse, selv-konstitusjon, teleologi og narrativ identitet er alle essensielle aspekter ved det Kierkegaardianske selvet, og hvorfor Kierkegaard’s syn på selvet har fortsatt en relevans i et moderne syn på hva personlig identitet og et selv er.

Tid: 27. april 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Kierkegaard og selvet
Foredagsholder: Mattias da Silva Bjartveit, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 6. april 2018

Semesterets tredje Filosofisk fredagsseminar vil bli holdt av Oda Davanger, tidligere redaktør for Filosofisk supplement, og snart uteksaminert Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO). Temaet for foredraget er etnosentrisme og feminisme. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Abstract:
I analyze bell hooks and Uma Narayan’s feminist critiques of mainstream feminism as a political project. In my view, their charge is that feminism is ethno-/Eurocentric. This charge may be analyzed in two forms: (1) the philosophical charge, as feminism is based on Western philosophy and will therefore favor white (Ango-American), middle-class women; and (2) the political charge, where feminist politics tend to favor white (Anglo-American), middle-class women and reinforce elements of slavery and colonialism. These charges prevent feminism from achieving solidarity and sisterhood with all women. The two charges can be analyzed by referring to Audre Lorde’s famous metaphor on how the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. In other words, tools that are derived from Western philosophy, such as reason, objectivity and equality, may not provide feminism with long-term solutions to the problem of patriarchy. One of the reasons for this, pointed out by hooks and Narayan, is that sexism is inextricably, structurally, and ontologically linked to racism and colonialism. Therefore, if feminism only aims to tackle issues related strictly to gender, and not to race or postcolonialism, it will not only run the risk of working in contradictory terms but also risk supporting the very structure it works to dismantle. Several solutions to ethnocentrism in feminism have been proposed, and attempted. These include identity politics, intersectionality, and race-blind rights discourse. These solutions all have problems because they end up essentializing identity in the same way that makes possible the very patriarchal oppression they resist. Feminist poststructuralism offers a way to think about subjectivity and difference that differs from these solutions, but this framework is also risky. Poststructuralism’s notion of ‘radical change’ may end up forfeiting the existing rights and formal equalities that women have fought so hard for. Any solution to feminism’s ethnocentric charges must therefore include an understanding of history, power imbalances, and political reality, while simultaneously attempting to overcome these without resorting to tools that ultimately reinforce them.

Tid: 6. april 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Feminism’s Ethnocentric Problem: The Risk of Reproducing Oppression
Foredagsholder: Oda Davanger, Master-student i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 23. mars 2018

——-Bilde: Blanche of Castile… (ca. 1230)——-

Sara Kasin Vikesdal er doktorgradskandiat i filosofi ved IFIKK (UiO), medlem av forskningsgruppen ConceptLab, og fredag den 23. mars skal hun holde vårsemesterets andre Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Tittelen til seminaret er «The Nature of Thoughts». Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Abstract:
It seems plausible that when someone has a thought about a single individual in a direct way, the content of the thought is transparent to the thinker. For instance, if you believe that Ringo Starr was the drummer for the Beatles, you have a particular person in mind and you believe of that particular person that he has a certain property.

It may seem equally plausible that it is transparent to the thinker whether or not two of her thoughts concern or refer to the same thing. After all, if you have a further belief that Ringo Starr is from Liverpool it will be obvious to you that this thought concerns the same individual as you belief that Ringo was the drummer for the Beatles, and you can use this information to infer that the drummer for the Beatles is from Liverpool. However, it is not the case that sameness of reference is always transparent to thinkers. Let’s say you have a further belief that Richard Starkey was the drummer for the band Rory Storm and the Hurricanes. This thought concerns the same individual that you believe to be the drummer for the Beatles and who was born in Liverpool. In this case, it is possible that you are not aware of this fact: You may fail to know that Richard Starkey and Ringo Starr is the same person. What is puzzling, then, is that even though you may know the content of these thoughts in isolation, you may fail to know whether or not they concern the same individual. This phenomenon has been at the center of many debates within philosophy of language and mind since Frege (1892). It is widely held that it causes problems for a compelling view about the nature of thoughts. I aim to solve these problems. I will propose a new account of the nature of thoughts and use this framework to explain the difference between cases where the fact that two thoughts have the same content is transparent to the thinker and cases where it is not.

Tid: 23. mars 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: The Nature of Thoughts
Foredragsholder: Sara Kasin Vikesdal, doktorgradskandiat i filosofi og medlem av ConceptLab ved IFIKK (UiO)

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Filosofisk fredagsseminar, 9. februar 2018

——Bilde: The Kiss, Gustav Klimt (1907-8)——-

Forrige april forsvarte Monica Roland sin doktorgradsavhandling i filosofi, døpt What is Love?, ved Universitetet i Oslo–og fredag den 9. februar skal hun holde vårsemesterets første Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Tema for seminaret annonseres omtrent to uker i forveien. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.

Abstract:
One of the hottest topics in analytic philosophy right now is love. But how are we to understand this phenomenon? What is love? When asked this question, most people refer to the affective aspect of love; love is something that one feels for another person. Furthermore, most people seem to agree that love also has a motivational component; love and what we care about affect our motives and behavior. More controversial, however, is the idea that love is inherently moral, as well as the claim that love is responsive to reasons.

In this talk I will address these more controversial ideas and some of the arguments against them. I will defend the idea that love is a moral emotion; you cannot love someone without respecting them. Furthermore, I will argue that there are normative reasons for love; we have reasons to love some people over others.

Tid: 9. februar 2018, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: Love, Morality, and Reasons
Foredragsholder: Monica Roland, doktor i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO)

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