Fredag den 25. januar skal Sivert T. Ellingsen, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO), holde vårsemesterets første Filosofisk fredagsseminar. Seminaret vil bestå av et foredrag på omtrent en time, etterfulgt av en pause på et kvarter, og avsluttes med en spørsmålsrunde på 30 minutter.
Abstract:
There is a widespread intuition that in some sense, all human beings share the same basic — and unusually strong — moral rights simply in virtue of being human. Among other things, this intuition seems to be the basis for much of our current concern and preoccupation with human rights. Philosophers, however, often discount it, accusing it of having its roots in irrational biases like speciesism — our purportedly unresonable privileging of our own species over other species. And indeed, it has proven difficult to identify any properties that could plausibly ground such a strong form of human moral equality. Assuming that mere membership in the human species has no intrinsic moral relevance, what sort of morally relevant difference could it make? What sort of «rightsmaking» property could be had, and had to the same degree, by all human beings? Recently, however, S. Matthew Liao has suggested that what he calls the genetic basis for moral agency (which, he argues, is plausibly had by all human organisms) is a strong candidate for such a «rightsmaking» property. Notably, Liao gives no positive arguments for this view, and questions whether such arguments are even possible or necessary. In this talk, I explain, defend, and develop Liao’s genetic account of rightholding. I also break with it in places, most notably by sketching out a positive argument for it.
Tid: 25. januar 2019, kl. 18.15-20
Sted: Seminarrom 219, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Tittel: «The Genetic Account of Rightholding»
Foredagsholder: Sivert T. Ellingsen, Master i filosofi fra IFIKK (UiO)
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